McKeon v. State for Use of Conrad

• Decision Date: 12 December 1956
• Docket Number: No. 38,38
• Citation: 211 Md. 437,127 A.2d 635
• Parties: Francis Daniel McKEON v. STATE of Maryland, for the USE of Olive M. CONRAD and Rosella M. Conrad.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 437

211 Md. 437

127 A.2d 635

Francis Daniel McKEON v. STATE of Maryland, for the USE of Olive M. CONRAD and Rosella M. Conrad.

No. 38.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 12, 1956.

David W. Byron and Irvine H. Rutledge, Hagerstown (Lane, Bushong & Byron, Hagerstown, on the brief), for appellant.

Ernest V. Wachs, Hagerstown, for appellee.

Before BRUNE, C. J., and COLLINS, HENDERSON, HAMMOND and PRESCOTT, JJ.

PRESCOTT, Judge.

The appellant was the driver of an automobile which was involved in a collision with an automobile driven by Evelyn Conrad, a sister of the appellees, near Hagerstown on July 5, 1954. Evelyn Conrad died five days later of injuries received in the collision. Two suits were filed against him, one by the executor for medical expenses, pain and suffering and one by the appellees for pecuniary loss under Article 67 generally referred to as 'Lord Campbell's Act'.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the executor's suit of $8,538.71. In the Lord Campbell's suit the jury found on the issues submitted to them that the sisters were 'wholly dependent' upon Evelyn Conrad and returned a verdict of $7,650,--apportioned $3,600 to Olive and $4,050 to Rosella.

This appeal is taken in the Lord Campbell's suit only and is from the refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury that the appellees were not 'wholly dependent' upon their deceased sister, Evelyn Conrad.

At the time of her death, Evelyn Conrad lived in Arlington, Va., and worked in Washington as a Clerk for the Department of the Army. She was 57 years old and unmarried. She left surviving her three brothers and three sisters, including Olive and Rosella. The three surviving brothers were married and had families of their own. At the time of their sister's death in 1954, Olive was 69 years of age, and Rosella 67. Like their sister, Evelyn, they had never married. The two lived together on the main street in Chest Springs, Pa., in the house which had belonged to their mother, whose death occurred in 1933. Under the terms of her will, their mother left to her children this house, an adjoining lot, owned by Evelyn at the time of her death, on which a gas station was located and three other lots in Chest Springs. The will provided, in part:

'That as long as two or more of those children who have not married, wish to live in the home at Chest Spring, that this part of the estate and the adjoining lot shall not be sold.'

The support furnished by Evelyn to her two sisters consisted of a check for $15 sent to them each month, which was supplemented by a check in the amount of $25 each month from the tenant of the gas station owned by Evelyn, making monthly cash payments to the two sisters together of $40. Both sisters testified that Evelyn paid, in addition, bills which Olive estimated came to $35 a month. These took the form of contributions to their church, insurance premiums on Rosella's life, doctor bills for Rosella and taxes and repairs to the house. Both sisters estimated they collectively received from Evelyn the equivalent of $75 per month.

The house in which the sisters lived was a seven-room three-bedroom house. Olive testified it was worth $2,400; and that she and her sister paid no rent.

In addition to their interest in their mother's property, Olive and Rosella had an interest in the estate of their deceased brother, Alex, who died in 1951, and whose estate apparently had not been distributed at the time of the trial of this case. Bernard Conrad, a brother and executor of Evelyn's estate, stated he did not know the size of his deceased brother's estate, but Olive testified it was $995, which she said would go to her father's and mother's estate. Olive also testified that her brother left her, Rosella, and Evelyn his share in the homeplace. Olive estimated the value of the three lots in Chest Springs, left under her mother's will, at $50 apiece.

Both sisters testified they were not employed at the time of Evelyn's death. Rosella stated she never worked in her life. Olive stated she had not been employed for twenty-six years since she had lost her employment. Olive testified she never required medical care, but Rosella said she required it constantly.

