McLaughlin v. American Oil Co.

• Decision Date: 17 July 1979
• Docket Number: No. 3-1278A321,3-1278A321
• Citation: 391 N.E.2d 864,181 Ind.App. 356
• Parties: Barry McLAUGHLIN, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. AMERICAN OIL COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, and Joseph J. Claro, M.D., Appellees (Defendants Below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 864

391 N.E.2d 864

181 Ind.App. 356

Barry McLAUGHLIN, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. AMERICAN OIL COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, and Joseph J Claro, M.D., Appellees (Defendants Below).

No. 3-1278A321.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, Third District.

July 17, 1979.

Terrence M. Rubino, Hammond, for appellant.

Lester F. Murphy, East Chicago, for appellees; Murphy, McAtee, Murphy & Constanza, East Chicago, of counsel.

HOFFMAN, Judge.

Barry McLaughlin brought this suit seeking damages against Dr. Joseph Claro, a company physician, for medical malpractice and against American Oil Company for intentional tort. McLaughlin had suffered severe burns while working at American's Whiting, Indiana refinery, and he alleged that Claro's disregard of the seriousness of his injury was the result of American's attempt to maintain its plant safety statistics by influencing the medical treatment given to him.

The suit was originally filed in the Lake Superior Court, and appellees' first motion for summary judgment was overruled by that court. After a change of venue to the LaPorte Circuit Court, appellees filed their "Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment" which was based on the same ground as the original motion: that McLaughlin's sole remedy was that provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act. The court initially denied the "Supplemental Motion;" but, after appellees' subsequent motion to reconsider, the court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants.

McLaughlin now seeks reversal of the summary judgment on the following grounds:

(1) that the ruling of the Lake Superior Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment was, under the doctrine of "the law of the case," a bar to any subsequent inconsistent ruling on the same issues;

(2) that IC 1971, 22-3-2-13 (Burns Code Ed.), which limits the remedies of an employee injured by the acts of a fellow employee to those provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act, presents no barrier to a malpractice action against a company physician; and

(3) that, because his claim against American alleges injury caused by an intentional act, it is not one for which the Workmen's Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy.

McLaughlin presents a two-pronged argument regarding the effect of the doctrine of the law of the case on the rulings made below. First, he argues that the ruling of the Lake Superior Court, the first court to address the summary judgment motion, was binding on the LaPorte Circuit Court upon a change of venue. A similar argument was laid to rest in State ex rel. Williams Coal Co. v. Duncan, Judge (1937), 211 Ind. 203, at 207, 6 N.E.2d 342, at 343-344, wherein our Supreme Court specifically stated that the ruling of the first judge who exercises jurisdiction does not become the law of the case. Moreover, the court noted that the judge who later has jurisdiction is duty-bound to exercise his judicial discretion "as though the matter were presented for the first time." 211 Ind. 203, 6 N.E.2d at 344. As his second argument, McLaughlin asserts that once the LaPorte Circuit Court had initially denied the "Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment", it was powerless to change that ruling. However, this Court has previously held that a trial court has inherent power to reconsider, vacate or modify any previous order, so long as the case has not proceeded to judgment, i. e., the case is still In fieri. Indiana Suburban Sewers, Inc. v. Hanson (1975), Ind.App., 334 N.E.2d 720, at 723; Metro. Develp. Comm. et al. v. Newlon et al. (1973), 156 Ind.App....