McKnatt v. McKnatt

• Decision Date: 01 March 1915
• Citation: 10 Del.Ch. 392,93 A. 367
• Court: Court of Chancery of Delaware
• Parties: JAMES MCKNATT, WILBERT MCKNATT, HARRY MCKNATT, ERNEST MCKNATT, SUSAN PARVIS, ELIZABETH SHILKUTT, MARY J. REYNOLDS, MARY S. SHOCKLEY and OSCAR COHEE, v. CHARLES W. MCKNATT, NETTIE MCKNATT and JAMES A. SMITH, Executor of the last will and testament of Ebenezer McKnatt, deceased

93 A. 367

10 Del.Ch. 392

JAMES MCKNATT, WILBERT MCKNATT, HARRY MCKNATT, ERNEST MCKNATT, SUSAN PARVIS, ELIZABETH SHILKUTT, MARY J. REYNOLDS, MARY S. SHOCKLEY and OSCAR COHEE, v. CHARLES W. MCKNATT, NETTIE MCKNATT and JAMES A. SMITH, Executor of the last will and testament of Ebenezer McKnatt, deceased

Court of Chancery of Delaware, Kent

March 1, 1915

BILL TO SET ASIDE A CONVEYANCE. The complainants, the heirs at law and beneficiaries under the will of Ebenezer McKnatt, seek to invalidate a deed made by him on May 1, 1913, to Charles W McKnatt, for the consideration of one dollar, conveying a farm near Harrington, worth about five thousand dollars. The grantor, a bachelor about eighty-one years of age, being no longer able to farm his land, had boarded in Harrington at several places, including the home of his nephew, Joshua Reynolds. On December 30, 1912, while living there he made a will, which was after his death duly probated. By it he directed a sale of his property by his executor and a division of the proceeds. At that time his health had failed and he had serious and incurable ailments, including Bright's disease of the kidneys, and required much nursing, being usually unable to walk without assistance. He was an illiterate, uncommunicative person. It is probable that at the time when he executed the will he was mentally competent to do so. After the death of his nephew, Reynolds he continued to live with the widow of his nephew; but it was not a happy state for either of them, so that when on April 17, 1913, the defendant, Charles W. McKnatt, the tenant on the farm, took the old man to live with him on the farm there was no regret on the part of either Mrs. Reynolds, or Ebenezer McKnatt, but on the contrary words passed between them which indicated a feeling of relief on both sides though Mrs. Reynolds was entitled under his will to nearly two-thirds of his property. Between the feeble old landlord and his tenant there was no kinship, but the latter had been attentive in visits to his landlord and took good care of him after he came to the farm. The new home was indeed a haven of rest for Ebenezer McKnatt, for there seemed to be no other home then open to him, and he was happy there, and for a while improved in health. But he was very feeble and required increasing ministrations to such an extent that the defendant, Charles W. McKnatt, as he testified, was obliged to give up work on the farm in order to care for the homeless old man he had taken into his home, and who was not a very pleasant patient.

According to the uncorroborated statement of the grantee, the grantor expressed a desire to convey the farm to his tenant, the defendant, in consideration of the attention in the past and future care in this home during the rest of his life and the payment of his funeral expenses after his death. Ebenezer McKnatt wanted to consult a certain Maryland lawyer, whom he named, but Charles W. McKnatt sent for his own attorney, R. R. Kenney, Esquire, of Dover, the other lawyer probably not being readily accessible. By arrangement, three old friends of the grantor, Zadoc C. Fleming, William T. Sharp and Samuel L. Shaw, all men of standing and repute in the community, one of them a notary public, and James L. Wolcott, Esquire, (the attorney who came in the place of Mr. Kenney) met at the farm on May 1, 1913, and the proposed transaction was explained to them, both grantor and grantee being present. Thereupon the deed conveying the farm was then and there prepared by the attorney, read over to the grantor and explained to him, and executed and acknowledged, and within a few days left for record at the proper office. In form, the deed was in the usual form of a conveyance, the only stated consideration being one dollar, and was without a warranty clause, and was signed by the grantor only.

