McLaughlin v. Watson
| Decision Date | 20 November 2001 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 00-2377 and 01-1372,s. 00-2377 and 01-1372 |
| Citation | 271 F.3d 566 |
| Parties | (3rd Cir. 2001) JOHN MCLAUGHLIN; CHARLES A. MICEWSKI; DENNIS J. MCKEEFERY; EDWARD EGGLES v. ALEX WATSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT; DAVE LAWRENCE; LARRY LEIGHTLEY; VICTORIA NAYLOR; MICHAEL STILES; DETECTIVE SILVANA; DETECTIVE WOODS; ARNOLD GORDON; TOM CORBETT; JOHN KELLY; MICHAEL B. FISHER; RICHARD PATTON; LOU GENTILE; FIQUITO VASQUEZ; PENA- GOMEZ; PEDRO CORPORAN MICHAEL STILES, APPELLANT |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 97-CV-01555) District Judge: Hon. A. Richard Caputo
Mary C. Fry, Esq. Office of the United States Attorney Federal Building 228 Walnut Street P.O. Box 11754 Harrisburg, PA 17108, Peter R. Maier, Esq. (Argued) United States Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Staff 601 D. Street, N.W., Rm. 9106 Washington, DC 20530, and Barbara L. Herwig, Esq. United States Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Staff 601 D. Street, N.W., Rm. 9110 Washington, DC 20530, for Appellant.
Donald A. Bailey, Esq. (Argued) 4311 North 6th Street Harrisburg, PA 17110, for Appellees McLaughlin; Micewski; McKeefery and Eggles.
Robert B. Hoffman, Esq. Reed Smith 213 Market Street P.O. Box 11844 Harrisburg, PA 17101, for Appellees Kelly; Fisher; Patton and Gentile.
Before: Scirica, Greenberg and Cowen, Circuit Judges
We are presented with the question of when a federal official is entitled to "qualified immunity" in a Bivens-based1 civil action for damages. Because we conclude that the District Court erred in denying Defendant the protection of qualified immunity, we will reverse.
This litigation centers around an investigation into drug trafficking activities in the Dominican Republic. Plaintiffs/Appellees are agents of the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office who were involved in the drug investigation. In 1997, Plaintiffs filed a Bivens suit against Defendant/Appellant Michael Stiles ("Stiles"), then United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The Complaint alleged that Stiles violated Plaintiffs' first amendment rights and fifth amendment due process rights, and violated the provisions of 42 U.S.C. S 1981. Plaintiffs also filed a civil rights action against members of the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office ("PAG" Defendants), including Pennsylvania Attorney General Michael Fisher ("Fisher"), alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. SS 1981 and 1983. The original Complaint is long, prolix, and somewhat difficult to discern. However, the various causes of action were grounded in factual assertions that Defendants intentionally impeded Plaintiffs' criminal investigation and caused adverse employment conditions for Plaintiffs because Defendants wished to protect the Dominican drug organization. This appeal only involves the allegations against Stiles.
Stiles moved to dismiss the Complaint for non- compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. The Magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation that the Motion to Dismiss be granted. The District Court adopted the Magistrate's Recommendations and dismissed the case against Stiles, noting that Stiles was entitled to "absolute prosecutorial immunity." The case against the PAG Defendants was also dismissed because it failed to state viable claims and because the suit was barred by the 11th amendment to the United States Constitution.
