Mclaughlin v. Mayor of Cambridge

• Decision Date: 30 June 1925
• Citation: 253 Mass. 193
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: FREDERICK H. McLAUGHLIN v. MAYOR OF CAMBRIDGE & another.

253 Mass. 193

FREDERICK H. McLAUGHLIN v. MAYOR OF CAMBRIDGE & another.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

June 30, 1925

January 20, 1925.

Present: RUGG, C.

J., BRALEY, CROSBY PIERCE, WAIT, & SANDERSON, JJ.

Civil Service. Cambridge. Police. Municipal Corporations, Charter Plan B Mandamus.

The adoption of an ordinance by the city of Cambridge in 1917, abolishing the then existing department of public safety and establishing a fire department and a police department and placing the police department under the chief of police as its head, was effectual under St. 1915, c.

267, Part I Section 5.

That part of a rule of the Cambridge police department providing in substance that, before the removal of a police officer for cause, he was entitled to be heard by a trial board appointed by the chief of police, was held, to be subject to the provisions of civil service law in G.L.c. 31, Section 42A, and therefore to be of no effect, since the statutory provisions were for a hearing "before the officer or board having power of appointment and removal."

Although G.L.c. 31, Section 45, which provides for a review by a district or municipal court of a decision of removal under Section 42A, states that "The decision of the court shall be final and conclusive upon the parties," the parties are not deprived of the right to have manifest errors of law corrected by a writ of certiorari.

A writ of mandamus will not be granted to give relief from removal of the petitioner under G.L.c. 31, Section 42A, where he has an adequate remedy under Section 45 of that statute.

PETITION, filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Middlesex on April 15, 1924, for a writ of mandamus

"ordering" all of the acts of the respondent John J. McBride in removing the petitioner from office of patrolman "to be rendered null and void and that the order of removal be revoked and all entries thereto be stricken from the records"; and that the respondent Edward W. Quinn, "the duly elected mayor of said city of Cambridge and the executive head thereof and clothed with all the rights, powers and duties pertaining thereto over the various departments including the police department, may reinstate the said petitioner to his office as patrolman."

The petition was heard by Carroll, J., upon the pleadings and an agreed statement of facts. Material facts are described in the opinion.

Rule No. 55 of the general regulations for the government of the police force of the city of Cambridge was as follows:

"Any officer may be punished by the Chief, in his discretion, either by reprimand, suspension, or fine not exceeding in amount five days' pay for any one offence which may be enforced by withholding pay, and in accordance with the provisions of the laws governing the civil service by the Chief of Police, by being reduced in rank, or by dismissal from the Force, either on conviction by any court of any offence, or if found guilty by a trial Board appointed by the Chief of any one of the following offences, to wit: [enumerating intoxication and fourteen other offences]. . . ."

The petitioner asked for the following rulings of law: "1. That the acceptance of the municipal charter Plan B did not either expressly or impliedly grant power to the city council of Cambridge to repeal an act of the State Legislature made for the benefit of the city of Cambridge known as St. 1912, c. 611.

"2. That the act of the Cambridge city council entitled `An Ordinance abolishing the department of public safety' of 1917 did not repeal St. 1912, c. 611, either expressly or by implication.

"3. That the suspension of your petitioner from the Cambridge police department is in violation of G.L.c. 31, Section 42A.

"4. That the removal of your petitioner from his office is void because: --

(a) He has never received notice of the finding of the trial board of

March 17, 1924, as provided for by G.L.c. 31, Section 42A. (b) He has not been accorded a hearing as required by rule 55 of the

Cambridge police regulations and without such hearing cannot be removed from the department.

(c) That he has not been accorded a fair and impartial hearing as required by G.L.c. 31 under your respondent who disqualified himself from giving such a hearing by an expression of bias, prejudice and prejudgment.

(d) That your respondent is not impowered by law to remove officers from the Cambridge police department which power is vested in a commissioner of public safety.

"5. That the hearing of March 26, 1924 was in violation of your petitioner's legal rights and constitutional guarantees because in violation of G.L.c. 31, Rule 55 of the Cambridge police regulations and your petitioner's right not to be twice tried for same offence.

"6. That rule 55 of the Cambridge police regulations is in full force and effect and that thereunder your petitioner was entitled to a hearing before a trial board before a removal from office."

The single justice refused to rule as requested by the petitioner, ordered the petition dismissed, and reported the case upon the pleadings and the agreed statement of facts to the full court for determination.

The case was argued at the bar in January, 1925, before Rugg, C.J., Braley, Crosby, & Wait, JJ., and afterwards was submitted on briefs to all the Justices except Carroll, J.

F. Hunt, (G.

A.McLaughlin with him,) for the plaintiff.

P.J. Nelligan, city solicitor, for the defendants.

CROSBY, J. This is a petition for a writ of mandamus, brought to compel the respondents to reinstate the petitioner as a patrolman in the police department of the city of Cambridge, from which he was removed March 27, 1924, by the respondent McBride as chief of police of that city. Hereinafter McBride will be referred to as the respondent. The question, whether the petitioner received seasonable notice of his suspension is immaterial as this proceeding is not brought to reinstate him because of such suspension, but on account of his removal from office.

The parties have agreed upon certain facts, from which it appears that the petitioner on January 20, 1924, was a patrolman on the Cambridge police force; that the respondent, previous to that date, had been appointed chief of the police department of that city, which appointment was confirmed by the city council, and by virtue thereof he has since acted in that capacity; that the respondent Quinn was and still is mayor of the city; that on January 23, 1924, the respondent received a written report from one Ginty, a lieutenant in the police department, to the effect that the petitioner, on the night of January 20, 1924, was intoxicated; that on January 23 the respondent suspended him from duty, and notice in writing of such suspension was delivered to him on the same date; that on January 24, the respondent received formal charges of intoxication and arrest therefor against the petitioner, made by one Leahy, captain of the petitioner's district; that on February 1, 1924, the respondent appointed three police officers of the department as a trial board, and also notified the petitioner of the charges and that a hearing would be held thereon February 6, 1924; that thereafter on account of illness of the petitioner the hearing was adjourned from time to time until March 17, 1924, on which date he filed with the board written objections to the jurisdiction of the board to hear charges against him; that no further action was taken by it. On March 19, 1924, the respondent notified the petitioner that he contemplated removing him as a police officer for reasons specifically given to him in writing, and appointed March 26, 1924, for a hearing. At the time and place fixed for the hearing the petitioner appeared by counsel and objected in writing to the jurisdiction of the respondent to hear charges against him but the latter proceeded with the hearing. On March 27, 1924, the respondent made his decision, finding the petitioner guilty upon the charges, and removed him from his position as police officer, and on the same day notice in writing, as required by law, was given to him of such decision. It is also agreed that since January 3, 1916, the city of Cambridge has been governed by the provisions of Plan B,...