McKinley v. Clarke County

• Decision Date: 06 August 1940
• Docket Number: 45132.
• Citation: 293 N.W. 449,228 Iowa 1185
• Parties: McKINLEY v. CLARKE COUNTY et al.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

293 N.W. 449

228 Iowa 1185

McKINLEY v. CLARKE COUNTY et al.

No. 45132.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

August 6, 1940

Appeal from District Court, Warren County; Norman R. Hays, Judge.

Action by surviving spouse of county engineer to recover workman's compensation for his accidental death arising out of and in the course of the performance of his duties. The District Court denied the claim for compensation, and plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

O. M Slaymaker, R. E. Killmar, and D. D. Slaymaker, all of Osceola, for appellant.

Miller, Huebner & Miller, of Des Moines, for appellees.

OLIVER, Justice.

L. W McKinley, county engineer of Clarke County, Iowa, was accidentally killed while en route from Des Moines to Clarke County with repair parts for county road machinery. His widow instituted proceedings against the county and its insurance carrier under the Workmen's Compensation Act to recover compensation for his death. The defense pleaded, in addition to a general denial, was that McKinley was an " official" appointed by the county, and, therefore, was not a " workman" or " employee" within the purview of the act.

Upon arbitration the Deputy Industrial Commissioner, as sole arbitrator, denied claimant compensation. Upon review the Industrial Commissioner awarded compensation to said claimant. Appeal was then taken to the District Court, which reversed and set aside the findings, decision and award of the Industrial Commissioner and denied compensation to claimant. From the ruling and judgment of the District Court claimant prosecutes this appeal.

It is practically conceded the death of McKinley arose out of and in the course of the performance of services connected with his position as county engineer. The only question for solution concerns his status under the Compensation Act, and particularly under Code, Section 1421. This section defines " workman" or " employee" and then sets out certain exceptions, in part as follows:

" 3. The following persons shall not be deemed ‘ workmen’ or ‘ employees': * *

d. * * * an official elected or appointed by the * * * county * * *."

If McKinley was an " employee" of the county his death was compensable, if he was an " official", he was in a class excepted from the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

I.

The position of county engineer is statutory. Section 4644.17, Code of Iowa 1939, provides: " Engineer-term. The board of supervisors shall employ one or more registered civil engineers who shall be known as county engineers. The board shall fix their term of employment which shall not exceed three years, but the tenure of office may be terminated at any time by the board."

The powers and duties of such position are conferred by statute and are largely specifically defined. It is established without dispute that the board of supervisors employed McKinley in this position. The Commissioner so found. However, the Commissioner also found that a county engineer was not " an official" within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and upon such finding awarded compensation to appellant.

Appellant contends this finding was, in part at least, a conclusion of fact which being based upon sufficient evidence was binding upon the District Court, and, therefore, that the court erred in setting the same aside and denying the claim for compensation. We do not agree that this was, or could properly have been, a finding of fact. It was predicated upon the Commissioner's interpretation of the Compensation Act, and statutes relating to the employment, powers and duties of county engineers. Where statutes create a position and prescribe its duties and powers, the status of one occupying such position should be thereby determined. We hold the Commissioner's finding upon this proposition was a conclusion of law and was subject to review by the court.

II.

Appellant contends that to interpret Code, Section 4644.17, as creating the public office of county engineer would render the statute void as being in violation of Section 29 of Article III of the Constitution of Iowa, which provides that every act shall embrace but one subject, and matters connected therewith which subject shall be expressed in the title. The specific complaint is that the subject is not expressed in the title. The Code Section was enacted as part of Chapter 20, Laws of the 43, G.A., which was entitled, " An Act to define and designate the secondary roads of the state, to provide for the construction and maintenance of such roads, * * * to define the powers and duties of public officers and employees in reference to such work, to coordinate and harmonize various statutes which relate to roads and highways, and to this end to repeal" various enumerated sections and chapters and to amend others. Among the sections repealed was Section 4641, Code of 1927, which had authorized the board, at its discretion, to employ one or more county engineers. The effect of Chapter 20 of 43, G. A., among other things, was to make such appointment mandatory and change some of the powers and duties of county engineers. The result was that the position of county engineer was continued by this legislation with powers and duties modified to conform therewith. Chapter 20 of 43, G. A., was amendatory and substitutional rather than legislation in a new field. The title mentions provisions concerning the powers and duties of officers and employees in reference to secondary road construction and maintenance. One reading such title would have no legitimate reason for surprise at the provisions concerning the employment, powers and duties of county engineers. Manifestly, they are germane to the title and the act. We think these subjects are sufficiently expressed in the title to comply with the requirements of the Constitution. See State v. Gibson, 189 Iowa 1212, 174 N.W. 34; State v. Talerico, 227 Iowa 1315, 290 N.W. 660, and...