McKinley v. Holiday Inn, Docket No. 55232

• Decision Date: 11 June 1982
• Docket Number: Docket No. 55232
• Citation: 320 N.W.2d 329,115 Mich.App. 160
• Parties: Cynthia McKINLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOLIDAY INN, Defendant-Appellee, and Archie Baker, Defendant. 115 Mich.App. 160, 320 N.W.2d 329
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 329

320 N.W.2d 329

Cynthia McKINLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOLIDAY INN, Defendant-Appellee and Archie Baker, Defendant.

Docket No. 55232.

115 Mich.App. 160, 320 N.W.2d 329

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Feb. 9, 1982.

Decided April 8, 1982.

Released for Publication June 11, 1982.

[115 MICHAPP 161] Sablich, Ryan, Rapaport, Bobay & Pollok, P. C., Lansing, for plaintiff-appellant.

Harvey, Kruse, Westen & Milan, P. C., by James E. Sukkar, Detroit, for defendant.

Before DANHOF, C. J., and CAVANAGH and WALSH, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff, Cynthia McKinley, appeals entry of accelerated judgment in favor of defendant Holiday Inn. GCR 1963, 116.1. In granting accelerated judgment, the court ruled that plaintiff's action was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act (WDCA). M.C.L. Sec. 418.131; M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(131).

In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that, while working as a maid at the Holiday Inn in Howell, she was assaulted and raped by defendant Archie Baker, one of the guests at the motel. ¹ She further alleged that defendant Holiday Inn had had notice of the danger posed to maids who work alone in cleaning rooms of the motel. She claimed that she had made repeated requests to be allowed to work with others, but that defendant Holiday Inn had denied her requests. She alleged that defendant Holiday Inn breached its duty to ensure protection and safety to her as she cleaned its motel rooms and that said breach resulted in plaintiff's being assaulted and raped. She sought money damages from defendant Holiday Inn for pain and suffering, [115 MICHAPP 162] medical care, mental anguish, emotional hardship and inability to continue familiar relationships. With regard to these final elements of damage, she claimed that, as a result of the incident, she had become afraid of men, that any contact with men made her "squeamish and nervous", that she had become "much more distrustful of men", and that she was no longer able to work alone. As noted above, the court ruled that plaintiff's exclusive remedy was in the workers' compensation arena and dismissed her complaint with prejudice. We agree with the circuit court and affirm entry of accelerated judgment.

Section 131 of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act provides in part: "The right to the recovery of benefits as provided in this act shall be the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer." M.C.L. Sec. 418.131; M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(131). ² The right to recovery of benefits is set forth in Sec. 301: An employee "who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment" is entitled to compensation as provided in the act. M.C.L. Sec. 418.301(1); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(301)(1).

Application of the plain words of the statute to the facts of this case persuades us that plaintiff's complaint was properly dismissed. Plaintiff clearly alleged personal injury which arose out of and in the course of her employment. ³ The exclusivity provision, therefore, bars her common law action.

The fact that plaintiff may not actually be entitled to receive compensation benefits does not give [115 MICHAPP 163] her the right to maintain this type of common law action. It is axiomatic that, in order for any injured employee to receive compensation benefits, the employee's work-connected injury must result in a disability--an inability to perform suitable work. "[T]he existence of an injury and pain therefrom do not necessarily create disability." Dressler v. Grand Rapids Die Casting Corp., 402 Mich. 243, 253, 262 N.W.2d 629 (1978). However, for purposes of determining whether the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA bars an injured employee's common law action against his or her employer, the existence or nonexistence of a disability is immaterial. If the WDCA covers the kind of injury suffered, the act remedy is exclusive even though under the facts of the particular case no compensation is payable because there has been no actual loss of earning capacity. 2 A Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Secs. 65.10, 65.20, Tredway v. District of Columbia, 403 A.2d 732 (D.C.App.1979), cert. den. 444 U.S. 867, 100 S.Ct. 141, 62 L.Ed.2d 92 (1979), Grice v. Suwannee Lumber Mfg. Co., 113 So.2d 742 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1959), Hubbard v. Reynolds Metals Co., 482 F.2d 63 (C.A.9, 1973), Williams v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 50 Cal.App.2d 116, 123 Cal.Rptr. 812 (1975). In Grice v. Suwannee Lumber Mfg. Co., supra, the Florida court ruled that the exclusivity provision of Florida's workers' compensation act barred the plaintiff's suit even though the plaintiff's injury--loss of a testicle--had not resulted in loss of earning capacity:

"By accepting the benefits of the Act, with the concomitant right to compensation and medical expenses irrespective of whether the employer is at fault, the employee relinquishes his common law rights to compensation for those elements of damages that normally flow from the injury but, having no relationship to [115 MICHAPP 164] earning capacity, are not compensable under the Act. That the remedy so afforded by the Act is exclusive of all others seems to accord with the prevailing opinion of other courts in the country.

"This results in a yielding by both employer and employee of certain rights existing at common law for the new rights and remedies afforded by the Act. Any contrary interpretation would subject an employer to dual liability for practically every accidental injury suffered by his employees. The quid pro quo accruing to the employer as represented by the limited liability and exclusiveness of remedy provisions of the Act would be withdrawn. To construe the Act in any other way would not only be grossly violative of the underlying principles of the Act and injurious to the mutual benefits flowing therefrom, but under such circumstances the Act would be a farce and its ultimate repeal inevitable.

"If the compensation thus provided is considered inadequate or allowance should be made to the employee for all or part of the common law elements or ingredients of relief known to the law of negligence, the change should be effectuated by legislation and not by judicial fiat." 113 So.2d 742, 746 (footnotes omitted.)

The cases relied on by plaintiff in support of her attempt to avoid the exclusivity provision of the WDCA are distinguishable. In our view, the holdings in those cases turned on the essence of the torts alleged by the plaintiffs: Moore v. Federal Dep't Stores, Inc., 33 Mich.App. 556, 190 N.W.2d 262 (1971), lv. den. 385 Mich. 784 (1971) (false imprisonment), Stimson v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 77 Mich.App. 361, 258 N.W.2d 227 (1977) (sex discrimination), ⁴ Broaddus v. Ferndale Fastener Division, Ring Screw Works, 84 Mich.App. 593, 269 N.W.2d 689 (1978), lv. den. 403 Mich. 850 (1978) (intentional infliction of emotional distress), Kissinger v. Mannor,[115 MICHAPP 165] 2 Mich.App. 572, 285 N.W.2d 214...