McLaran v. Mead

• Decision Date: 31 March 1871
• Citation: 48 Mo. 115
• Parties: CHARLES MCLARAN, Appellant, v. MARTHA MEAD AND LUCIEN MEAD, HER HUSBAND, Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

48 Mo. 115

CHARLES MCLARAN, Appellant,

v.MARTHA MEAD AND LUCIEN MEAD, HER HUSBAND, Respondents.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March Term, 1871.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.

Glover & Shepley, for appellant.

I. Lucien Mead took an estate in the land of his wife for her life, and that passed by the sheriff's deed. (Boyce's Adm'r v. Cayce, 17 Mo. 47; Schneider v. Staihr, 20 Mo. 269; 2 Kent, 110-111.) If, then, the deed of McLain vested the fee in Martha Mead, the husband took a fee during the marriage, and this, by the sheriff's deed, passed to McLaran.

II. Lucien Mead being insolvent, his creditors had a valid claim on whatever property proceeded from his means or credit. Mrs. Mead had no separate estate. She had property inherited from her father, who died in 1857, but it was all covered by the marital rights of her husband, Lucien Mead. He had the right to take the rents and profits during marriage, and to convey it in mortgage or otherwise to that extent.

III. The instruction No. 4 ought to have been given. The property conveyed to Mrs. Mead by McLaran was, in contemplation of the law, paid for by Lucien Mead. Mrs. Mead had no present property. Her credit, if she had any, was her husband's. The money raised to pay to McLain was raised on the husband's note and the wife's, but the wife's note was void. (Freer v. Walker, 1 Bailey, 184; Chouteau v. Merry, 3 Mo. 254; Aldridge v. Burlison, 3 Blackf. 201; Fowler v. Shorer, 7 Mass. 14; Wadleigh v. Glines, 6 N. H. 17; Sto. Prom. Notes, 87, § 85.) The note, then, in contemplation of the law, was only the note of Lucien Mead. The credit of Mrs. Mead was not pledged by the note at all. The deed of trust made to secure the note of Lucien Mead conveyed Lucien Mead's property--his estate for his wife's life. The money, then, was raised on Lucien Mead's credit--that is, his note--and on lucien Mead's security, to-wit, his conveyance of his property--his life estate. Unless Lucien Mead had joined in the deed of trust, so as to pass his interest in the property, no loan would have been effected. (Keeny v. Good, 21 Penn. St. 353.) Lucien Mead, therefore, contributed both by his means and his credit to raise the $2,000 that paid for the property. Goods purchased by the wife on her credit are liable to husband's creditors; her skill, industry and credit belong to her husband. (Robinson et al. v. Wallace, 39 Penn. St. 129; Keichline v. Keichline, 54 Penn. St. 77; Aurand v. Aurand, 43 Penn. 363; Marshall v. Pearce, 12 N. H. 130; Gault v. Saffin et al.,44 Penn. St. 307; Baringer v. Stiver, 49 Penn. St. 129; Waddingham v. Loker, 44 Mo. 134; Worth v. York, 13 Ired. 206.) If part of the consideration is fraudulent, the whole deed is void as to creditors. (Ticknor v. Wiswell, 9 Ala. 311; Patterson v. Campbell, id. 933; Hopkins v. Carey, 23 Miss. 54; Burke v. Murphy, 27 Miss. 167; Pauley v. Vogel, 42 Mo. 291; Baringer v. Stiver, 4 Am. Law Reg., N. S., 559; Hoffman et al. v. Toner, 49 Penn. St. 232; Merrill v. Smith, 37 Me. 394.)

IV. If Mrs. Mead took the deed in consideration of money raised by means of her husband's credit, or by means of her own credit, based on her common-law property or otherwise and not on her separate property, then the deed was fraudulent, regardless of her interest. The court erred in instructing the jury that an insolvent debtor, conveying property by absolute conveyance, which he records, but with an agreement that the deed was only a security, was a fair transaction as to creditors of the debtor. The instruction was calculated to mislead the jury. If the fact did not make the absolute deed fraudulent, it was a badge of fraud, and the instruction ought not to have been given. (Halcombe v. Ray, 1 Ired. 340; Coburn v. Pickering, 3 N. H. 415; Winkley v. Hill, 9 N. H. 31; Smith v. Lovell, 6 N. H. 67.)Lackland, Martin & Lackland, with whom were Krum & Decker, for respondents.

