McLaughlin v. State

• Decision Date: 08 October 1971
• Docket Number: No. 42512,42512
• Citation: 291 Minn. 277,190 N.W.2d 867
• Parties: Michael Patrick McLAUGHLIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 867

190 N.W.2d 867

291 Minn. 277

Michael Patrick McLAUGHLIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.

No. 42512.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Oct. 8, 1971.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The lower court could reasonably find that appellant's confession and guilty plea were not made in reliance on a promise by a police officer.

2. An arresting officer without a warrant need not have personal knowledge of all facts establishing probable cause when the arrest was pursuant to a request of police officials of another city who did have probable cause.

3. Criminal sanctions for uttering a forged prescription do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment to appellant although he was a drug addict.

4. An indeterminate sentence according to law which could last for as long as 20 years is not cruel and unusual punishment for one convicted of uttering a forged prescription.

C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Roberta K. Levy, Doris O. Huspeni, Asst. Public Defenders, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., James M. Kelley, Asst. Atty. Gen., William B. Randall, County Atty., Steven C. DeCoster, Asst. Co. Atty., St. Paul, for respondent.

Heard before NELSON, MURPHY, PETERSON, KELLY, and ODDEN, JJ.

OPINION

KELLY, Justice.

This is an appeal by a state prisoner from the district court's denial of postconviction relief. Appellant attacks the validity of his arrest and search and the voluntariness of his confession and guilty plea. He further contends that the indeterminate sentence not to exceed 20 years is cruel and unusual punishment for uttering a forged drug prescription. We affirm.

During November 1964, Lieutenant Ernest Williams of the St. Paul Police Department was in charge of investigating a series of forged drug prescriptions. With the aid of a police photograph, one or more druggists had identified appellant as the alleged forger. In addition, the license plate number of the suspected forger was registered to appellant or a member of appellant's household, and it was found that his residence was at a Hopkins address. Lieutenant Williams requested Hopkins authorities to arrest appellant but did not procure an arrest warrant. Pursuant to that request, Officer Firmis Opitz of the Hopkins Police Department began to stake out appellant's home on November 30, 1964. Shortly after 9 p.m., Opitz observed a car matching the description of the vehicle used by the suspected forger and followed it, shining a red light on the pursued car. The car speeded up, and Opitz gave chase. The car then crashed into a parked car, whereupon appellant jumped out and was standing next to the car at the time of his arrest. A search of the area revealed two plastic containers of morphine tablets, some syringes, and some prescription pads, one of the containers of morphine tablets being found on the ground next to appellant's left foot.

A few hours later, appellant was taken to St. Paul and charged with violating Minn.St.1969, § 618.18, relating to the forgery of drug prescriptions. At the time of appellant's arrest, the maximum penalty for such violations was 20 years in a state penal institution. Section 618.18 has since been repealed and, in a different form, reenacted with a maximum penalty of 4 years' imprisonment, a fine of $30,000, or both. L.1971, c. 937, § 17, subd. 3.

After being taken to St. Paul, appellant was questioned by St. Paul police officers. At that time he was a drug addict, taking intravenously at least one-half grain of morphine seven or eight times a day. By 2 or 3 a.m., December 1, 1964, he began suffering withdrawal symptoms. At 4:33 a.m., he made an unsigned exculpatory statement and demanded an attorney. At 2:45 p.m. of the same day, appellant gave a confession which he later signed at 8:30 p.m. that day. On December 2, 1964, the still-uncounseled defendant signed a second confession. A week later, with his attorney present, appellant pleaded guilty to uttering a forged prescription. The trial judge sentenced appellant to an indeterminate sentence not to exceed 20 years.

Appellant filed a petition seeking postconviction relief on November 17, 1969, alleging (1) that the plea was involuntary and had not been made with complete understanding because appellant erroneously thought that his arrest and confession were legal and because he was induced to plead by promises of treatment, and (2) that both his conviction and his sentence violate the prohibitions of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments against cruel and unusual punishment.

A postconviction hearing was held March 2 and 3, 1970. Appellant testified that Lieutenant Williams had assured him that the court would be more interested in helping him than punishing him. Williams, it was claimed, had stated that he would intercede on appellant's behalf and see that he received tretment at the Federal treatment center in Lexington, Kentucky. Appellant contends that he believed Williams could arrange for this treatment. Appellant felt that his reasoning had been impaired due to his withdrawal symptoms. Finally, appellant testified, he signed the confession, and later pleaded guilty as charged, because of Williams' assurances. While he admitted that he had stated at the plea hearing that his plea was voluntary and that he had received no threats or promises, he asserted that he had been told that such admissions were proper and routine. He testified at the postconviction hearing that he did not tell his attorney about statements made to him by Williams.

At the postconviction hearing, Lieutenant Williams admitted that appellant was having withdrawal symptoms during questioning and that he had discussed appellant's drug problem with him. However, Williams denied making any specific threats or promises to appellant. He stated that he could not remember mentioning the treatment center at Lexington.

1. Assuming for the sake of argument that the arrest and detention of appellant were constitutionally defective, the question arises whether appellant may raise such defects after tendering a plea of guilty. The United States Supreme Court has recently answered that precise question in the negative. In McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970), state prisoners alleged that their guilty pleas were products of confessions obtained by physical coercion. The court ruled that allegations that the pleas were motivated by coerced confessions, without more, did not entitle the prisoners to a habeas corpus hearing or relief. The logic advanced in McMann is compelling:

'* * * (T)he decision to plead guilty before the evidence is in frequently involves the making of difficult judgments. All the pertinent facts normally cannot be known unless witnesses are examined and cross-examined in court. Even then the truth will often be in dispute. In the face of unavoidable uncertainty, the defendant and his counsel must make their best judgment as to the weight of the State's case. Counsel must predict how the facts, as he understands them, would be viewed by a court. If proved, would the facts convince a judge or jury of the defendant's guilt? On those facts would evidence seized without a warrant be admissible? Would the trier of fact on those facts find a confession voluntary and admissible? Questions like these cannot be answered with certitude; yet a decision to plead guilty must necessarily rest upon counsel's answers, uncertain as they may be. Waiving trial entails the inherent risk that the good-faith evaluations of a reasonably competent attorney will turn out to be mistaken either as to the facts or as to what a court's judgment might be on given facts.' 397 U.S. 769, 90 S.Ct. 1448, 25 L.Ed.2d 772.

McMann does not apply to situations 'where the circumstances that coerced the confession have abiding impact and also taint the plea.' 397 U.S. 767, 90 S.Ct. 1447, 25 L.Ed.2d 771. See, State ex rel. Drysdale v. Tahash, 278 Minn. 361, 154 N.W.2d 691 (1967). Neither does McMann pertain to defendants who plead while uncounseled. See, Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116, 76 S.Ct. 223, 100 L.Ed. 126 (1956).

In the present case the lower court was justified in rejecting appellant's contention that he pleaded guilty because of his reliance upon a claimed promise by Lieutenant Williams. At the time of entering his plea, appellant testified under oath that no threats or promises had been made in an effort to elicit a guilty plea. That testimony corroborates similar statements made in his two inculpatory confessions. No believable evidence exists upon which it could be found that the confessions were induced by a promise, much less that any promise had an abiding impact resulting in the guilty plea.

Even if the confessions and evidence obtained at the time of arrest were suppressible, the plea of guilty in this case should be sustained because appellant was represented by counsel. As pointed out in McMann, a decision to plead guilty must necessarily rest upon counsel's answers, uncertain as they...