McKinney v. State, 2758
| Decision Date | 08 July 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 2758,2758 |
| Citation | 566 P.2d 653 |
| Parties | Billy McKINNEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
Walter L. Carpeneti, Asst. Public Defender, Juneau, and Brian Shortell, Public Defender, Anchorage, for appellant.
Larry Weeks, Dist. Atty. and Avrum M. Gross, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellee.
Before BOOCHEVER, C. J., RABINOWITZ, CONNOR and BURKE, JJ., and DIMOND, J. Pro Tem.
Billy McKinney was indicted for assault and stabbing with intent to kill in violation of AS 11.15.160 1 and AS 11.15.150. 2 Admitting the acts charged, he claimed insanity and incompetence to stand trial. The trial court ruled against him on both grounds and sentenced him to fifteen years imprisonment under AS 11.15.150.
In this appeal, McKinney challenges the trial court's findings of sanity and competence. He raises issues concerning the interrelationship between voluntary intoxication and the insanity defense and the appropriate standard of review. Additionally, McKinney claims that due to inadequate time for his attorney to prepare for sentencing, he was denied due process and effective assistance of counsel. 3
We find that the record in this case is sufficient to support both the finding of sanity at the time the offense was committed and the finding that McKinney was not incompetent by reason of insanity to stand trial and assist in his own defense. The insanity issue in this case is similar to that presented in the recently-decided case of Alto v. State, 565 P.2d 492 (Alaska, 1977). In Alto, we reversed a trial court's judgment of conviction because after evidence of insanity had been introduced, the state had failed to sustain its burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, however, we hold that there was an adequate basis for the trial court's judgment of conviction. Further, we hold that, as a matter of law, the insanity defense is not available to a defendant who is legally sane before voluntarily commencing drinking but loses control when intoxicated. Finally, we conclude that under the circumstances of this case, defendant was not denied due process at sentencing.
The attack occurred in the evening at the apartment of Curtis Harden. Present at that time were the defendant, Paul Hill (the victim and a security guard in Juneau), Marissa Osborne, Charlene Sumdum, Curtis Harden and Paul Hill's young child. McKinney had just been released from jail that morning, having served approximately three months on an earlier assault and battery charge and arrived at the apartment with Ms. Osborne.
Throughout the afternoon and evening, all those in Harden's apartment had been drinking. Although Harden stated that McKinney was not drunk, according to Sumdum, defendant had been drinking beer and liquor during the evening and was "drunk", "feeling pretty high." Ms. Osborne testified that she and McKinney had at least a few drinks before going to Harden's apartment, and Hill (the victim) stated that defendant had passed out earlier in the day.
At some point during the evening, all members of the group except McKinney left the apartment to buy liquor. The attack took place about forty-five minutes after they returned. No one in the group recalled seeing defendant obtain the knife used in the attack, but McKinney testified that he had obtained it without being noticed while the others were in the apartment. McKinney estimated that this occurred approximately twenty minutes before the attack. He further stated that he had the intention of stabbing Hill when he picked up the knife.
McKinney did not explain why he assaulted Hill. Of those in the apartment, only Harden was willing to suggest the reasons for the attack. He speculated that jealousy and hatred of "cops" motivated defendant to act as he did. 5
Shortly before the attack, Ms. Osborne had been sitting in the kitchen with Hill (the victim), her legs across his lap. McKinney called Ms. Osborne over to him a couple of times. She responded that she could hear him from where she was sitting, but she refrained from getting up and going over to him.
Before he had gone to jail, McKinney had been involved with Ms. Osborne. The nature of their relationship at the time of the assault, however, was unclear. Ms. Osborne stated that on the night of March 23, Harden and Hill (the victim) had been joking with McKinney about the fact that Ms. Osborne was McKinney's fiancee, but Ms. Osborne indicated that she did not think this was the nature of their relationship. McKinney's responses to the examining psychiatrists suggested that he did have some attachment to Ms. Osborne. He stated at trial he did not know whether or not he would have stabbed Hill if Ms. Osborne had come over to him when he called her.
