McManus v. Sequoyah Land Associates

• Decision Date: 24 February 1966
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 20 A.L.R.3d 1015 Thomas K. McMANUS, Nelson Hyde Chick and Jonn C. Gutleben, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. SEQUOYAH LAND ASSOCIATES, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 22519.

Page 592

49 Cal.Rptr. 592

240 Cal.App.2d 348, 20 A.L.R.3d 1015

Thomas K. McMANUS, Nelson Hyde Chick and Jonn C. Gutleben, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. SEQUOYAH LAND ASSOCIATES, Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 22519.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Feb. 24, 1966.

Hearing Denied April 22, 1968.

Sturgis, Den-Dulk, Douglass & Anderson, by Robert T. Anderson, Oakland, for appellant.

John Felton Turner, Oakland, for respondents.

MOLINARI, Justice.

Plaintiffs brought this action to recover from defendant, Sequoyah Land Associates, a corporation, one-half of the costs of improving an easement which runs across plaintiffs' property and which, at the time the improvements were made, was owned by defendant, and to enjoin defendant from trespassing on plaintiffs' property. After trial without a jury, the court entered judgment for $21,374.82 in favor of plaintiffs, this amount constituting one-half of the amount the court found to be the fair and reasonable cost of improving the subject easement, but denied plaintiffs the injunctive relief they sought. From that portion of the judgment in favor of plaintiffs defendant appeals, ¹ urging in particular that there was in fact no easement in existence when plaintiffs constructed the roadway on their property; that, if there was in fact an easement in existence at that time, plaintiffs as the owners of the servient tenement had no right to improve it at the expense of defendant without defendant's consent; and that requiring defendant to pay one-half of the cost of the improvements would constitute an unjust enrichment to plaintiffs.

The Record

Prior to March 16, 1959 one Sarah Mendonca owned two adjoining parcels of land of approximately 17 acres and 10 acres (hereafter referred to as parcels A and B, respectively) in the City of San Leandro. ² By deed dated March 16, 1959 Sarah Mendonca conveyed parcel A to defendant and on the same day granted defendant an easement of approximately 60 feet in width running north and south across parcel B to Williams Street, which formed the southern boundary of parcel B. This easement, according to the terms of the grant, was 'A non-exclusive, perpetual easement and right of way' generally for street and utility purposes. The grant further provided that the easement was subject to the following conditions: '1--In the event the party of the second part, its successors or assigns, desire to use said easement, as set forth herein, the cost of improving same (which shall be approved by the City of San Leandro and according to City of San Leandro specifications) shall be bourne [sic] equally by the owner or owners of said Parcel 'A' and by the owner or owners of Parcel 'B' hereinafter described. * * * 3--In the event the Party of the second part herein, its sucessors or assigns, do not want to use said easement as set forth herein, or to use said easement only for sewer purposes, within a period of three years from the date of this instrument, then this instrument shall be considered null and void.'

Testimony concerning the circumstances surrounding the grant of easement was conflicting: Arthur Mendonca, who had executed the grant of easement as attorney in fact for his mother, Sarah Mendonca, testified that Diane Mason, the real estate broker, requested this easement on behalf of defendant. However, John Thiel, defendant's vice president, who testified on behalf of defendant, stated that defendant had not requested the easement, but that it had been proposed by Diane Mason, who had prepared the actual document.

On March 16, 1962 defendant caused to be recorded the grant of easement and a document entitled 'Declaration of Election to Use Easement.' This document provided that 'Sequoyah Land Associates, a corporation, hereby declares, elects and expresses its desire and intention to use that certain easement granted by Sarah C. Mendonca, a widow, on March 16th, 1959, which grant is recorded concurrently herewith and incorporated herein as follows: * * *.' At this point in the instrument the provisions of the grant of easement were set out in full, including descriptions of the easement and of the dominant and servient tenements and the conditions to which the grant was subject. The document concluded with the following language: 'The intention and purpose of this declaration is to exercise the option and use the easement granted to Sequoyah Land Associates by the grant as set forth above for all the purposes of the grant (and not to use said easement only for a sewer pipe line) ³ and otherwise to comply with all of the conditions of said grant.'