The sole question here presented is whether Olive and Rosella Conrad were, 'as a matter of fact', 'wholly dependent' upon their deceased sister, Evelyn Conrad, at the time of her death July 10, 1954, so as to enable them to bring suit under Act. 67, Sec. 4 of the Code of Maryland 1951. The appellant, of course, contends the facts do not show them to have been 'wholly dependent' under the statute, and the appellees maintain the facts do.

Prior to 1852, under the common law, Maryland permitted no recovery for pecuniary loss suffered by a relative of one killed by the negligence of another. In that year, the Legislature enacted Ch. 299 of the Acts of 1852, which provided an action at law for the benefit of a wife, husband, parent and child of a person whose death shall have been caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another, against the person wrongfully causing said death. The list of persons entitled to recover under the then Sec. 2 of the above Act, remained the same until 1937, when it was enlarged to permit recovery by the mother of an illegitimate child and by an illegitimate child when the deceased person was the mother of such child. In 1952, the Legislature again added to this list by including relatives of the deceased who met certain dependency qualifications, but only if there were no surviving wife, husband, parent or child. The pertinent part of the present law, Art. 67, Sec. 4, reads:

'Every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child of the person whose death shall have been so caused or if there be no such person or persons entitled, then any person related to the deceased by blood or marriage, who, as a matter of fact, was wholly dependent upon the person whose death shall have been so caused.' (Italics supplied.)

It will be noted in the above, if the action be brought by the surviving wife, husband, parent or child, he or she must establish the amount that the deceased had, and probably would continue to have, contributed to his or her support, but need not prove dependency. More distant relatives, to the contrary, must prove they were 'wholly dependent' in order to have any standing in court. This seems to be the effect of the words 'as a matter of fact'. In some of the workmen's compensation statutes, close relatives are extended a presumption concerning dependency, while more remote ones are not, but are required to establish dependency by affirmative proof. This, clearly, is the import of 'as a matter of fact' in our statute. In Jones v. Jones, 45 Md. 144, 159, this Court cited, with approval, a case that held evidence of cohabitation and repute was insufficient to establish a first marriage, notwithstanding both parties to it were dead, but such marriage should 'as an actual fact' be proved; that all mere presumption of the previous marriage, founded simply upon habit and repute, was at once overthrown, and it then became incumbent to establish the alleged marriage by more direct proof.

We are strongly urged to hold that our 'Lord Campbell's Act' is in derogation of the common law, and therefore should be strictly construed. This Court has so held on at least two occasions: Demczuk v. Jenifer, 138 Md. 488, 114 A. 471, and State to Use of Dunnigan v. Cobourn, 171 Md. 23, 187 A. 881, 107 A.L.R. 1045; and we see no necessity to hold to the contrary now.

The primary and fundamental purposes in construing and interpreting a statute are to ascertain, and to carry out, the true intention of the law. The object of all rules, canons of construction and maxims is to act as aids and guides in discovering the real legislative intent. They are not completely rigid and intractable and must give way to a clear intention to the contrary.

'Strict construction' means that a statute is not to be construed beyond its natural meaning, In re Bragg's Estate, 106 Mont. 132, 76 P.2d 57, 63. The term is not a precise but a relative expression varying in degree according to the character of the law being construed, Cummins v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 334 Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d 920. It is not the exact converse of liberal construction for it does not consist in giving the words of a statute the narrowest meaning of which they are susceptible (Ibid.), and 'strict construction' is in no way violated if the words of a statute are given their full meaning. Franklin County Coal Co. v. Ames, 359 Ill. 178, 194 N.E. 268. The term 'excludes mere implications, but does not require a literal and blind adhesion to mere words.' Dissenting opinion in Bowman v. Little, 101 Md. 273, 61 A. 223, 657, 1084. See, to like effect, Glickfield v. State, 203 Md. 400, 101 A.2d 229.

'Dependent' has been defined by this Court as one who relies wholly or in part upon another for the...