Cave v. Rudolph

• Decision Date: 05 March 1923
• Docket Number: 3799.
• Citation: 287 F. 989
• Parties: CAVE et al. v. RUDOLPH et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

287 F. 989

CAVE et al. v. RUDOLPH et al.

No. 3799.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia.

March 5, 1923

Submitted October 24, 1922.

Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

N.C. Turnage and C. F. Claxton, both of Washington, D.C., for appellants.

F. H Stephens and R. L. Williams, both of Washington, D.C., for appellees.

Before SMYTH, Chief Justice, ROBB, Associate Justice, and MARTIN Judge of the United States Court of Customs Appeals.

MARTIN Acting Associate Justice.

On the 12th of August, 1921, the commissioners of the District of Columbia enacted a regulation, to become effective on the 30th day thereafter, in the following terms, to wit:

'Section 13. A driver of a public vehicle for hire shall not stop or loiter upon a street except at a public hack stand or while actually taking on or discharging a passenger. ' Article IV, section 13, Police Regulations of the District of Columbia.

The authority under which the commissioners acted when passing the regulation is to be found in an act of Congress (24 Stat. 368, Sec. 1), which reads in part as follows:

'That the commissioners of the District of Columbia be, and they are hereby, authorized and empowered to make, modify, and enforce usual and reasonable police regulations in and for said District, as follows:

'Fourth. To make needful regulations for the orderly disposition of carriages or other vehicles assembled on streets or public places, and to require vehicles upon such streets and avenues as they deem necessary to pass along on the right side thereof.

'Tenth. To regulate the movements of vehicles on the public streets and avenues for the preservation of order and the protection of life and limb.'

Afterwards by a joint resolution Congress provided that, in addition to the foregoing authority, the commissioners shall be empowered to make and enforce all such reasonable and usual police regulations--

'as they may deem necessary for the protection of lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of all persons and the protection of all property within the District of Columbia.' 27 Stat. 394, Sec. 2.

After the enactment of the regulation, and before it became effective, the appellants filed a bill in equity in the Supreme Court of the District, against the commissioners and the major and superintendent of police, praying for an injunction to prevent them from enforcing it.

In their petition the plaintiffs averred that they are engaged in the business of transporting passengers for hire upon the streets of the District, at such lawful rates of fare as may be agreed upon by individual contracts between themselves and their passengers; that their principal source of employment consists of such casual calls as may be made for their services upon the streets, at points which are convenient for prospective passengers; that they are not permitted to solicit business upon the streets, except by displaying a sign upon their vehicles; that their business is commonly known as 'public hacking,' and is in competition with so-called 'private hackers,' who are supposed to depend for employment upon messages sent to their offices or garages; that about 892 motor vehicles are now employed in the business of public hacking in the District; that nevertheless under said ordinance the defendants have established hackstands, which will accommodate only 195 vehicles, although room for 61 more is contemplated; that the locations of those already established are inconvenient and unsatisfactory; and that by reason thereof the great majority of the persons engaged in the said business will be practically excluded from the use of the streets, and from the ordinary and reasonable pursuit of their lawful occupation.

They say, furthermore, that there is approximately $1,000,000 invested in the business of public hacking in the District, with about 1,000 persons employed therein, and that if said ordinance be enforced it will result in irreparable injury to plaintiffs and others similarly employed, for which they would have no adequate remedy at law. They claim that the ordinance is unreasonable, arbitrary, and discriminatory; that it would deprive the appellants of a reasonable opportunity to pursue their lawful and useful calling, and would tend in practice to build up a monopoly of said business in favor of the private hackers aforesaid; and for these reasons and others incident thereto they claim that the ordinance is illegal and void. They therefore prayed for an injunction as aforesaid, and for general relief.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the petition upon grounds which amounted to a general demurrer thereto. The court sustained the motion, and dismissed the petition. The defendants appealed.

We sustain the decision of the trial court upon the following grounds:

1. It is of course axiomatic that in general courts of equity will not take jurisdiction of causes for which there exists a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law. 21 Corpus Juris, p. 41. In the instant case the issue relates to the validity of the aforesaid ordinance. The ordinance, however, can only be enforced against the plaintiffs by an arrest and prosecution before the police court of the District. That court is a law court, upon which jurisdiction in such cases has been conferred by statute; and in case of an arrest under the ordinance the defendant would be entitled to contest its validity in that court upon the same principles as would be applicable in a court of equity. If the ordinance should be found invalid at law, the defendant would be discharged. Furthermore, the decision of the police court in such a case would be reviewable upon a writ of error to this court. It appears accordingly that the final relief of such a defendant, and the mode of obtaining it, at law, would be as efficient as in equity; and that in either case the decision upon the ordinance would be reviewable by this court.

Nor does the possibility of a multiplicity of arrests and trials in such cases, pending a final decision of the question avail to bring the issue within the jurisdiction of equity; for if a party should elect to repeatedly violate the ordinance before a final decision could be had concerning its validity, he could not complain of its enforcement against him...