The attorney who drew the deed and the friends of the grantor who were around him when he did so, all testified that he understood what he was doing, though he talked little; that he was capable mentally of making the deed; and that he and the grantee and those present understood the arrangement for the care of the old man, and that the grantor was satisfied with it. According to Mr. Fleming, the grantor said he wanted a home and did not want to go to the poor-house. Mr. Sharp testified that when Ebenezer McKnatt was asked by Mr. Wolcott the attorney, what he wanted done, the old man turned to Charles W. McKnatt, the grantee, who was present, and said to him: "What is it you want me to do? You tell them;" and also that after the deed and the consideration were explained to the grantor he had said that that was what he wanted. Mr. Shaw took the acknowledgement, and when he learned what the real consideration was, said he thought it was a "tame" deed, because the real agreement should have been in it, and discussed this with the grantee and the attorney. All of this was probably in the presence of the grantor, though whether he heard it, or not, does not appear from anything he said. At any rate, all of his friends there present approved of the transaction and trusted the grantee to fully perform his part.

The grantor owned practically no other property than the farm, and his personal property was just about enough to pay his debts, except the funeral expenses, after his death. He had no relatives nearer than nephews and nieces, and none dependent upon him, or intimate with him.

There was much testimony as to the mental condition and the character of his physical ailments, and the effect thereof on his mind. The physicians who testified differed on the point, as also did the witnesses.

On July 18, 1913, about two and one-half months after the deed was made, the grantor died, the grantee having taken care of the grantor until the end of his days, and at his own expense buried his body after his death.

The bill was filed December 20, 1913, to set aside the deed, claiming that advantage had been taken of the helpless condition and dependence of the grantor on the grantee, and that at the time of the conveyance the grantor was of unsound mind and incapable of transacting business, was unduly influenced and was without the benefit of counsel. The prayers were for a cancellation of the deed, for an accounting of rents from January 1, 1913, and for a reconveyance by Charles W. McKnatt and his wife to the heirs at law of Ebenezer McKnatt, subject to the right of his executor to sell it for distribution as authorized by the will.

By their joint answer Charles W. McKnatt and wife denied the allegations of undue influence, mental incompetence and advantage taken of the condition of the grantor, while admitting the illiteracy, old age, physical weakness and serious illness of Ebenezer McKnatt. The defendants alleged that when the deed was made it was understood and agreed between the grantor and grantee that the consideration for it was the expense, service, care and attention incurred and rendered, to be incurred and rendered to the grantor for the rest of his life and the burial of his body after his death; that Charles W. McKnatt faithfully performed the consideration, including the payment of $ 202.25 for funeral expenses.

The executor of Ebenezer McKnatt was made a formal party defendant, and answered, submitting to the order of the court.

The case was heard on the bill, answer and testimony, heard, by agreement, by the Chancellor orally in open court.

All the costs will be put on the defendant, Charles W. McKnatt.

Henry Ridgely, with him T. Alan Goldsborough, of Denton, Md., for the complainants.

James H. Hughes, for the defendants.

OPINION

THE CHANCELLOR (after stating the facts as above). From the foregoing statement of facts, which I have prepared in order to state as fairly as I could the important facts, the question for solution, stating it most favorably for the defendants, the grantee in the deed, is this: A very aged, sick and very infirm, homeless bachelor, dependent for many physical attentions on the nurse in whose home he lived, having made a deed by which he conveyed practically all his property to the nurse, not a kinsman, for a consideration not stated in the deed, viz., the caring for the grantor for the rest of his life, and the payment of his funeral expenses after his death, should the court set aside the conveyance after the death of the grantor, even though the grantor apparently comprehended the transaction and was not unduly influenced by the grantee to make it, and the grantee having in fact performed the consideration. The complainants claim that there was a fiduciary relation between the grantor and grantee, based on the dependence of the former on the latter, and the transaction between them was to be judged by the same standards as are dealings between trustee and cestui que trust; that the transaction was unfair to the grantor (1) because the real consideration was not stated in the deed; (2) because there was no power reserved to revoke it in case of non-performance, or effective means of enforcing performance of the consideration, for the helpless grantor was thereby left to the mercy of the grantee; and lastly, that the performance of the executory consideration did not change the legal situation.

There is no reported case in this State in which this question has been raised and decided. In the case of Short v Prettyman, 6 Del. 334, 1 Houst. 334, the executory consideration for a conveyance such as an agreement to clothe, board and lodge the grantor was stated in the deed, and there was no evidence showing a fiduciary relation. The court in Jones v. Thompson, 5 Del.Ch. 374, set aside a deed made by an aged and infirm man to two of his children of a large part of his property for a price shown to...