In an unpublished opinion, a panel of this Court reversed. See McLaughlin v. Watson, No. 99-3087, (Sept. 21, 1999) ("McLaughlin I"). The Panel held that Plaintiffs were entitled to amend their Complaint to state a first amendment cause of action against the PAG defendants and an "administrative" cause of action against Stiles. Id. at 3-4. The Panel explained that while Plaintiffs' Complaint was "not a model of clarity," the Complaint suggested that Stiles used his influence as a United States Attorney to "obtain adverse personnel actions" against Plaintiffs. Id. at 3. The Panel further explained:
As we made clear in Carter v. City of Philadelphia, [181 F.3d 339 (3d Cir. 1999)], prosecutorial immunity is restricted to prosecutorial--as distinguished from administrative--functions. Administrative decisions, including those regarding the employment or supervision of personnel outside the prosecutor's office, are not subject to absolute prosecutorial immunity. Because [U.S. Attorney] Stiles was not clearly entitled to prosecutorial immunity from all of the claims against him, the analysis for whether the Agents state a cause of action against Stiles should proceed along the same lines as for the PAG Defendants.
Pursuant to the Panel's suggestion in McLaughlin I, Plaintiffs amended their Complaint, which now included three counts.2 In Count I, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants (both PAG and Stiles) impaired Plaintiffs' "terms and conditions" of employment via adverse "administrative" personnel action. According to Count I, Plaintiffs' rights were violated because Stiles and the PAG Defendants:
[impaired] where [Plaintiffs] could work, how much they were required to travel to the point of extreme hardship causing serious and painful medical consequences, loss of promotional opportunities, and subsequent wages, shift differentials and overtime and career damaging evaluation reports.
App. at 234. According to the Amended Complaint, these actions breached Plaintiffs' "federally guaranteed rights to be free of irrational and injuries [sic] administrative actions for the proper performance of their duties...."
Count II of the Amended Complaint alleged that Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their right to "substantive due process" by subjecting them to unfair treatment in their public employment. Count II further alleged that Defendants acted against Plaintiffs solely because of "their successful efforts to investigate [the Dominican] criminal wrongdoing." Id. at 235.
Count III of the Amended Complaint alleged that Defendants violated Plaintiffs' first amendment rights by preventing Plaintiffs from responding to negative comments about Plaintiffs contained in certain press releases. According to the Amended Complaint: "the PAG defendants are still unlawfully enforcing today [their order to Plaintiffs] not to respond to the press in any form, or answer any charges in any forums." App. at 236.
Stiles moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint based on qualified immunity or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The summary judgment part of the motion argued that there was no issue of fact as to whether Stiles acted administratively against Plaintiffs. In a Memorandum Opinion dated July 6, 2000, the District Court denied Stiles' Motion to Dismiss with the following language:
Defendant contends he is entitled to qualified immunity. I find it premature to determine this issue in defendant's favor. There is a first amendment claim asserted against defendant. That is a clearly established constitutional right, which, if interfered with by defendant's use of influence with plaintiffs' employer, would nullify the availability of qualified immunity.
The Motion for Summary Judgment was denied because the District Court concluded that "there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether actions taken by defendant caused adverse employment decisions to be made concerning the plaintiffs...."3 Stiles now appeals again to this Court, solely on the qualified immunity issue.
We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. S 1291; see Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 115 S.Ct. 2151 (1995); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (1985). We review a motion to dismiss based on the defense of qualified immunity de novo as it involves a pure question of law. Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 609 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Burns v. County of Cambria, 971 F.2d 1015, 1020 (3d Cir. 1992)).
The contours of the doctrine of "qualified immunity" are well-delineated and its underlying rationale has been clearly pronounced. As the Supreme Court explained, "permitting damages suits against government officials can entail substantial social costs, including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038 (1987). Courts have accommodated this concern "by generally providing government officials performing discretionary functions with a `qualified immunity,' shielding them from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated." Id.; see Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096 (1986).
"One of the purposes of [qualified] immunity... is to spare a defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn out lawsuit." Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 237, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793 (1991). Doctrinally speaking, qualified immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815 (1985) (emphasis in original); see Siegert, 500 U.S. at 226, 111 S.Ct. at 1794. As the Supreme Court has explained, "qualified immunity" affords "protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. at 1096. The rule supports "the need to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority." In Re City of Philadelphia Litig., 49 F.3d 945, 960 (3d Cir. 1995) (quot...
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