McKerall & Murchison v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 March 1907
• Citation: 56 S.E. 965,76 S.C. 338
• Parties: McKERALL & MURCHISON v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

56 S.E. 965

76 S.C. 338

McKERALL & MURCHISON v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

March 19, 1907

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Marion County; Gage Judge.

Action by McKerall & Murchison against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company. From an order of the circuit court affirming a judgment of the magistrate, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Montgomery & Lide, for appellant. M. C. Woods, for respondent.

JONES J.

The plaintiffs sued defendant company in a magistrate court for $78 damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of delay in the transportation of a gasoline engine and shafting, and recovered judgment for the full amount claimed, which was affirmed by the circuit court.

The testimony tended to show that the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, on October 5, 1905, issued a bill of lading at Bordentown, N. J., for one gasoline engine and one bundle of shafting, consigned to plaintiffs at Marion, S.C Defendant's transfer clerk, at Columbia, S. C., received a shipment for plaintiffs on October 18th, and shipped same on October 20th to Marion. The engine arrived at Marion on October 23d or 24th, and notice was given to plaintiff, and about three weeks or a month later the shafting arrived, and notice was given to plaintiff. It usually requires from 10 to 12 days to transport freight from New Jersey to Columbia, S C., and 2 days from Columbia to Marion. On October 7, 1905, plaintiff presented the bill of lading to defendant's agent at Marion and made inquiry as to the articles, and was informed that it would require about 10 days for the shipment to arrive. Plaintiff testified that he told defendant's agent at Marion, before the arrival of the engine and shafting, that he wanted the engine and shafting for a boat right away, and would have to order another outfit, which he did; the last ordered outfit arriving before or about the time of the first. The articles in question were delivered to plaintiffs in good condition and were placed in their storeroom, packed up. Plaintiffs testified that the cash price of the goods was $78.15, that the articles were not in their line, were of no value to them, were a dead loss to them, that the shafting was worth $5, that no effort had been made to dispose of the goods, and that the order was a special one for J. D. Murchison, one of the plaintiffs.

1. The first exception alleges error in affirming the refusal of the magistrate to instruct the jury that if defendant is not liable for delay in delivering the engine, but is liable for delay in delivering the shafting, that only damages for delay in delivering the shafting could be recovered. The circuit judge properly sustained the ruling of the magistrate, as the request to charge did not meet the view that the engine and shafting constituted a whole, and a failure to deliver a part is a failure to deliver the whole, if the part is necessary to make the whole effective.

2. The magistrate charged the jury that "the measure of damages is the difference in the value of the goods to plaintiffs when they should have arrived and when they did arrive; in other words, if the defendant has been negligent, what plaintiffs have lost owing to such negligence. Value of a thing is what one can get for it in the market, or what it may be worth to him otherwise if he does not care to sell it." The circuit court sustained this charge, and the second exception alleges error (1) in making the value of the goods to plaintiff only the standard of comparison, instead of the market value; (2) in that the market value of the goods cannot be disregarded because a party might not wish to sell. The true measure of damages...