McManama v. Lukhard
Decision Date | 29 December 1978 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 77-0268(R). |
Citation | 464 F. Supp. 38 |
Parties | Alfred C. McMANAMA et al. v. William L. LUKHARD et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
Claude M. Lauck, The Legal Aid Society of Roanoke Valley, Roanoke, Va., for plaintiffs.
Michael F. Blair, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., State Dept. of Welfare, Wilburn C. Dibling, Jr., City Atty., Roanoke, Va., E. Marshall Coleman, Atty. Gen., Richmond, Va., for defendants.
Opinion on Amount of Attorneys' Fees December 29, 1978.
This class action civil rights suit was compromised and settled on April 6, 1978, when the parties entered into a consent order. Plaintiffs, representing a class of persons receiving Aid to Families and Dependent Children (AFDC) facing termination, challenged the legality of Virginia procedures governing adversary hearings held prior to termination of benefits. They sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming certain practices and policies of defendants regarding hearings violated controlling federal regulations and the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint prayed for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The only issue before the court is whether plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in this litigation.
The case presents five issues: (1) What legal standards govern the exercise of the court's discretion in awarding attorney fees under § 1988? (2) Are plaintiffs, by virtue of settling the suit, "prevailing parties" within the meaning of the statute? (3) If so, are there any factors counseling against an award of attorney's fees to the Legal Aid Society of Roanoke Valley? (4) If the answer to the last two questions is affirmative, is the award of fees and costs barred by the Eleventh Amendment? (5) Finally, if an award is proper, what is the proper amount?
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1988, provides in relevant part:
... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
By its terms, the statute grants the district court discretion in awarding attorney's fees. Although the act prescribes no standard for granting fees, the Supreme Court in construing similar legislation has addressed the issue of discretion in a district court to award fees. In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1977) the Court considered the attorney's fees section of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. That provision, strikingly similar to § 1988, provides:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
Justice Stewart discussed at length the standard controlling a district court's discretion in awarding fees. He wrote:
Id. 98 S.Ct. at 697-98 (emphasis added).
As Christiansburg Garment Co. indicates, the Supreme Court has consistently held the Newman v. Piggie Park test governs the award of attorney's fees under modern civil rights statutes. This test applies to the award of fees under § 1988. See, e. g., Lopez v. Aransas County Independent School District, 570 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1978). Thus, if plaintiffs are "prevailing parties" for purposes of § 1988 they should recover attorney's fees absent exceptional circumstances.
This controversy was terminated prior to a ruling on the merits by entry of a consent decree. The approved decree incorporated most of the relief sought by plaintiffs' complaint and it appears defendants changed their policies appreciably as a direct result of this litigation. The question before the court is whether settling plaintiffs who nevertheless effect change may be considered "prevailing parties" for purposes of § 1988.
The legislative history of the 1976 act makes clear parties may be considered to have prevailed in litigation when they vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief. See S.Rep. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong.2d Sess. 5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 5908, 5912; H.R.Rep. No. 94-1558, 94th Cong.2d Sess. 7, 8 (1976); Derfner, One Giant Step: The Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976, 21 St. Louis L.J. 441 (1977). A party need not win a full trial on the merits to be said to prevail, but the lawsuit must have resulted in or been the catalyst of a victory for the party or the class he represents. E. g., Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970). Courts have uniformly followed this Congressional mandate and awarded attorney's fees under § 1988 to plaintiffs who have successfully terminated litigation by settlement prior to trial. E. g., Brown v. Culpepper, 559 F.2d 274, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1977); Howard v. Phelps, 443 F.Supp. 374, 376-77 (E.D.La. 1978); Hartmann v. Gaffney, 446 F.Supp. 809, 812 (D.Minn.1977); Mental Patient Civil Liberties Project v. Hospital Staff, 444 F.Supp. 981, 985-86 (E.D.Pa.1977); Buckton v. NCAA, 436 F.Supp. 1258, 1264-65 (D.Mass.1977). The settlement in this action clearly accomplished the goals of the suit, and therefore under controlling precedents plaintiffs are properly deemed "prevailing parties" for the meaning of § 1988. They should be awarded attorney's fees absent exceptional circumstances.
Plaintiffs were represented by counsel employed by the Legal Aid Society of Roanoke Valley, a federally-funded legal services project which renders free legal services to qualifying individuals. The counsel charged plaintiffs no fee for the efforts rendered in this litigation. The issue before the court is whether this fact influences the decision of the court to award fees under § 1988. The history of the 1976 act demonstrates the mere fact that a successful plaintiff is represented by an attorney employed by a legal services organization or by a public interest organization should not influence an award of fees under § 1988. H.R.Rep. No. 94-1558, 94th Cong.2d Sess. 8, n.16 (1976); Derfner, supra. In applying the 1976 amendments to § 1988, courts have universally granted attorney's fees to plaintiffs represented by both public interest organizations and legal services projects. See Mid-Hudson Legal Services, Inc. v. G. & U., Inc., 518 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1978); Walston v. School Board, 566 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1977) (NAACP Legal Defense Fund); Reynolds v. Abbeyville County School District, 554 F.2d 638, 644 (4th Cir. 1977) (ACLU); NAACP v. Bell, 448 F.Supp. 1164 (D.D.C.1978); Willett v. Chester Water Authority, 447 F.Supp. 967 (E.D.Pa.1978) (Legal Services); White v. Beal, 447 F.Supp. 788, 795 (E.D.Pa.1978) (Legal Services); Alsager v. District Court, 447 F.Supp. 572, 576-78 (S.D.Iowa 1977) (ACLU); Card v. Dempsey, 445 F.Supp. 942, 944-45 (E.D.Mich.1978) (Legal Services); Howard v. Phelps, supra (Legal Services); Lund v. Affleck, 442 F.Supp. 1109, 1111-12 (D.R.I.1977) (Legal Services). This result under amended § 1988 is consistent with results prior to 1976 in civil rights cases and with present results under other statutes allowing attorney's fees. The rule appears to be firmly established that an attorney employed by legal services or public interest organizations is entitled to statutory fees as any other lawyer. E. g., Barber v. Kimbrell's Inc., 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1978) (Truth-in-Lending Statute); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1245-46 (3rd Cir. 1977) (Age Discrimination Act); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., Inc., 517 F.2d 1141, 1148 (4th Cir. 1975); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 605-06 (5th Cir. 1974). Measured by these standards, there is no reason to deny an award based upon the fact that plaintiffs were represented by a legal services...
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