McLaughlin's Adm'rs v. Daniel

• Decision Date: 10 June 1838
• Citation: 38 Ky. 182
• Parties: McLaughlin's Administrators v. Daniel.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

38 Ky. 182

McLaughlin's Administrators v. Daniel.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 10, 1838

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR SCOTT COUNTY.

Messrs Morehead & Brown for plaintiffs.

Messrs Robinson & Johnson for defendant.

OPINION

EWING JUDGE.

Statement of the case.

William Clark obtained judgment against John McLaughlin's administrators, for a demand due to their intestate, at the July Court, 1821, for two hundred and twenty one dollars fifteen cents damages, and eleven dollars forty seven cents costs. His execution was levied on a negro boy, by the name of Jack, as assets in the hands of the administrators--he being found in the possession of Mrs. McLaughlin, who was one of them; and upon a sale under the levy, Enos Daniel became the purchaser, and sold the boy to Keningham.

Mary McLaughlin, one of the children of John, set up claim to the slave, and commenced an action of detinue against Keningham and recovered him.

Enos Daniel, claiming to have satisfied the judgment, commenced this suit, in chancery, to recover the amount of Clark's judgment, and enforce its collection of some slaves in the possession of the widow, and former administratrix of Clark she and her co-administrator having been previously removed, on the motion of their securities, and the sheriff ordered to take possession of the estate; and to which slaves, she and her children set up claim in their own right, under her father, Charles Daniel; also, to enjoin a bond for the balance of the price, which had been executed by him to Taylor, the sheriff, to whom the estate was committed upon the removal of the administrators.

The defendants answer resisting the recovery, upon the ground, first, of a defect of parties; second, that the complainant was fully apprised, at the time of his purchase of Jack, that he was the property of Mary McLaughlin; third, that the slaves sought to be subjected, were the property of the widow and children, and were never the estate of the decedent.

And the widow and her former co-administrator, besides the foregoing grounds, allege that they have settled with the County Court, and made distribution more than five years before the commencement of this suit; and plead and rely upon the statute of limitation of 1819, Statute Law, 1147. Also, that the widow has been in the adverse possession of the slaves sought to be subjected, claiming them in her own right, and as natural guardian to her children, for more than five years, and can not now be disturbed by a creditor.

The Circuit Court decreed that the slaves were subject to the debts of the creditors of the deceased; and that the complainant should be substituted in the place of Clark, whose debt he paid amounting to two hundred and thirty two dollars sixty two and a half cents; and that the slaves, or so many of them as were necessary, should be subjected to sale for the payment of the same and costs; and perpetuated the injunction against the bond to the sheriff for the residue of the price of the slave Jack. And the defendants have appealed to this Court; and assign various errors, questioning the decree, some of which only, we deem necessary to notice.

Decree of the circuit court. and appeal.

The defendant's counsel had also, filed cross errors, questioning the decree upon the ground that no interest was given.

We perceive no material defects of parties.

And admitting that Enos Daniel knew that Jack belonged to Mary McLaughlin, and was not subject to the execution against the estate, this, in our judgment, presents no legal impediment to his claim upon the estate, for the amount of Clark's demand paid by him. The slave was sold as the property of the estate, under the process of law; he purchased him, and, by his purchase, and execution of a sale bond to Clark, he satisfied and extinguished that amount against the estate, and for which it stood responsible. And, according to the principle repeatedly recognized by this Court, he has an equitable right to be substituted in the place of the creditor, and to have the amount so paid refunded to him out of the estate. His equity rests, not upon the ground of his want of knowledge as to the title of the slave, but on the ground of his having discharged a judgment against the estate, for which it stood chargeable, by a purchase of property, made under the coercive process of the law, and therefore, has the equitable right, to be reimbursed out of the estate. And if it could be deemed to be important for him to show, that he had actually paid off the sale bond, the lapse of time since its execution, would authorize a presumption of its payment, especially in the absence of any distinct denial of the fact by any of the defendants, and especially as the record before us, is certified to be only a part of the record, the residue having been destroyed in the burning of the office of the Court, where the case was tried. Nor do we deem it important for him to show by proof, that he has refunded the consideration to his vendee, Keningham, or satisfied him. He attended upon and defended the suit brought against him for the slave, and is bound by the recovery. And if he has not satisfied him, he stands personally liable to him; and Keningham has no remedy against the estate, as he would have, upon a sale of real estate and warranty of title. The complainant's right to be reimbursed is complete upon a judgment and eviction by paramount title against himself, or his vendee. And if the proof of payment to Keningham were deemed necessary, it would be presumed for the same reasons given as to the payment to Clark.

The purchaser of property sold under ex'on has a right, in equity, when the property is recovered from him, or his vendee, by virtue of a superior title, to ??e substituted for the creditor, and to have the amount of his purchase money refunded to him by the defendant in the execution, or--where the execution was against administrators--out of the assets of the intestate. And his rights in this respect are not affected by his knowing, at the time of his purchase, that the property sold belonged to a stranger, and was not subject to the execution.

If a sale bond was given by the purchaser in such a case, its satisfaction may be presumed from lapse of time.

Where the property was recovered from a vendee of the purchaser under execution, it is not necessary for the latter to show, in his suit for indemnity, that he has reimbursed his vendee, to whom he only, and not the defendant in the execution, is liable.

Nor can we admit that the allegations of the bill do not sufficiently charge a recovery of Jack by paramount title. And if they could be deemed insufficient, any defect in this respect is supplied by the answers; all of which concede the fact, that Jack belonged to Mary McLaughlin, and she sued and recovered him from Keningham. And if this admission be regarded as made only in the answers of the administrators, it is sufficient for the purposes of the complainant's recovery, as will appear hereafter.

Defects in the allegations of a bill may be supplied by concessions in the answer.

The statute of limitation of 1819 will not bar the complainant's equity; nor can the possession of the widow, for more than five years, be relied on, to protect her, or the estate in her hands, from responsibility, if it is otherwise subject to the payment of the testator's debts.

Where property is sold under execution against adm'rs, as assets, and the purchasers afterwards loses it by paramount tit'e, his cause of action, to have his purchase money refunded out of the estate of the decedent. accrues at the time of eviction, not before. And--

Tho' by the act of 1819 (S. L. 1147) an ex'or or adm'r is exempt from suit on account of any contract made with the decedent,...