McKeon v. Daley, 5:98-CV-193.
| Decision Date | 24 May 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 5:98-CV-193.,5:98-CV-193. |
| Citation | 101 F.Supp.2d 79 |
| Parties | Mary R. McKEON, Plaintiff, v. Michael E. DALEY, Individually, and as District Attorney for the County of Herkimer, State of New York; John Ahern, Individually, and as an employee, agent and servant of the New York State Police; and The County of Herkimer, State of New York, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
L. John Van Norden, Schenectady, NY, for plaintiff.
Carter, Conboy, Case, Blackmore, Napierski & Maloney, P.C., Albany, NY, for defendant Daley & Herkimer County, Blair W. Todt, of counsel.
Hon. Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York, Department of Law, Albany, NY, for defendant, Ahern.
Plaintiff, Mary R. McKeon ("plaintiff"), commenced the instant action on February 5, 1998, alleging violations of her constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, the New York State Constitution, and state common law. Defendants Michael E. Daley, Individually, and as District Attorney for the County of Herkimer, State of New York ("Daley" or "District Attorney") and The County of Herkimer, State of New York ("Herkimer County") move to dismiss plaintiff's complaint in its entirety as to each pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and/or Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Oral argument was held on February 11, 2000 in Utica, New York. Decision was reserved.
The chronology of events, as drawn from the papers submitted by each party, is set forth below. Prior to September 1996, Daley was prosecuting New York State police officer Thomas Rathburn ("Rathburn") for various assault crimes. Concurrently, attorney Jeffrey Rheinhardt ("Rheinhardt") was representing the City of Little Falls, New York, in an Article 75 proceeding against Rathburn. At a meeting between Daley and Rheinhardt in September 1996, Rheinhardt informed Daley that an individual named Mary McMahon had filed a criminal complaint against him in Cambridge, Massachusetts on or around March 18, 1996, alleging an assault (the "Cambridge Complaint"). The Cambridge Complaint was purportedly filed several days after Rathburn had failed a polygraph examination (presumably in the course of Daley's prosecution of him). Rheinhardt, having determined that he was not in Massachusetts on the date in question, asked the District Attorney to inquire further into the false complaint.
Daley also claims that John Speer ("Speer"), a part time Assistant District Attorney, was present at the meeting. Speer stated that in or around January or February 1996, his private client, Mary McKeon, had asked him if he knew someone named Jeffrey Rheinhardt, and further stated that Rheinhardt was "doing something bad" to a friend of hers. Daley was informed that plaintiff had ties to the Boston area, and then learned that the police officers who had taken the complaint recalled the complainant. Daley submits that he and others (non-experts) subsequently compared a handwriting exemplar of plaintiff Mary McKeon with Mary McMahon's signature on the criminal complaint, and determined they were remarkably similar. Daley contacted the State Police and requested an investigator. Defendant John Ahern ("Ahern") was assigned.
According to plaintiff's complaint, on October 2, 1996, Ahern appeared at plaintiff's residence in the early afternoon and presented her with a subpoena directing her to appear that morning as a witness before a grand jury at the Herkimer County Courthouse. The subpoena was allegedly issued by Daley in his capacity as the District Attorney for the County of Herkimer, New York. Ahern entered plaintiff's residence, and subsequently transported her by automobile to the courthouse. See Compl. ¶¶ 10-16. Plaintiff testified at her deposition that Ahern threatened to place handcuffs on her unless she rode with him to the courthouse (plaintiff would have preferred to drive with her daughter, who followed them to the courthouse). See Todt Aff.Ex. D at 103, 107-111.
Plaintiff admits in her deposition testimony, however, that she agreed to accompany Ahern to the courthouse after conversing with her attorney on the telephone.1 See id. at 236. Plaintiff further stated that her attorney also spoke with Ahern while they were still at plaintiff's residence, and thereafter advised her to go with Ahern, and that he would meet her at the courthouse. See id. at 92-93.
