McLain v. Glenwood Regional Medical Center
| Decision Date | 24 June 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 23747-CA,23747-CA |
| Citation | 602 So.2d 240 |
| Parties | Charles E. McLAIN, et ux., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GLENWOOD REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, Orthopaedic Clinic of Monroe, and Dr. Myron Bailey, M.D., Defendants-Appellees. 602 So.2d 240 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Dimos, Brown, Erskine and Burkett, Monroe by Donald R. Brown, for Charles E. McLain, et ux.
Watson, Blanche, Wilson & Posner, Baton Rouge by Rene J. Pfefferle, for Glenwood Regional Medical Center.
Before MARVIN, NORRIS and STEWART, JJ.
In this medical malpractice action against a hospital, the plaintiffs appeal a judgment rejecting their demands against the Glenwood Medical Center. The judgment was based on the verdict of a jury which effectively concluded that the hospital personnel did not deviate from the standard of care expected of them in their treatment of the plaintiff wife.
The issues are essentially factual. Not finding clear error, we affirm the judgment.
The plaintiff wife, Mrs. McLain, a school bus driver afflicted with arthritis, had a history of right knee trouble. She twice underwent unsuccessful arthroscopic surgery. In July 1986, she had a total knee arthroplasty (total knee replacement) which was performed by Dr. Bailey, originally a defendant in this action who was dismissed after the plaintiffs settled their claims against him.
After the total knee replacement, Dr. Bailey administered a local anesthetic and manipulated the knee, attempting to improve the range of motion without success. Dr. Bailey thereafter admitted Mrs. McLain to Glenwood on August 11, 1987, to attempt further manipulation. On August 12, Mrs. McLain, under a spinal anesthetic, underwent further manipulation of her knee. After this was accomplished, Dr. Bailey placed her leg in a cast to temporarily maintain the leg in a fully flexed (sharply bent) position.
After being in the recovery room for almost two hours she was returned to her room about 10:45 a.m. Hospital records show that in recovery she complained of right knee pain at 10 a.m., and in her room at 10:45 a.m., at which time Dr. Bailey was contacted. Thereafter, on the doctor's orders, Mrs. McLain was given medication when she complained of pain on several occasions during the 27 hours after her leg was manipulated and placed in the cast. She was also given medication for sleep.
About 12:30 p.m., August 13, at his wife's request, Mr. McLain found blisters on the top of her leg underneath the cast. Finding Dr. Bailey in the hospital cafeteria shortly afterward, Mr. McLain informed him of the blisters. Dr. Bailey removed the cast at 1:30 p.m. Mrs. McLain suffered third degree burns as a result of the plaster of paris cast that was applied to her leg.
Mr. and Mrs. McLain presented their claim to a review panel of three doctors who concluded that Dr. Bailey's conduct was a factor in the resulting damages, but Glenwood's was not. Her demands against Dr. Bailey were compromised and dismissed. Her demands against the hospital were tried by jury.
In finding that Glenwood personnel did not deviate from the standard of care expected of them, the jury apparently concluded that it was reasonable for the nurses to attribute Mrs. McLain's complaints of pain to the knee manipulation and the flexed position of the leg, and that specific complaints of burning were not made to the nursing personnel.
The trial court denied the McLains' motions for a JNOV and a new trial.
In a medical malpractice action against a hospital, the plaintiff must prove that the hospital owed the plaintiff a duty to protect against the risk involved, that the hospital breached that duty, that the plaintiff suffered an injury, and that the hospital's actions were a substantial cause in fact of the injury. Smith v. State through Dept. HHR, 523 So.2d 815 (La.1988).
A hospital must exercise the requisite amount of care toward a patient that his or her particular condition may require. Hunt v. Bogalusa Community Medical Center, 303 So.2d 745 (La.1974); Brown v. E.A. Conway Memorial Hosp., 588 So.2d 1295 (La.App. 2d Cir.1991).
Whether a hospital has breached the duty of care it owes to a particular patient depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Hunt, supra; Brown, supra. A hospital may be held liable for the negligent conduct of all of its employees, including but not limited to nurses and staff doctors, committed while acting in the course and scope of their employment. Brown, supra.
A two-part test to review a trial court's factual determination is suggested:
1) the appellate court must find from the record that there is a reasonable factual basis for the finding of the trial court, and
2) the appellate court must further determine that the record establishes that the finding is not clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous).
Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120 (La.1987); Housley v. Cerise, 579 So.2d 973 (La.1991).
Where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact are not disturbed on review, even though other reasonable evaluations and inferences may be made. Great deference is given to the findings of the trier of fact, who is more aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding and belief in what is said by a witness. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989); Fuller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 577 So.2d 792 (La.App. 2d Cir.1991).
In the absence of objective contrary evidence or internal inconsistency which would cause a reasonable fact finder not to believe a witness's story, a decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses can virtually never be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Rosell, supra; Fuller, supra.
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