Grice v. Suwannee Lumber Mfg. Co.
| Decision Date | 07 July 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. B-86,B-86 |
| Parties | Jesse J. GRICE, Appellant, v. SUWANNEE LUMBER MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Philip Barton and Richard J. Wilson, Gainesville, for appellant.
Lazonby, Dell, Graham & Willcox, Gainesville, for appellee.
From an order granting summary final judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. There is no contention that there exists an issue of fact to be resolved by trial. The sole issue is one of law involving a question which has not heretofore been squarely passed upon on Florida.
The complaint alleges that while plaintiff was engaged as an employee of defendant in the operation of a price of mechanical equipment referred to as a 'hog and hopper', a block of wood was thrown out of the machine striking plaintiff in the left testicle. It is alleged that the injury suffered proximately resulted from the carelessness and negligence of defendant in failing to properly equip the machine with such reasonable and ordinary safety devices as would protect plaintiff operator from the occurrence which caused his injury. By reason of the injury, plaintiff was required to submit to surgery for the removal of his left testicle rendering him permanently disabled, and inflicting upon him such damages as will result from future pain and anguish, disfigurement, diminution of sexual propensity, physical handicap and future medical expenses.
Among the defenses interposed by defendant to this common law action is one alleging that at the time of the injury plaintiff was an employee of defendant; that the injury arose out of and in the course of plaintiff's employment; that plaintiff's remedy any defendant's liability are confined exclusively to those provided for and proscribed in the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act. 1
After answering, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion is supported by a affidavit of an insurance agent which avers that at the time of plaintiff's injury there was in force and effect a workmen's compensation insuranced policy issued by the agent's company to defendant; that following plaintiff's injury the insurance company paid to him all benefits to which he is entitled under the Act, including compensation together with hospital, medical, surgical and other expenses incident to the claim.
Summary final judgment was then entered in favor of defendant.
Appellant proceeds upon the basic premise that the Workmen's compensation Act is a substitute for the common law rights and liabilities of the employee and employer only on the subjects which it covers, and within its self contained limitations. That it does not affect rights which are not within the purview of the act or which by necessary implications or negation are excluded therefrom, we agree. 2 As a necessary corollary it follows that an employee is free to pursue his common law remedies for damages resulting from injuries not encompassed within the express provisions or intendments of the Act. 3
Appellant strenuously contends that a permanent injury to a testicle, such as was suffered by him, is not within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 4 Although he correctly points to the omission from the enumerated scheduled injuries any specific reference to an injury resulting in permanent damage to or loss of a testicle, 5 he does concede that by judicial interpretation the injury suffered might be construed as falling within the purview of the 'other cases' provision of the Act. 6 However, appellant insists that such an interpretation would do violence to the fundamental principle which requires that statutes in derogation of the common law be strictly construed.
Attention is invited to the provision of the Act which defines 'disability' to mean incapacity because of an injury to earn in the same or other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of his injury. 7 Thus the compensation which an injured employee is entitled to receive under the Act represents the single element of damage known as 'loss or diminution of earning capacity' computed on the arbitrary formulae prescribed by the Act. 8 It is not the injury (from which arises all the several common law elements of damage) that is compensable under the Act. It is the disability from the injury which results in a loss of earning capacity that is compensable. 9 It should be noted also that aside from the compensation benefits of the Act, other benefits are provided for the injured employee 10, and these benefits flow to the use of the employee absent any consideration of the 'disability' aspect of the claim. Medical, surgical and other remedial treatment is provided for all injured employees who have not given notice, prior to the injury, of which waiver of benefits under the Act. 11
Appellant urges that inasmuch as the several elements of damage suffered by him and alleged in his complaint do not include and have no relationship to loss of earning capacity, and are therefore not recoverable under the Act, he is free to pursue his common law remedies in an action at law to recover such damages.
With this contention we cannot agree. The Florida Workmen's Compensation Act constitutes social legislation which in its overall objective is intended to benefit the employee and employer alike, but which at the same time withdraws from each certain rights otherwise secured at common law. The contract of employment under the Act is statutory, and the Act is implicit in every employer-employee relationship irrespective of the nature of the employment. 12 The Act affords the exclusive remedy for recovery of damages arising from compensable injuries falling within its purview. 13 'This is the quid pro quo in which the sacrifices and gains of employees and employers are to some extent put in balance, for while the employer assumes a new liability without fault, he is relieved of the prospect of a large damage verdict.' 14
Of course, an employee is privileged to reject the Act in the manner provided therein. 15 By so doing, he is left free to pursue his common law remedies and recover every element of damage suffered by him from an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. In such a suit, however, he not only must carry the burden of proving that his injury proximately resulted from a breach of duty owned by his employer, but must also be prepared to meet and overcome the common law defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk and the fellow servant rule. 16
Every accidental injury suffered by an employee which arises out of and in the course of his employment is within the scope of the Act if it is of such character that it results, or might have resulted, in a loss or diminution of earning capacity, either temporary or permanent, or for which the employer is obligated to furnish medical or other benefits. The fact that in a particular case the injury suffered does not in fact result in a...
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