McLellan v. Colo. Dep't of Human Servs.
| Decision Date | 06 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 20CA1217 |
| Citation | 507 P.3d 1025,2022 COA 7 |
| Parties | Sally A. MCLELLAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES and Larimer County Department of Human Services, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, Keith Bradley, Scheleese Goudy, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Aaron J. Pratt, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee Colorado Department of Human Services
Gordon P. McLaughlin, District Attorney, Andrew Lewis, Deputy District Attorney, Fort Collins, Colorado; Jeannine Haag, County Attorney, David P. Ayraud, Deputy County Attorney, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee Larimer County Department of Human Services
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
¶ 1 Appellant, Sally A. McLellan, appeals the district court's judgment upholding the decision of the Colorado Department of Human Services (the Department), through its Office of Appeals, allowing the Larimer County Department of Human Services (Larimer County) to retain a Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefit back payment as reimbursement for interim assistance provided to McLellan. McLellan contends that Larimer County's entitlement to direct reimbursement was limited to funds from the first check issued to McLellan by the Social Security Administration (SSA). Thus, McLellan argues, because the reimbursement provided to Larimer County did not come from the "first retroactive SSI payment" sent by the SSA, Larimer County wrongfully received the funds. We conclude, as a matter of first impression, that the "first SSI benefit payment" from which the reimbursement may be withheld is the entire balance of the retroactive amount the SSA initially determines to be due an applicant, not the first installment check issued to pay that retroactive amount. Consequently, Larimer County properly received the SSI distribution. We therefore affirm the district court's judgment, albeit on different grounds.
¶ 2 McLellan is disabled. In 2007, she applied for SSI benefits from the SSA. Her request was not approved until 2017. While awaiting approval from the SSA, McLellan applied for interim assistance from Larimer County.
¶ 3 In cases such as McLellan's, an individual whose application for SSI benefits has not yet been approved may receive interim assistance from her county human services department under the Aid to the Needy Disabled – State Only (AND-SO) program. § 26-2-111(4), C.R.S. 2021; Dep't of Hum. Servs. Reg. 3.540, 9 Code Colo. Regs. 2503-5 (effective Sept. 1, 2018 to Oct. 31, 2018) (hereinafter AND-SO Regulation). A county may then be reimbursed by the SSA for these AND-SO payments pursuant to the Interim Assistant Reimbursement Regulation, Dep't of Hum. Servs. Reg. 3.546, 9 Code Colo. Regs. 2503-5 (effective Mar. 2, 2014 to Feb. 29, 2020) (hereinafter IAR Regulation). The IAR Regulation details how a county is reimbursed for the interim assistance it provided to an individual. As a condition of receiving AND-SO benefits, applicants are required annually to sign an Authorization for Reimbursement of Interim Assistance (IM-14) form. Id. at Reg. 3.546(A)(2). The IM-14 authorizes the county to recover the funds from the "first retroactive SSI payment." Id.
¶ 4 In 2012, Larimer County began providing McLellan monthly assistance payments through the AND-SO program. In 2017, the SSA determined that McLellan was eligible for SSI benefits beginning in 2012 and found that she was due $30,402.90 in back payments for the period between 2012 and 2017. On March 14, 2018, McLellan received her first disbursement from the SSA in the amount of $2,250. She received a second disbursement for the same amount on September 5, 2018. On the same day, Larimer County received a check from the SSA in the amount of $11,571. This check reimbursed Larimer County for the interim assistance it had provided to McLellan. Larimer County notified McLellan that it had received the reimbursement.
¶ 5 McLellan requested a hearing before the Office of Administrative Courts (Administrative Court), alleging that (1) she never authorized Larimer County to keep any portion of her back payment award; (2) any authorization she may have given was invalid or had expired; and (3) Larimer County was not entitled to keep the $11,571 because it was not the initial SSI back payment. The Administrative Court issued an initial decision finding that Larimer County was entitled to keep the money. McLellan appealed the initial decision to the Department's Office of Appeals. In a final decision, the Department, through its Office of Appeals, affirmed the initial decision of the Administrative Court. McLellan sought judicial review under the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA), section 24-4-106, C.R.S. 2021, and the district court upheld the final decision. McLellan now appeals the district court's order.
