McKinney v. Griggs

• Decision Date: 24 June 1869
• Parties: McKinney, & c., v. Griggs, & c.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

68 Ky. 401

McKinney, & c., v. Griggs, & c.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 24, 1869

1. In 1854, Moberly, in consideration of two hundred and twenty-five dollars, conveyed to Griggs, Owens, Marsh, and Norris a house and two and one half acres of land, situated near a house of religious worship of a congregation of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South. The object of the purchase was, that the property should be used as a parsonage, and occupied as a residence by the minister in charge of said congregation; and, in pursuance of a parol arrangement, the consideration paid was mostly raised by contributions, and refunded. This property was occupied and used as contemplated from the date of the purchase, except at intervals, up to 1865. During the recent war, about sixty-five members of the congregation, including Griggs, Owens, and Norris, severed their relations with the Methodist Episcopal Church, South and erected a new house of worship, at which they organized themselves as a congregation, in connection with the Methodist Episcopal Church of the United States. They left about thirty-seven members in the old congregation, who continued to adhere to the Methodist Episcopal Church, South and kept up their organization, and retained exclusive control of the old house of worship. Griggs, Owens, and Norris (Marsh having left the State) asserted ownership to and obtained possession of, the parsonage and lot. Appellants, as trustees of the old congregation, brought this suit for the recovery of the property and a conveyance. The circuit court adjudged that the restoration of the money paid by plaintiffs was the only relief to which they were entitled. That judgment is reversed, and a judgment for restoring the possession is ordered.

2. The purchase and appropriation of property as a home for the minister of that congregation, whoever he might be, according to the rules and discipline of the religious denomination with which the congregation was connected, was a dedication of the property to the use and benefit of all those who then composed that organized congregation, or might constitute it thereafter.

3. A dedication of land for public purposes may be made by parol and be established, by parol evidence. (Trustees of Dover vs. Fox, 9 B. Monroe, 200; Wickliffe vs. City of Lexington, 11 B. Monroe, 155; 9 Cranch, 292; 6 Peters, 431.)

4. The reason for exempting a dedication of property from the rules of law applicable to a contract of sale, seems mainly to be, that, while in a sale there is a transmission of right from a vendor to a vendee, in whom the title can rest, a dedication consists in devoting it to the use of the public generally, or of some particular class or society.

5. It is not essential that the title shall be vested to the use intended, as the fee may remain in abeyance for want of a grantee capable of taking; but the dedication will preclude the party making it from reasserting any right, so long as it remains subject to the use to which it was made.

6. A dedication made as in this case, for the use and benefit of a particular organized community or society, must be restricted in its enjoyment to the purpose for which it was made, and cannot be diverted to another and different object, unless, by the division or disruption of that community or society, a partition or apportionment of the property is authorized by express law.

7. " Schism or division," as contemplated by subsection 4 of section 3, chapter 14, Revised Statutes (1 Stanton, 236), imports no more than a separation of the society into two parts, without any change of faith or ulterior relations.

8. The " Methodist Episcopal Church of the United States," and the " Methodist Episcopal Church, South," are judicially known, since 1845, to have been distinct, separate, and independent organizations.

9. The appellees, and others who dissolved their connection with the society of which they were members, and the entire ecclesiastical body (Methodist Episcopal Church, South) of which it was a part, and united with another and distinct religious organization (Methodist Episcopal Church of the United States), cannot be regarded as a party within the meaning of the statute (Revised Statutes, subsec. 4 of sec. 3, chap. 14, 1 Stanton, 236), occasioned by a schism or division of a society, and entitled to a proportion of the use of the property.

APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT.

S. TURNER, For Appellants,

CITED--

7 B. Mon., 494; Gibson vs. Armstrong.

1 Bouvier's Law Dic., 386, " Dedication. "

BURNAM & CAPERTON, For Appellees,

CITED.