I. The claim that Lucien Mead had a life estate in the land of his wife, which became vested in McLaran by virtue of the execution sale, was excluded from all consideration by the written pleadings, which submitted the validity of Mrs. Mead's title as the only issue in the case.

II. Mrs. Mead's purchase from McLain could not inure to the use of her husband's creditors unless it was acquired with her husband's money, and not her own. The money with which her purchase was paid proceeded from her own estate--not separate estate, but such as had descended to her from her father. She executed certain promissory notes, secured by a deed of trust upon her lands, and sold the notes in the market. With the proceeds of such sale she paid for the lands in controversy. Her husband joined with her in the execution of these instruments, but only for the purpose of adding validity to the security. The money was raised upon the faith of that security. It was received by Mr. Stagg as agent of Mrs. Mead, and, as such, paid over to the vendor of this land. Her husband never touched the proceeds, nor reduced, nor claimed to reduce, the same to his possession. It has been settled in this State that the proceeds of a wife's real estate belong to her, and not to her husband. (Crofts v. Bolton, 31 Mo. 355; Kinner v. Walsh, 44 Mo. 65.)

III. Any small interest in the way of a life estate which Lucien Mead may have had in the land from which the money proceeded, would be no ground for avoiding the purchase of Mrs. Mead with such money. To avoid a purchase with money which proceeded principally from her own estate, would be surrendering to her husband's creditors something which neither they nor her husband had any claim to. If Mr. Mead had any inconsiderable interest in such proceeds, that interest might be reached in a proper proceeding to subject the lands to the enforcement of his creditors' claims to the extent of such interest. They have no equity when they attempt to avoid her interest also. The court, therefore, properly refused the instruction offered by attorneys of appellant, McLaran, which sought to avoid the deed to Mrs. Mead if Mr. Mead contributed anything to the purchase. It might be void as to his interest, which was a small thing, and still be valid as to her interest, which comprised the principal part of the purchase money, being the proceeds of her fee simple estate.

BLISS, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff, and defendant Martha Mead, each claimed to own the same undivided fourteenth of certain real estate belonging to the Jennings estate, the plaintiff having purchased it at sheriff's sale as the property of Lucien Mead, and the said Martha having before received a deed of the same. The issues arose in a suit for partition instituted by F. Rayburn and others, and this interest was set apart to the contending parties, in whose name I have entitled the case, as in controversy. After it was set off, the said parties voluntarily appeared for an adjustment of their adverse claim, and the present plaintiff set forth his title, alleging that the property was purchased by said Lucien Mead of John C. Jennings and wife in 1856; that it continued to be his property until November, 1865, when it was sold at sheriff's sale upon a judgment in favor of the Union Bank, and bought by the plaintiff.

He charges that said Lucien, in September, 1862, conveyed the property to one Montague to defraud his creditors and secure a sum of money borrowed of him; that he paid up said sum of money, and caused said Montague to convey the same to one McLain, with intent to defraud his creditors and secure an advance by said McLain; and having paid up all that said McLain had advanced, he caused him, in June, 1865, to convey the same property to his said wife Martha Mead, with intent to defraud his creditors. He therefore prays that the title to the land be vested in him. Defendants deny all fraud, and set out a purchase by, and a good title in, the said Martha Mead. The issue was submitted to a jury, who found for the defendant.

The plaintiff offered in evidence the deeds from Jennings to Lucien Mead, from Lucien Mead to Montague, from Montague to McLain, and from McLain to Martha Mead, the last of which was dated some six months before his purchase at sheriff's sale. He also showed that the deed to Montague, although absolute on its face, was intended as a security for a loan of $1,000, and that Montague's deed to McLain was made at Lucien Mead's request as security for $2,000 loaned him, $1,000 of which was to pay Montague, and the other thousand was advanced some time afterward. In regard to Mrs. Mead's purchase, McLain testifies that ...