McKinney v. Harvie

• Decision Date: 19 December 1887
• Citation: 35 N.W. 668,38 Minn. 18
• Parties: MCKINNEY AND OTHERS v HARVIE.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

38 Minn. 18

35 N.W. 668

MCKINNEY AND OTHERSvHARVIE.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

December 19, 1887.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

The instrument set forth in the complaint acknowledging the receipt of a sum of money in part payment of a certain lot described, and signed by the defendant, held to be a receipt only, and not a contract for the sale of land, and hence subject to be explained or supplemented by evidence aliunde.

Evidence in this case held sufficient to show that the sum specified in the receipt was paid by the plaintiff as agent, on a parol agreement for the purchase of land for another person, who was the principal in the transaction.

Where a vendor under a contract for the sale of lands, which is within the statute of frauds because not in writing, is nevertheless willing and offers to perform on his part, but the vendee refuses to fulfill, and repudiates the contract, the latter is not entitled to recover an installment of purchase money previously paid.

Appeal from municipal court, city of Duluth; MARTIN, Judge.

D'Autremont & Cheeseman, for McKinney and others, appellants.

White, Shannon & Reynolds, for Harvie, respondent.

VANDERBURGH, J.

The receipt set forth in the complaint, as follows: “Received of F W. McKinney one hundred dollars in part payment of lot seventy-six, block 32, Duluth, Minn., third division,”-and signed by defendant, was open to explanation, and the defendant was properly permitted to show the transactions connected with it, and that in the matter of the purchase of the lot the plaintiffs were acting as the agents of a third party, and paid the money for him. It is not a contract for the sale or purchase of land, and it is subject to be explained and supplemented by evidence aliunde. It is simply evidence of the payment of the sum of money specified for the particular object named. Eighmie v. Taylor, 98 N. Y. 295;Filkins v. Whyland, 24 N. Y. 339;Ryan v. Ward, 48 N. Y. 208;Barickman v. Kuykendall, 6 Blackf. 24, 25.

The evidence in the case tended to show that plaintiffs were real-estate brokers at Duluth, and on or about the eighteenth day of June, 1886, applied to appellant to purchase the lot in question, obtained his terms, and agreed by parol to take the lot at the price named by him, and paid him $100, and took the receipt referred to. That this was done in contemplation of the purchase of the lot by a customer procured by them, one Chapman, with whom they had previously conferred, and who was expected to purchase it. Soon after, the parties were brought together, and it was mutually understood that the negotiations for the purchase were made for Chapman, who agreed to take the lot, and pay the price indicated. That afterwards, on or about July 15, 1886, plaintiffs prepared a deed in due form running to Chapman, and, at their instance, it was executed by defendant to be delivered to him, and left with them. That Chapman subsequently refused absolutely to take the deed and complete the purchase, though he made no objection to the title. Defendant's evidence also tends to show that he subsequently applied to the plaintiffs, and that they refused to take the lot, and referred defendant to Chapman. There is no evidence that Chapman at anytime afterwards offered or was willing to pay for the property, and fulfill the agreement. On the contrary, he finally abandoned and repudiated it altogether; and it also expressly appears by the testimony of the plaintiff McKinney, who attended to the matter exclusively, that he never asked for a deed for himself, or offered to pay the purchase money; and it does not appear that,...