McLaughlin v. Feerick

• Decision Date: 26 June 1931
• Citation: 276 Mass. 180,176 N.E. 779
• Parties: McLAUGHLIN v. FEERICK et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

276 Mass. 180

176 N.E. 779

McLAUGHLIN

v.FEERICK et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

June 26, 1931.

Appeal from Probate Court, Middlesex County; Charles N. Harris, Judge.

In the matter of the estate of Nellie Elizabeth McLaughlin, deceased. Petitions by Frederick W. McLaughlin to revoke a decree appointing James J. Feerick administrator; to revoke a decree authorizing the compromise of claims; to revoke a decree licensing the sale of real estate; for the removal of Feerick as administrator, and for revocation of a decree allowing his final account. From a decree dismissing the petitions, petitioner appeals.

Affirmed.E. J. Davis, of Brighton, and S. Abrams, of Boston, for petitioner.

L. A. Mayberry, H. L. Barrett, R. F. Bradford, and G. F. Mckelleget, all of Boston, for respondents.

CARROLL, J.

Nellie Elizabeth McLaughlin died intestate April 19, 1927. On the petition of Sarah McLaughlin, an alleged creditor, James J. Feerick was appointed administrator. The petition for the appointment of an administrator alleged that the intestate died possessed of goods and estate remaining to be administered, ‘leaving no husband, and as her only heirs-at-law and next of kin * * * Frederick W. McLaughlin [of] Newton [her] son * * * (In U. S. Navy. Last heard from at Manila, P. I.).’ The administrator, by a decree of the probate court, was authorized to sell the real estate of the intestate and to adjust by compromise certain claims against the estate.

Frederick W. McLaughlin, who became of age June 4, 1928, in March, 1930, brought four petitions in the probate court alleging that he was the legally adopted son of Nellie Elizabeth McLaughlin; that at the time of her death he was her only heir and was then in the service of the United States Navy in China; and that Feerick was appointed administrator of the estate of the intestate. The petitions also allege that Feerick, Sarah McLaughlin, Mary McLaughlin, Edward McLaughlin and Dennis M. Cronion conspired to defraud the petitioner by securing the approval of the probate court of fictitious claims and by concealing from the petitioner and the court property of the intestate's estate; that the administrator was permitted to compromise certain claims and to sell the property of the estate to pay these claims; and that the allowance of the administrator's final account was approved through fraud. The four petitions are (1) a petition to revoke the decree appointing Feerick administrator; (2) a petition to revoke the decree authorizing a compromise of claim; (3) a petition to revoke the decree licensing the sale of real estate; and (4) a petition for the removal of Feerick as administrator and for a revocation of the decree allowing his final account. In the probate court the petitions were dismissed. The petitioner appealed.

The petitions based on the alleged fraud were properly dismissed. It is a general rule that when a final decree is entered in an equity suit, the case is finally disposed of subject to a right of appeal, and fraud in the presentation of the case in which the decree was based is not a ground for the revocation of the decree. The reason for the rule was stated by Knowlton, C. J. in Zeitlin v. Zeitlin, 202 Mass. 205, at page 207, 88 N. E. 762,23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 569, 132 Am. St. Rep. 490: ‘It is in the interests of justice that, after a trial and final judgment in a case, the matters heard and adjudicated shall not be opened for a further hearing because of a supposed error in the determination of facts by the tribunal that heard the evidence. A contention that some part of the material testimony was false might be made with plausibility, in a large proportion of the cases that are tried.’ This rule applies to decrees of probate courts. Renwick v. Macomber, 233 Mass. 530, 534, 124 N. E. 670;Fuller v. Fuller, 261, Mass. 82, 158 N. E. 333;Clarke v. Clarke, 262 Mass. 297, 159 N. E. 750;Pepper v. Old Colony Trust Co., 262 Mass. 570, 160 N. E. 446;Holyoke National Bank v. Dulitzky (Mass.) 173 N. E. 405. There are exceptions to the general rule: A probate court can correct errors in its decrees, Waters v. Stickney, 12 Allen, 1, 90 Am. Dec. 122;Harris v. Starkey, 176 Mass. 445, 57 N. E. 698,79 Am. St. Rep. 322; a decree may be revoked if procured by fraud which induced the court to take jurisdiction it did not have, Sampson v. Sampson, 223 Mass. 451, 461, 462, 112 N. E. 84, a decree may also be vacated if the fraud operates to deprive an interested party of his day in court, Child v. Clark, 231 Mass. 3, 120 N. E. 77. See Tucker v. Fisk, 154 Mass. 574, 28 N. E. 1051;Sullivan v. Sullivan, 266 Mass. 228, 165 N. E. 89. The facts in the case before us bring it within the general rule and not within the exceptions. See Hilton v. Hopkins (Mass.) 175 N. E. 162.

The original petition for authority to compromise the claims against the estate was dated May 9, 1928. The presiding judge made a notation that the citation should not be returnable before June 4, when Frederick W. McLaughlin, the present petitioner, would be of age. The citation was in fact returnable June 11 and was served by delivery of a copy to all persons interested, including the present petitioner. He did not appear in opposition to this petition. He was of full age and had ample opportunity to oppose the petition to compromise if he so desired. The petition to revoke this decree was properly dismissed. The decree to sell the real estate was dated June 20, 1928. This decree was based upon a petition which was assented to by the present petitioner. He was of full age and the fact that he was without business experience is not a ground for the revocation of this...