McKinley v. McKinley, 633
Decision Date | 06 July 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 633,633 |
Parties | Keith McKINLEY, Indiv. and as Independent Executor of the Estate of Royal McKinley, Deceased, Appellant, v. Flora McKINLEY, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Esir Tobolowsky, James H. Martin, Dallas, for appellant.
Jerry W. Biesel, Dallas, for appellee.
This suit was filed November 6, 1970, in the District Court by appellee Flora McKinley against Keith McKinley, Individually and as Independent Executor of the Estate of Royal McKinley, Deceased, Kenneth McKinley and Louise McKinley Leichtfuss for a temporary restraining order and injunction to prevent them from distributing and disposing of the assets of the estate of Royal McKinley whose will had been admitted to probate. By amended pleading appellee asked the court to act under Article 2524--1 Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.St. and to determine and set out by declaratory judgment that two savings and loan certificates totaling $26,400.00 were the community property of Royal McKinley, Deceased, and appellee, his surviving wife. Kenneth McKinley and Louise McKinley Leichtfuss were dismissed from the case. The trial court held the savings and loan certificates were community property and rendered judgment against appellant for $13,200.00 resulting in this appeal.
We are met at the outset in Point 1 with the contention of appellant that the District Court was without jurisdiction to hear and render judgment in this cause. The deceased died on October 15, 1970, and appellant qualified as Independent Executor on October 19, 1970, and on November 2, 1970, the Probate Court admitted the will of deceased to probate. On November 4, 1970, appellant, as executor, filed an inventory and appraisement which listed the two savings and loan certificates involved here as 'separate' personal property, and such inventory and appraisement were approved by an order of the Probate Court on the same day. This suit was filed two days later on November 6, 1970.
Appellant maintains that appellee's cause of action to contest the nature of the personal property as evidenced by the two savings and loan certificates was by appeal or certiorari from the order of the Probate Court approving the inventory and appraisement, and where appellant has not followed any of the rules or statutes pertaining to appeal or certiorari from the Probate Court, the District Court was without jurisdiction. Point 1 is overruled.
Rules of Civil Procedure 332 through 337 set out the procedure in appealing a matter from the Probate Court to the District Court, and Rules 344 through 351 provide for an application for writ of certiorari made to the District Court to try de novo specific grounds of error claimed by the applicant to have been made by the Probate Court.
We agree that it is the settled law in Texas that the District Court has no original jurisdiction of probate proceedings in the administration of the estate of a deceased, and that its jurisdiction in this respect is appellate only. Dunaway v. Easter, 133 Tex. 309, 139 S.W.2d 286 (Comm. of Appeals, 1939); Callahan v. Stover, 263 S.W.2d 630 (Tex.Civ.App., Beaumont, 1953, writ ref.); Biddy v. Jones, 446 S.W.2d 388 (Tex.Civ.App., Tyler, 1969, n.w.h.).
However, Article 2524--1, Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, provides in Section 1 that courts of record 'shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations,' and Section 2 provides '(a)ny person interested under a deed, will, written contract * * * may have determined any question of construction or validity * * * and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.' Section 4 provides that '(a)ny person interested as or through an executor, administrator * * * of the estate of a decedent * * * may have a declaration of rights or legal relations in respect thereto * * * (B) To direct the executors, administrators, or trustees to do or abstain from doing any particular act in their fiduciary capacity; or (C) To determine any question arising in the administration of the estate or trust * * *.' Section 5 provides the enumeration in Sections 2, 3 and 4 does not restrict the powers conferred in Section 1, and Section 9 provides that when a suit under the act involves the determination of a fact issue, such issue may be tried and determined as in other civil actions.
It seems to be the rule of Texas that a declaratory judgment proceeding is an additional and cumulative remedy and does not supplant any existing remedy, and the existence of another adequate remedy does not bar the right to maintain an action for declaratory judgment. Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 360, 190 S.W.2d 709 (Tex.Supreme, 1945); Dodgen v. Depuglio, 146 Tex. 538, 209 S.W.2d 588 (1948); Crow v. City of Corpus Christi, 146 Tex. 558, 209 S.W.2d 922 (1948); Zamora v. Zamora, 241 S.W.2d 635 (Tex.Civ.App., El Paso, 1941, n.w.h.).
In Hilley v. Hilley, 305 S.W.2d 204 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco, 1957, writ ref., n.r.e.) a son of a deceased filed an action against the widow of deceased alleging that the widow was administratrix of deceased's estate and that she was claiming certain property as her separate property which was in fact community property, and she had not included same in the inventory filed in the Probate Court. He asked the court to require the widow to file an inventory of the property she claimed as her separate estate and to enter a declaratory judgment decreeing such property to be community property. The widow claimed the Probate Court had exclusive jurisdiction and that the District Court had no jurisdiction. The court held:
We hold that the District Court did have jurisdiction.
The inventory of an estate filed in the Probate Court is prima facie evidence of title to property either listed or omitted, but it is not conclusive. Krueger v. Williams, 163 Tex. 545, 359 S.W.2d 48 (1962).
By Points 2 through 31 appellant challenges the findings of fact numbered 8 through 16 1 and says there is no evidence and insufficient evidence to support the findings, and that each such finding is contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.
Royal McKinley, deceased, and appellee Flora McKinley were married on January 15, 1965, and each had been previously married two times. The deceased was a barber and was semi-retired but continued to work part-time after the marriage and he had earnings each year from 1965 through 1970 from wages, salaries and tips which varried from a low of $659.57 in 1965 to a high of $1926.00 in 1969. There was interest income during the same period of $3,008.29, $1,327.84, $1423.88,. $1,755.02, $2,261.00, and $1,638.81 from promissory notes and savings and loan deposits. Both appellee and deceased were drawing social security benefits at the time of marriage and continued to do so during the marriage, and together they received more than $19,000.00 from that source. There was more than $9,000.00 added by deposits to the Dallas Federal Savings & Loan account and these deposits were either from interest on the deposits or from unknown sources. There were additions...
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