Plaintiff met her attorney at the courthouse and was apparently afforded time for a private conversation in an empty room. See id. at 121-130. Plaintiff was then questioned by Daley in his office concerning the Cambridge Complaint. Plaintiff's attorney was present for the duration of the questioning. See id. at 131-134. According to plaintiff's complaint, the District Attorney allegedly "demanded that Plaintiff appear before a grand jury and testify that Rathburn [sic] had counseled, importuned, directed and/or coerced her to file false charges against Rheinhardt in Cambridge, Massachusetts on March 18, 1996, under a grant of immunity." Compl. ¶ 21. Plaintiff denied any involvement with the Cambridge Complaint. She was nevertheless given a subpoena to appear on October 9, 1996, and she agreed to have her photograph taken before leaving the courthouse (according to plaintiff's testimony, her attorney first advised her that she was not required to consent to the photograph). See Todt Aff.Ex. D at 141-143.
Ahern has submitted an affidavit with defendants' motion denying that he appeared at plaintiff's home on October 2, 1996. Ahern asserts that he was not in the State of New York on that date due to military service obligations. Rather, defendants claim that Ahern contacted plaintiff at her home on October 7, 1996, served her with a subpoena directing her to appear before a grand jury on October 9, 1996, and requested that she discuss the Rheinhardt matter further with Daley. Defendants state that no subpoena was issued requiring plaintiff to appear on October 7, 1996 (nor for October 2, 1996), but that plaintiff was called only for October 9, 1996, and voluntarily met with Daley on October 7, 1996, after conversations with her attorney. Ahern testified at his deposition that he did not transport plaintiff to the courthouse in his car.
Defendants claim that following the District Attorney's questioning of plaintiff, Ahern traveled to Cambridge, Massachusetts, and interviewed the two police officers who had taken the complaint against Rheinhardt. Each officer selected plaintiff's photograph from a photo array of six other individuals, and identified plaintiff as the person who filed the criminal complaint against Rheinhardt.
There is no dispute that on October 9, 1996, plaintiff appeared before a grand jury pursuant to a subpoena issued by the District Attorney's office. Plaintiff gave testimony in the presence of Daley, and continued to deny that she was involved in filing false criminal charges against Rheinhardt in Cambridge. Following her testimony, Daley informed a uniformed officer that he had witnessed plaintiff commit the crime of perjury, and that she should be arrested. She was arrested and charged with the crime of perjury before a grand jury based on her testimony that day. Bail was set in the amount of $5,000.00. She remained in the Herkimer County Sheriff's Department for approximately six hours, and was then released on bail. On April 3, 1997, a grand jury returned an indictment against plaintiff, charging her with perjury in the first degree in violation of § 210.15 of the Penal Law of the State of New York.
At a subsequent Wade hearing in April 1997, plaintiff was directed to sit in a courtroom among many of her female family members. In this context, the two witnesses from Cambridge, Massachusetts, (the parties dispute whether such witnesses were police or court officers) were unable to positively identify her as the individual who filed the complaint against Rheinhardt. Plaintiff alleges that despite "the failure of the prosecution's proof" defendants subsequently persisted in their prosecution of plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 46. On September 2, 1997, the indictment for perjury against plaintiff was dismissed. Acting Supreme Court Justice Patrick L. Kirk's written decision nevertheless stated that:
The People have consistently set forth the theory that the victim [Rheinhardt] in this case was set up as a retaliation or as an attempt to intimidate due to the victim's involvement in the prosecution of a defendant in another case who was a former police officer [Rathburn]. From the Court's participation in both matters it agrees with the People's theory, and as such, believes there was harm caused by the act which gave rise to the grand jury investigation...
Todt Aff.Ex. I. Justice Kirk's decision, however, explained that dismissal was necessary because certain facts relied on by the prosecution could not be used at trial. Defendants have also submitted an affidavit from Justice Kirk to this effect.
Based on the above facts, plaintiff's complaint alleges that while acting under color of state law, defendants violated her rights protected under the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as enumerated below:
Plaintiff was wrongfully arrested on October 2, 1996 pursuant to invalid legal process and without legal authority, unlawfully subjected to custodial interrogation, threatened with prosecution, unlawfully photographed, entrapped, forced to testify before a grand jury for the purpose of manufacturing a basis to effect her wrongful arrest, improperly and unlawfully investigated and accused of wrongdoing, forced to waive her privilege against self incrimination, deprived of the benefit of legal counsel, unlawfully arrested on a false and unsubstantiated charge of perjury, wrongfully held in custody, deprived of her freedom and liberty, subjected to search, subject to ridicule,...
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