On February 11, 1963 Arthur Mendonca, having inherited parcel B upon his mother's death, conveyed this land to plaintiffs. Commencing in the latter part of 1962, prior to the date on which plaintiffs acquired title to parcel B, and continuing through April 1963, plaintiffs, through letter, telephone conversations, and several face-to-face meetings, advised the officers of defendant that they desired to develop parcel B; that they were prepared to proceed with defendant in improving defendant's easement across parcel B; that they considered the construction of the improvements on the easement to be a matter of some urgency; and that they would appreciate defendant's cooperation in selecting an engineer to determine the requirements, specifications, and costs for constructing a street on the easement. In addition, plaintiffs furnished defendant with a preliminary sketch of the roadway and an estimate of the costs of constructing this roadway. Throughout these communications defendant remained noncommittal as to its plans for proceeding with the development of the easement. However, by letter dated April 9, 1963, Lewis Keller, defendant's secretary, informed plaintiffs that defendant did not desire to proceed with plans for the construction of a roadway across plaintiffs' property at that time. Thereafter, from April 12, 1963 until May 1, 1963 there ensued a series of communications between plaintiffs and defendant. Plaintiffs indicated to defendant that they would proceed with the construction of the roadway and that they expected to be reimbursed by defendant for one-half of the costs incurred. The tenor of defendant's communications to plaintiffs was that defendant asserted its easement rights under the grant; that the determination of the time at which the easement would be developed was solely that of defendant; that the proposal to develop the easement did not at that time fit defendant's plans; that when defendant was ready to proceed with the improvement it would advise plaintiffs so that mutually satisfactory plans could be worked out; that plaintiffs should desist from any activity which would affect the easement; and that if plaintiffs persisted in proceeding with the development they did so at their own risk and expense.

Plaintiffs proceeded with the construction of the roadway along the line of defendant's easement across parcel B upon securing approval of their plans from the City of San Leandro. During the course of construction plaintiffs advised defendant of the nature and cost of the work and, upon completion of the roadway in January 1964, presented defendant with a statement for one-half of the total cost amounting to $44,963.55. Payment was refused by defendant. Subsequently, the roadway was approved by the City of San Leandro and, upon being dedicated as a public street, was named Neptune Drive. Following the filing of the instant action defendant sold parcel A and recorded a document entitled 'Declaration of Election Not to Use Easement.' In finding for plaintiffs the trial court disallowed an 'overhead' item and set the actual total cost of the roadway improvement at $42,749.64, of which one-half was assessed against defendant.

Existence of the Easement

Considering defendant's first contention, namely, that at the time plaintiffs constructed the roadway on their property, there was in fact no easement in existence, we note that defendant's argument is predicated on the assertion that the language used in the grant of easement is so uncertain as to be unenforceable. Specifically, defendant argues that the grant 'can be interpreted to mean that the grantee must use the easement within the 3 year period, or that 'wanting' to use it means at least some action taken in regard to the development of the easement, or that the mere declaration is all that is required.' While we agree with defendant that the language of the grant of easement is ambiguous, such ambiguity does not require a conclusion that defendant acquired nothing by the grant. Rather, we are faced with a problem of interpreting the language of the grant of easement in order to determine which interpretation is the proper one.

In construing an instrument conveying an easement the rules applicable to the construction of deeds generally apply. (Kerr v. Brede, 180 Cal.App.2d 149, 150, 4 Cal.Rptr. 443; Eastman v. Piper, 68 Cal.App. 554, 561, 229 P. 1002.) Accordingly, where the language of a grant of easement is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine its meaning. (Schofield v. Bany, 175 Cal.App.2d 534, 536-537, 346 P.2d 891; Wright v. Best, 19 Cal.2d 368, 383, 121 P.2d 702; Code Civ.Proc. § 1856, see Laux v. Freed, 53 Cal.2d 512, 522-523, 2 Cal.Rptr. 265, 348 P.2d 873.) Where such evidence is properly received the appellate court will accept or adhere to the interpretation adopted by the trial court where the extrinsic evidence is conflicting and conflicting inferences arise therefrom. (Parsons v. Bristol Development Co., 62 Cal.2d 861, 865-866, 44 Cal.Rptr. 767, 402 P.2d 839; Estate of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343, 352, 131 P.2d 825.) Where, on the other hand, extrinsic evidence is received but there is no conflict in the evidence the interpretation of the instrument becomes a question of law and the appellate court is not bound by the trial court's...