¶ 6 On appeal, McLellan argues that (1) Larimer County "improperly withheld the third retroactive SSI payment" and (2) the form authorizing Larimer County to recover money directly from a back payment was not valid. The Department, in turn, asserts that McLellan lacks standing to bring this appeal and that Larimer County was entitled to keep the disbursement. We reject the Department's standing challenge but affirm the district court's judgment upholding the final decision.
¶ 7 On appeal from a district court's review of a final agency action, we apply the same standard of review as the district court — the standard set forth in section 24-4-106(7). § 24-4-106(7), (11)(e), C.R.S. 2021; Romero v. Colo. Dep't of Hum. Servs. , 2018 COA 2, ¶ 25, 417 P.3d 914. Agency actions are subject to reversal if they are arbitrary or capricious, a denial of statutory right, in excess of statutory authority, or otherwise contrary to law. § 24-4-106(7)(b).
¶ 8 "In all cases under review, the court shall determine all questions of law and interpret the statutory ... provisions involved." § 24-4-106(7)(d). In construing an administrative rule or regulation, we apply the same basic rules of construction we use to interpret a statute. Petron Dev. Co. v. Wash. Cnty. Bd. of Equalization , 91 P.3d 408, 410 (Colo. App. 2003), aff'd , 109 P.3d 146 (Colo. 2005) ; see also Williams v. Colo. Dep't of Corr. , 926 P.2d 110, 112 (Colo. App. 1996). We first look to the ordinary and common meaning of the language in a provision, giving effect to every word and term. Lewis v. Taylor , 2016 CO 48, ¶ 13, 375 P.3d 1205. "If the statutory language is clear," we interpret the statute according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. at ¶ 20. "Where possible, the statute should be interpreted so as to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts." People v. Dist. Ct. , 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo. 1986).
¶ 9 Similarly, when there is interplay between a statute and related regulations, we construe statutory and regulatory language as a whole, interpreting it in a manner giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts. Barry v. Bally Gaming, Inc. , 2013 COA 176, ¶ 9, 320 P.3d 387. When a state regulatory system serves to implement and complement a concomitant federal program, we must construe the state and federal regulations as a scheme. See Indus. Comm'n v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 690 P.2d 839, 844 (Colo. 1984) ().
¶ 10 "An appellate court may ... affirm on any ground supported by the record." Taylor v. Taylor , 2016 COA 100, ¶ 31, 381 P.3d 428.
¶ 11 Initially, we address — and reject — the Department's argument that McLellan lacks standing to bring this appeal because "she suffered no injury" when Larimer County kept the reimbursement.
¶ 12 Whether a party has standing is a question we review de novo. Jones v. Samora , 2016 COA 191, ¶ 21, 395 P.3d 1165. To establish standing, a plaintiff must have (1) suffered injury in fact (2) to a legally protected interest. CO2 Comm., Inc. v. Montezuma County , 2021 COA 36M, ¶ 24, 491 P.3d 516. "Injury in fact exists if ‘the action complained of has caused or has threatened to cause injury.’ " Kreft v. Adolph Coors Co. , 170 P.3d 854, 857 (Colo. App. 2007) (quoting Romer v. Colo. Gen. Assembly , 810 P.2d 215, 218 (Colo. 1991) ). All averments of material fact in a complaint must be accepted as true when deciding whether a party has standing. Jones , ¶ 21.
¶ 13 In her complaint, McLellan alleged that "[t]he defendants sought, received, and retains [sic] $11,571.00 of my [SSI] back pay from the [SSA] without lawful authority to do so." This allegation of economic loss is sufficient to satisfy the requirement for an injury in fact. But the Department argues that, on appeal, McLellan concedes that she owes Larimer County the $11,571 and she therefore cannot establish injury. Not so. McLellan merely asserts that, if she owes the money to Larimer County, there are mechanisms available for Larimer County to recover the money from her. She has consistently maintained throughout the proceedings that she, and not Larimer County, was entitled to receive the third SSI distribution. Whether Larimer County would ultimately be able to recover that money from McLellan is immaterial to McLellan's claims and does not deprive her of standing in this matter.
¶ 14 McLellan contends that Larimer County improperly withheld the "third retroactive SSI payment." She argues that, under the IAR Regulation, Larimer County was only allowed to accept the first "payment" from the SSA;...
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