Before going to the liquor store, Harden and Hill had a conversation with McKinney in the bathroom according to Ms. Osborne. At the preliminary hearing, Harden admitted that he and McKinney had been discussing a robbery or burglary. Ms. Osborne testified that McKinney told her "It's not worth going back to jail for" immediately after the bathroom conversation had occurred.
After the stabbing, Harden attempted to call a doctor for Hill (the victim), but was prevented by McKinney who told him, "No, you back off and not call and let that son of a bitch die."
McKinney was indicted on May 1, 1975. On May 8, the defendant filed a notice of intention to rely on an insanity defense. He was examined in Anchorage over a three-week period from July 1 to July 22 by Dr. Joseph Bloom. A concurrent psychological evaluation was prepared by Allen Parker, Ph.D.
Trial, limited solely to the issue of defendant's sanity, commenced on October 27, 1975. Counsel immediately moved for a second psychiatric examination to resolve some of the conflicts between the reports of Dr. Bloom and Dr. Parker. At the outset, defense counsel indicated no difficulty communicating with his client and expressed no doubts as to his competency. The trial court questioned McKinney and found him capable of understanding what was happening and competent to give up his rights. At the very end of the hearing, McKinney was also questioned by defense counsel. At least to counsel, McKinney's answers at that time appeared nonresponsive and contrary to information provided at the preliminary hearing.
Dr. J. Edward Olivier examined McKinney on November 1, 1975 in Juneau and indicated that he was unable to appreciate the charges against him and to cooperate with counsel.
On November 3, defendant moved for judicial determination of mental competency. Hearing was set for November 28.
With the exception of his trip to Anchorage, McKinney had been institutionalized at the state correctional center in Juneau. For two months before his trip to Anchorage for psychiatric evaluation and from his return until October 29, 1975, he had been held by himself in a "quiet cell," a cell with a single window at eye level, covered by a single steel flap which opened only from the outside. The flap was occasionally open for McKinney, but when it was, he could see only a wall. 6 On October 29, McKinney was moved to an "open face cell" in the booking area of the institution for observation because he appeared to be hallucinating and was not eating. This cell was reserved for those for whom the institution had a deep concern and was constantly monitored. On approximately November 10, defendant was confined in the maximum security area where he was allowed an hour of recreation and was able to communicate with inmates in adjoining cells.
Shortly before November 28, the trial court indicated that it was going to rule against defendant on the insanity defense. On November 28, it provided counsel with a memorandum of decision and a pre-sentence report dated November 25. Defendant had been unaware that sentencing would take place on November 28.
At the November 28 hearing, defense counsel informed the court that he was able to communicate with McKinney who appeared "much more rational today than when Dr. Olivier and I visited him on the first of the month." At this point, defense counsel advised the court that McKinney did not wish to proceed with the motion for determination of competency. Defense counsel was, however, prepared to submit the competency issue on the basis of Dr. Olivier's report alone.
To determine competency, on November 28, the court heard the testimony of Ramona Green, a psychologist with the Mental Health Clinic who had interviewed McKinney twice during the early part of November and found him to be in contact with reality and in progressively better spirits. At the hearing, the court independently questioned McKinney whose answers were brief, but logical and responsive. McKinney indicated that he was able to communicate with counsel and that regarding the sentencing, he "just want(ed) to get it over with."
The trial court found that, on October 27, McKinney was competent. McKinney was then found sane at the time of his actions and guilty on both counts. The court sentenced him to fifteen years on the charge of Stabbing with Intent to Kill, Wound or Maim. Pursuant to McKinney's instructions, defense counsel made no formal objections to sentencing. He did, however, allege one factual conflict between information in the pre-sentence report and testimony given by the defendant which concerned McKinney's ability to remember the events. He also indicated for the record that he would have objected to the determination of guilt, the determination of competency and to sentencing if his client had permitted.
AS 12.45.100(a) prohibits the trial, conviction and sentencing of a defendant who cannot assist in his own defense or understand the proceedings against him. 7 This statutory mandate is of constitutional dimensions. The conviction of an accused who is not mentally competent to stand...
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