McKnight v. State

• Decision Date: 17 February 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-898.,98-898.
• Citation: 727 So.2d 314
• Parties: Sharon McKNIGHT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

727 So.2d 314

Sharon McKNIGHT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 98-898.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

February 17, 1999.

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Louis Campbell, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Wendy Benner-Leon, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before FLETCHER, SHEVIN and SORONDO, JJ.

SORONDO, J.

Sharon McKnight (defendant), appeals from a five year sentence imposed under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act. See ch. 97-239, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 775.082(8), Fla. Stat. (1997)).

The defendant was convicted by a jury and was subsequently adjudicated guilty of battery on a law enforcement officer and criminal mischief. The applicable sentencing guidelines range was eighteen to thirty months in state prison. The state requested that the defendant be sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR), pursuant to section 775.082(8). A certified copy of the defendant's conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer and sentence to twenty-six months prison on September 26, 1995, was introduced into evidence.

The trial judge stated that because of the defendant's psychological problems, he would have sentenced her to the bottom of the guidelines if he had discretion. Feeling that he was obligated to do so, however, the judge sentenced the defendant as a PRR to five years in state prison.

The defendant argues that the prison releasee reoffender statute is facially unconstitutional for two reasons. First, because, in her view, it gives the ultimate sentencing decision to the prosecutor, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. She contends that if the state seeks to sentence the defendant as a PRR and establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that she qualifies, the trial court has no sentencing options and must sentence her to the maximum term provided. A statute that wrests sentencing discretion from the court and removes it to the prosecutor's sphere, the argument goes, violates the Florida Constitution's separation of powers provision. Second, the defendant contends that the statute violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution, "because the means chosen by the Legislature to achieve its goal of enhanced punishment —namely excluding the court from the sentencing decision and transferring that function to the prosecutor—denies defendants their right to an unbiased sentencing process, and their right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard, particularly with regard to whether extenuating circumstances exist which would make sentencing under the statute inappropriate."

The relevant portions of section 775.082(8) read as follows:

(a)1. "Prison releasee reoffender" means any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit:

o. Any felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual;

within 3 years of being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor.

2. If the state attorney determines that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender as defined in subparagraph 1., the state attorney may seek to have the court sentence the defendant as a prison releasee reoffender. Upon proof from the state attorney that establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender as defined in this section, such defendant is not eligible for sentencing under the sentencing guidelines and must be sentenced as follows:

d. For a felony of the third degree, by a term of imprisonment of 5 years.

(d)1. It is the intent of the Legislature that offenders previously released from prison who meet the criteria in paragraph (a) be punished to the fullest extent of the law and as provided in this subsection, unless any of the following circumstances exist:

a. The prosecuting attorney does not have sufficient evidence to prove the highest charge available;

b. The testimony of a material witness cannot be obtained;

c. The victim does not want the offender to receive the mandatory sentence and provides a written statement to that effect; or

d. Other extenuating circumstances exist which preclude the just prosecution of the offender.

The statute further provides that anyone sentenced under its provisions must serve 100% of the sentence imposed by the court. See § 775.082(8)(b), Fla. Stat.

We begin our analysis by noting our agreement with the trial court that the provisions of the statute are mandatory and that where, as here, the state decides to seek enhanced sentencing and proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is a PRR, the trial judge must impose the sentence set forth in subsection (a)2. We reach this conclusion not only from a plain reading of the statute but also from our review of its legislative history.

The Florida Senate Committee on Criminal Justice, Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 2362 (1997) Staff Analysis 6 (Apr. 10, 1997), Section III, "Effect of Proposed Changes" states:

Upon proof from the state attorney that establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender, the defendant is not eligible for sentencing under the guidelines and must be sentenced as follows:

— for a life felony, life imprisonment.

— for a first degree felony, a 30-year term of imprisonment.

— for a second degree felony, a 15-year term of imprisonment.

— for a third degree felony, a 5-year term of imprisonment.

Essentially, then, the mandatory minimum is the maximum statutory penalty under s. 775.082, F.S. These provisions require the court to impose the mandatory minimum term if the state attorney pursues sentencing under these provisions and meets the burden of proof for establishing that the defendant is a prison releasee reoffender.

(Emphasis in original). The analysis goes on to say:

A distinction between the prison releasee provision and the current habitualization provisions is that, when the state attorney does pursue sentencing of the defendant as a prison releasee reoffender and proves that the defendant is a prison releasee reoffender, the court must impose the appropriate mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.

Id. (Emphasis added).

Additionally, the House Committee On Criminal Justice Appropriations, Committee Substitute for House Bill 1371 (1997) Bill Research and Economic Impact Statement 11 (April 2, 1997),¹ clarifies the distinction between the PRR and the "habitual offender" in a manner consistent with our interpretation:

While "habitual offenders" committing new... felonies within five years would fall within the scope of the habitual offender statute, this bill is distinguishable from the habitual offender statute in its certainty of punishment, and its mandatory nature. The habitual offender statute basically doubles the statutory maximum periods of incarceration under s. 775.082 as a potential maximum sentence for the offender. On the other hand, the minimum mandatory prison terms are lower under the habitual violent felony offender statute, than those provided under the bill. In addition, a court may decline to impose a habitual or habitual violent offender sentence.

(Emphasis added). Accordingly, it is absolutely clear that the statute in question provides no room for anything other than the indicated penalties when the state seeks punishment under the statute and successfully carries its burden of proof.

It is equally clear that subsection (d) of the statute is intended to provide the prosecution an opportunity to plea bargain cases involving PRRs, but only where one of the enumerated circumstances exist. The Senate Staff Analysis states:

The CS provides legislative intent to prohibit plea bargaining in prison releasee reoffender cases, unless: there is insufficient evidence; a material witness's testimony cannot be obtained; the victim provides a written objection to such sentencing; or there are extenuating circumstances precluding prosecution.

Fla. S. Comm. on Crim. Just., CS for SB 2362 (1997) Staff Analysis 7 (Apr. 10, 1997). The defendant cites, and we acknowledge, the Second District Court of Appeal's decision in State v. Cotton, 728 So.2d 251, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D18 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), holding that the "applicability of the exceptions set out in subsection (d) involves a fact-finding function," and "that the trial court, not the prosecutor, has the responsibility to determine the facts and to exercise the discretion permitted by the statute." We respectfully disagree with our sister court and decline the defendant's invitation to follow its decision. We do this for two reasons. First, our analysis above clearly establishes that the sentencing provisions of the statute are mandatory where the state complies with the statute's provisions. Second, it is, in our judgment, absurd to conclude that in a case where the defendant has been tried and found guilty by a jury—as in this case—the trial judge would be free to embark on a fact-finding mission at time of sentencing to determine whether, "the prosecuting attorney does not have sufficient evidence to prove the highest charge available." § 775.082(8)(d)1.a. Had that been the case it would have been the duty of the trial judge to grant the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the state's case. Likewise, judicial findings regarding whether "the testimony of a material witness cannot be obtained," section 775.082(8)(d)1.b, or whether "other extenuating circumstances which preclude the just prosecution of the case," section 775.082(8)(d)1.d, exist, would also be inappropriate. In the former instance all material witnesses would have testified so there would be no fact-finding to do, and the latter is clearly a question for the state's attorney and not for the judge. The only exception in s...