McKnight v. City of New York

• Decision Date: 02 October 1906
• Parties: McKNIGHT v. CITY OF NEW YORK.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

186 N.Y. 35

78 N.E. 576

McKNIGHT

v.CITY OF NEW YORK.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 2, 1906.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Action by James McKnight, Jr., an infant, by James McKnight, his guardian ad litem, against the city of New York. Appeal by the plaintiff by permission from a judgment of the Appellate Division (90 N. Y. Supp. 1105), overruling plaintiff's exceptions to the dismissal of the complaint. Reversed.

Hiscock, J., dissenting.

J. Brownson Ker, for appellant.

John J. Delany, Corp.

Counsel (Theodore Connoly, of counsel), for respondent.

WILLARD BARTLETT, J.

This is an action against the city of New York to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by reason of the negligence of the defendant. It was admitted upon the trial that the accident in which the plaintiff was injured occurred on the 15th day of June, 1897, and that this action was not commenced until the 21st day of January, 1902. It was also conceded that at the time of the accident the plaintiff was an infant under the age of 14 years. Upon these facts counsel for the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the action was barred by chapter 572, p. 801, of the Laws of 1886. The learned trial court granted the motion and ordered plaintiff's exceptions to be heard in the first instance at the Appellate Division. There the exceptions were overruled and judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant. From that judgment the Appellate Division has permitted an appeal to this court.

The question presented for determination is whether this action is barred by chapter 572, p. 801, of the Laws of 1886, which provides, in substance, that no action for negligence is maintainable against a municipality of this state having 50,000 inhabitants or over ‘unless the same shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action therefor shall have accrued.’ It is the contention of the appellant that this statute was not operative against the plaintiff during his infancy by reason of the exception contained in section 396 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the material part of which reads as follows: ‘If a person, entitled to maintain an action specified in this title [which includes negligence actions-see section 383, subd. 5], * * * is, at the time when the cause of action accrues * * * within the age of twenty-one years, * * * the time of such a disability is not a part of the time limited in this title for commencing the action,’ etc. Section 396 is found in chapter 4 of the Code, which also contains in section 414 the following declaration: ‘The provisions of this chapter apply, and constitute the only rules of limitation applicable to a civil action or special proceeding, except in one of the following cases: (1) A case where a different limitation is specially prescribed by law, or a shorter limitation is prescribed by the written contract of the parties.’ The respondent contends that this exception deprives the infant plaintiff of the benefit of the provisions of section 396, because the act of 1886, p. 801, c. 572, is a lsw which specially prescribes a different limitation in a case against a city having 50,000 inhabitants, where the action is brought to recover damages for personal injuries.

We think that this is too narrow a construction. The effect of the one-year limitation prescribed by the act of 1886 was to amend by implication section 383 of the Code of Civil Procedure by reducing the period of limitation in actions for personal injuries due to negligence from three years to one, where the defendant was a municipality with a population of 50,000. In this change we can find no evidence of a legislative intent to deprive an injured infant in such cases of the benefit of the general exception contained in section 396 which prevents the statute of limitations from running against a claimant while the disability of infancy exists. ‘The tendency of the latest decisions of this court has been to extend to all claims the benefit of the exceptions given by the Code of Civil Procedure to the bar of the statute of limitations, except where there is an express statute or contract to the contrary.’ Conolly v. Hyams, 176 N. Y. 403, 68 N. E. 662. This statement in the opinion of Cullen, J., is sustained by the cases which he...