5 Mon., 408; Brown, & c., vs. East.

3 Marshall, 24; 1 J. J. Marsh., 403.

2 Marshall, 106; 3 Marshall, 246.

JUDGES ROBERTSON AND PETERS CONCURRING, AND CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAMS DISSENTING:

OPINION

HARDIN JUDGE

On the 4th of March, 1854, Thomas S. Moberly and wife conveyed a dwelling-house and lot, containing two and a half acres of ground, to Jonas Griggs, James Owens, John Marsh, and Hamilton Norris, for the consideration of two hundred and twenty-five dollars. The property was situated near the house of religious worship of a congregation of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, of which the grantees in said conveyance were members, at or near a place called Texas, in Madison county.

The object of the purchase appears to have been, that the property should be used as a parsonage, and occupied as a residence by the minister in charge of said congregation; and in pursuance of some parol agreement, the price which was paid to Moberly was mostly raised by contributions and refunded to Griggs, Owens, Marsh, and Norris; and from the purchase of the property until about the year 1865, it continued to be so held and used, except during some short intervals. When it was not occupied by the preacher of the congregation, it was rented out; but the property does not appear to have been purchased or held for the use of the church generally, or of the conference or circuit to which that particular congregation was attached, but specially for the use of that congregation as a residence for its minister, who was required annually to account for the use of it, as so much paid him of his salary by the congregation.

During the recent civil war, the congregation of said church, at Texas, became disrupted, and about sixty-five of its members, including Griggs, Owens, and Norris, severed their relations with the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, and erected a new house of worship, at which they organized themselves as a congregation in connection with the Methodist Episcopal Church of the United States. Their withdrawal left only about thirty-seven members of the old congregation, who continued to adhere to the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, and kept up their organization and retained the exclusive control of the old house of worship. In the meantime, however, Griggs, Owens, and Norris (Marsh having removed from the State), asserting claim to the parsonage and lot under the deed from Moberly, obtained the possession of the property, and denied the right of those who remained of the old congregation to use or control it.

The appellants, as trustees of the old congregation, brought this action, seeking a judgment for the recovery of the property and a conveyance of the title, which was resisted by the defendants.

The circuit court, regarding the plaintiffs' claim to recover the property, as within the interdiction of the statute of frauds, adjudged that they were not entitled to further relief than to have restitution of so much of the money originally paid for the property as had been contributed by the plaintiffs and those they represented; and from that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

As we construe the facts of this case, we do not regard the claim of the old congregation as resting on a contract, the enforcement of which is prohibited by the statute referred to. But the purchase and appropriation of the property as a home for the minister of that congregation, whoever he might be, according to the rules and discipline of the religious denomination with which the congregation was connected, was a dedication of the property to the use and benefit of all those who then composed that organized congregation, or might constitute it thereafter. And the doctrine is well settled, and has been long and uniformly recognized, that a dedication of land for public purposes may be made by parol, and be established, by parol evidence. (Trustees of Dover vs. Fox, 9 B. Mon., 200; Wickliffe vs. City of Lexington, 11 B. Mon., 155; The Town of Pawlet vs. Clark, et al., 9 Cranch., 292; City of Cincinnati vs. The Lessees of White, 6 Peters, 431.)

The reason for exempting a dedication of property from the rules of law applicable to a contract of sale, seems mainly to be that, while in the latter case there is a transmission of right, from a vendor to a vendee, in whom the title can vest, a dedication consists in devoting it to the use of the public generally, or of some particular class or society. And it is immaterial to the validity of the grant whether it be gratuitous or for compensation, or whether the object be to subserve public convenience, as by the donation of ground for a street or a highway, or a charitable or religious purpose, in the appropriation of ground for a cemetery or church, or, as in this case, a residence for the minister of a particular congregation, as one of the means of procuring his services. Nor does it seem to be essential that the title be vested to the use intended, as the fee may remain in abeyance for want of a grantee capable of taking. But the validity of the dedication does not depend on this: it will preclude the party making the appropriation from reasserting any right over...