McKinney v. State, 74700

• Decision Date: 08 September 1987
• Docket Number: No. 74700,74700
• Citation: 184 Ga.App. 607,362 S.E.2d 65
• Parties: McKINNEY v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 65

362 S.E.2d 65

184 Ga.App. 607

McKINNEY v. The STATE.

No. 74700.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Sept. 8, 1987.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 22, 1987.

William C. Randall, Macon, for appellant.

E. Byron Smith, Dist. Atty., Thomas R. McBerry, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

POPE, Judge.

Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The evidence shows on August 30 1985 an officer with the Macon Police Department received a tip from a confidential informant that a cocaine deal was to take place that evening in middle Georgia, possibly around Macon. The deal was to involve Jerry Rutledge, a Macon resident known to the officer, and someone traveling from Florida on the interstate highway in a white Ford automobile rented out of Cincinnati, Ohio. According to the informant, the individuals were to meet, possibly at a motel, where the one traveling from Florida would drop off a sizable amount of cocaine and would continue north carrying more cocaine to Cincinnati. The officer also received information from law enforcement officials in Cincinnati.

In response to these tips, a surveillance team was assigned to follow Rutledge. At around 8:00 p.m. Rutledge left his residence in a pick-up truck and traveled to a motel in Forsyth where he took a room. According to the officers following Rutledge, the circuitous route he took and the maneuvers he made en route to the motel were consistent with one attempting to "clean himself" to discover if he was being followed. The officers learned from the motel clerk that Rutledge had given an Ohio address and tag number when he registered for a room, even though the vehicle he was driving bore a Georgia license plate. At the motel Rutledge walked around the premises and made several trips to the parking lot to look around.

At approximately 1:00 a.m. defendant McKinney pulled into the parking lot of the motel in front of Rutledge's room. He was driving a white Ford registered to an automobile rental agency in Cincinnati. Defendant carried a dark suitcase into Rutledge's room, stayed approximately twenty minutes, returned to the Ford with the suitcase and left the motel traveling north on Interstate 75. Rutledge left the motel traveling south.

One group of officers followed Rutledge while another group followed defendant. The officers stopped defendant about one mile north of the motel. As they pulled him over they received word over the radio that Rutledge was pouring a powdery white substance out the window of his truck as officers attempted to stop him. Once defendant was removed from the automobile, the officers opened the trunk and found several pieces of luggage and a briefcase. The officers opened one of the suitcases and found a grey fiberboard box containing balance scales, bottles and vials. Based upon considerable training and experience, the officers believed this box to be a cocaine test kit. An officer then opened the briefcase and found several plastic bags of a white powdery substance later confirmed to be cocaine. The search was conducted without a warrant.

1. We reject defendant's argument that the search of his automobile was made without probable cause. The confidential informant had supplied information to the officers on between five and ten previous occasions. All previous information was reliable and had resulted in seizure of contraband or arrest. Therefore, the information met the test of reliability. Defendant argues the information was insufficient to support a warrantless search because the source of the informant's information was undisclosed. The sufficiency of information obtained from an informant is not to be judged by any rigid test. Generally, probable cause is determined by the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding (1) the basis of the informant's knowledge and (2) the informant's veracity or reliability. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). "[A] deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability." Id. at 233, 103 S.Ct. at 2329. Here, any deficiency in the basis of the informant's knowledge was adequately compensated by the informant's previous record of reliability. Moreover, the details of the tip were corroborated by the personal observation of the investigating officers. When coupled with corroboration by the personal observation of a police officer, a reliable informant's tip is sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrantless search. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959).

2. We also reject defendant's claim that the circumstances did not support a warrantless search of the automobile. It is well settled by Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), and its progeny that an "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies to the search of a vehicle as to which there is probable cause to believe it contains contraband.

Defendant argues that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement is not applicable under the facts of this case because there existed no exigent circumstances requiring an immediate search. Citing several earlier opinions of this court, defendant argues any exigent circumstances which might otherwise arise in a case involving the search of an automobile were dispelled by the fact he was placed under arrest and handcuffed and the keys to the automobile were taken from him before the automobile was searched. See McKinney v. State, 155 Ga.App. 930(1), 273 S.E.2d 888 (1980); Buday v. State, 150 Ga.App. 686(3), 258 S.E.2d 318 (1979); Hardwick v. State, 149 Ga.App. 291(5), 254 S.E.2d 384 (1979); Love v. State, 144 Ga.App. 728, 242 S.E.2d 278 (1978). In these earlier...