McKeon v. Lennon

• Decision Date: 31 December 2013
• Docket Number: No. 34709.,34709.
• Citation: 147 Conn.App. 366,83 A.3d 639
• Parties: Maria F. McKEON v. William P. LENNON.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

147 Conn.App. 366

83 A.3d 639

Maria F. McKEON

v.William P. LENNON.

No. 34709.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 9, 2013.

Decided Dec. 31, 2013.

Maria F. McKeon, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).

Proloy K. Das, with whom was Debra C. Ruel, Hartford, for the appellee (defendant).

BEACH, BEAR and LAVERY, Js.

BEAR, J.

The plaintiff, Maria F. McKeon, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion to compel the defendant, William P. Lennon, to pay for one half of their now adult son Craig's auto insurance, pursuant to a postdissolution judgment stipulation. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) the trial court erred in denying the motion to compel on the ground of ambiguity in the stipulation; (2) even if this court agrees with the trial court that the stipulation is ambiguous, this court still should reject the defendant's interpretation that the termination of the stipulation self-executed upon Craig's graduation from high school; and (3) the trial court erred in denying the motion to compel when the defendant had not filed a motion to modify. Although we disagree with the trial court as to the ambiguity of the stipulation, we nonethelessaffirm the judgment of the trial court. ¹

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of the present appeal. This matter previously was before this court in McKeon v. Lennon, 131 Conn.App. 585, 588, 27 A.3d 436, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 901, 31 A.3d 1178 (2011), which we cite for relevant facts: “The parties were married on August 29, 1981. During the course of their marriage, the parties had three children, none of whom had reached the age of majority by August 3, 2005, when the plaintiff initiated the action to dissolve the parties' marriage. Following a ten day trial, the court rendered judgment dissolving the parties' marriage on December 31, 2007. The court issued a wide range of orders in connection with the dissolution judgment, including, among other things, orders regarding the custody and care of the parties' minor children, the children's medical care and finances, the distribution of the parties' real and personal property, and the payment of child support and alimony as well as the parties' tax liabilities.”

The parties subsequently entered into a postjudgment stipulation on September 2, 2009, in order to resolve certain postjudgment issues. One of these issues was the payment of automobile related expenses for their son Craig, who was born on November 19, 1991. We note that Craig was sixteen years old when the court rendered the dissolution judgment and seventeen years old when the parties entered into the stipulation.

The stipulation provides in relevant part: “In resolution of Defendant's Post–Judgment Motion for Contempt regarding 2007 Estimated Tax Payment (# 312), the following orders shall enter:

“4.1 Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff one-half of Craig's auto insurance and one-half of the difference for insuring Plaintiff's automobile with and without Craig on the policy, provided that Plaintiff elects a $500 deductible for both Craig's policy and the policy covering her own vehicle.

“4.2 The parties agree to carry $500 deductibles on their respective auto insurance policies and further agree to equally share the $500 deductible if Craig has an accident or causes property damage to his car or either of the parties' cars. Notwithstanding the foregoing, neither parent shall be prohibited from seeking reimbursement from Craig for his or her share of the deductible as he or she sees fit.

“4.3 As of September 2, 2009, Defendant's share of the above-outlined auto insurance expenses is $1,247.00, payable as set forth in Section 4.5 below.

“4.4 In resolution of Defendant's claim for estimated tax payments, the parties agree that Plaintiff owes Defendant $823.00 as reimbursement for Defendant's share of the joint 2007 first quarter estimated tax payment that was erroneously credited to Plaintiff by IRS, payable, as set forth in Section 4.5 below.

“4.5 In reconciliation of Sections 4.3 and 4.4 above, Defendant shall immediately pay to Plaintiff $424.00.” ²

The defendant stopped paying for one half of Craig's auto insurance in October, 2011; Craig was nineteen years old at that time. On January 30, 2012, the plaintiff filed a “Motion to Compel Re: Defendant's Refusal to Pay Car Insurance as Required by Stipulation Post–Judgment,” in which she requested that the court order the defendant to comply with his obligation under the stipulation to pay for one half of Craig's auto insurance. She stated that the defendant was refusing to pay unless she “turn[ed] over legal title of the vehicle to Craig (which the court specifically ordered was to be titled in her name), as well as [went] through the process of registering the car and unregistering the car each time Craig [came] home from school to save a few dollars.” She argued that the stipulation clearly and unambiguously requires the defendant to pay for one half of Craig's auto insurance without conditions and that the defendant should have taken legal action and not engaged in self-help in order to modify his obligation under the stipulation.

The court denied the motion without issuing a memorandum of decision on April 30, 2012. The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration and/or reargument on May 17, 2012, which the court denied on the same day. The plaintiff then filed the present appeal on June 4, 2012. On August 27, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion for articulation, which the court granted in part on September 20, 2012. The court articulated in relevant part: “Here, the September 2, 2009 stipulation is ambiguous. The September 2, 2009 stipulation is silent as to when the defendant's obligation to pay one half of Craig's car insurance terminates. The court is unable to determine from the language of the stipulation whether the defendant's obligation is a onetime occurrence; whether it terminates upon Craig reaching the age of majority; or whether it terminates when Craig graduates from college. Surely, the defendant's obligation to pay one half of Craig's car insurance cannot be forever.”

Before we address the plaintiff's claims, “[w]e initially set forth the well established standard of review and principles of law relevant to the plaintiff's appeal. The standard of review in family matters is well settled. An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented.... It is within the province of the trial court to find facts and draw proper inferences from the evidence presented.... In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McKeon v. Lennon, supra, 131 Conn.App. at 597, 27 A.3d 436.

In domestic relations cases, “[a] judgment rendered in accordance with ... a stipulation of the parties is to be regarded and construed as a contract.... Accordingly, [o]ur resolution of the [plaintiff's] claim is guided by the general principles governing the construction of contracts. A contract must be construed to effectuate the intent of the parties, which is determined from the language used interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Guaragno v. Guaragno, 141 Conn.App. 337, 344, 61 A.3d 1119 (2013).

“[T]he intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and ... the language used must be accorded its common, natural and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract.... Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms. A court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity.... Similarly, any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used in the contract rather than from one party's subjective perception of the terms.... [T]he mere fact that the parties advance different interpretations of the language in question does not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous....

“[I]n construing contracts, we give effect to all the language included therein, as the law of contract interpretation ... militates against interpreting a contract in a way that renders a provision superfluous.... If a contract is unambiguous within its four corners, intent of the parties is a question of law requiring plenary review.... When the language of a contract is ambiguous, the determination of the parties' intent is a question of fact, and the trial court's interpretation is subject to reversal on appeal only if it is clearly erroneous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Prymas v. New Britain, 122 Conn.App. 511, 517–18, 3 A.3d 86, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 915, 4 A.3d 833 (2010). “To identify and to apply the appropriate standard of review, we must, therefore, initially determine whether the agreement ... was unambiguous.” Bijur v. Bijur, 79 Conn.App. 752, 760, 831 A.2d 824 (2003).

I

In her first claim, the plaintiff asks us to hold that the court erred in denying her motion to compel on the ground of ambiguity in the stipulation provision, because the lack of an end date in the provision clearly and plainly indicates that the parties intended for the obligation to apply “until they decided to modify their agreement.” The plaintiff further argues with respect to the court's finding of ambiguity that the court was required to determine the intent of the parties once it determined that the provision was ambiguous, but it did not do so and instead relied on the mere existence of...