McLoughlin v. New Rochelle Hospital

• Decision Date: 30 June 1970
• Citation: 34 A.D.2d 1064,312 N.Y.S.2d 572
• Parties: Claim of Lawrence McLOUGHLIN, Respondent, v. NEW ROCHELLE HOSPITAL et al., Appellants, Workmen's Compensation Board, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 572

312 N.Y.S.2d 572

34 A.D.2d 1064

Claim of Lawrence McLOUGHLIN, Respondent, v. NEW ROCHELLE HOSPITAL et al., Appellants, Workmen's Compensation Board, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

June 30, 1970.

Albert R. Couchman, New York City, for appellants.

Laurence McLoughlin pro se.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. State of New York (by Daniel Polansky and Jorge L. Gomez, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel) for respondents.

Before HERLIHY, P.J., and REYNOLDS, GREENBLOTT, COOKE and SWEENEY, JJ.

REYNOLDS, Justice.

Appeal by the employer and its insurance carrier from a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Board on the grounds that there was no accident within the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Law and no substantial medical evidence of causal relation.

On March 14, 1967 claimant, a laboratory technician whose duties required that he stop at patients' homes on the way to work at the employer's hospital and take blood samples, left home about 7:00 A.M. with four stops to make before reporting to work at 8:30 A.M. The first stop was made with dispatch and without incident but while driving to the home of a second patient claimant developed a mild pressure pain and broke into a cold sweat. He pulled off the road and when the pain abated drove to the second home. When he arrived at the second home the pain returned, a physician was called and claimant was hospitalized with what was diagnosed as a posterior wall myocardial infarction secondary coronary thrombosis. The majority of the board found that 'claimant was under pressure to make those trips rapidly in order to be on time at the hospital because his work there was not covered by anyone else' and that 'such activity and work circumstances resulted in great tension, entailing greater stress and strain than the ordinary wear and tear of life'. The decision as to whether claimant's activities constituted 'strenuous' work within the meaning of Matter of Masse v. James H. Robinson Co., 301 N.Y. 34, 92 N.E.2d 56 and Matter of Burris v. Lewis, 2 N.Y.2d 323, 160 N.Y.S.2d 853, 141 N.E.2d 424 is, of course, factual but, nevertheless, we feel that the instant record contains no substantial evidence to support the board's determination and thus reversal and dismissal of the claim is mandated (Matter of McCormick v. Green Bus Lines, 33 A.D.2d 630, 304 N.Y.S.2d 807). To constitute stenuous work the activities involved must from the standpoint of the average man be...