McMillan v. City of Tacoma

• Citation: 67 P. 68,26 Wash. 358
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington
• Decision Date: 26 November 1901
• Parties: McMILLAN v. CITY OF TACOMA.

67 P. 68

26 Wash. 358

McMILLAN v. CITY OF TACOMA.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 26, 1901

Appeal from superior court, Pierce county; W. H. Snell, Judge.

Action by T. F. McMillan against the city of Tacoma and another. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant city appeals. Affirmed.

William P. Reynolds and Emmett N. Packer, for appellant.

F Campbell, for respondent.

HADLEY J.

Respondent is the owner of a general tax certificate of delinquency issued by the county of Pierce for delinquent taxes upon certain real estate in said county for the year 1895. In addition to the amount paid for the certificate, he also paid the delinquent taxes upon said property for subsequent years and thereafter commenced this suit to foreclose his lien under said certificate, and made the owner of the property and the appellant, the city of Tacoma, parties defendant in the suit. The city of Tacoma answered the complaint, and alleged facts showing the existence of a street assessment lien in its favor upon the same property, and asked that the respondent be denied judgment for his tax lien unless he should first pay or tender to said city the full amount of said street assessment lien. To said answer the respondent demurred, and the demurrer was by the court sustained. Appellant duly excepted to said ruling of the court, elected to stand upon its said answer, and refused to further plead. Thereafter Judgment was entered establishing respondent's tax lien as superior to all other liens, and particularly declaring the lien of the appellant for street assessments as junior and inferior to the general tax lien. From said judgment the city of Tacoma has appealed.

Appellant's contention is that, before respondent is entitled to judgment foreclosing his lien, he is required to 'pay all taxes that have accrued on the property,' as provided by section 20, page 302, of the amendatory revenue law of 1899, and that the word 'taxes,' as there used, means local assessments as well as general taxes. In support of the above position our attention is directed to certain portions of the revenue law and from certain words used it is argued that the legislature meant to include local assessments in the provision above mentioned. Our attention is first directed to section 58, p 162, Laws 1897, and particularly to the proviso at the close of said section, which reads as follows: 'Provided, that no taxes, except special taxes, shall be extended upon the tax rolls until the property valuations are equalized by the state board of equalization for the purpose of raising the state revenue.' It is urged that the words 'special taxes' here used must refer to local assessments. We agree, however, with respondent's contention that the words used refer to special taxes levied after the manner of general taxes. Our laws permit special taxes to be levied for school and road purposes. They are levied as so many specified mills upon the dollar upon all the taxable property, real and personal, within a given district. They are certified to the county auditor by the local authorities, extended upon the county tax rolls, and collected by the county treasurer in the same manner as general taxes. Whatever may be said as to the practical operation of the exception in the proviso invoked by appellant when applied to special taxes of the classes we have indicated, we believe that it was so intended, and was not intended to refer to the local street assessments, which involve a subject not then being considered by the legislature.

It is suggested that the revenue law will not be construed as ignoring local assessments unless it clearly appears that such was the intention of the legislature, and in support of the position that it was not the intention to exclude such assessments from the consideration here involved we are further referred to section 79, p. 174, Laws 1897. The following portion of the section is particularly cited, to wit: 'The person or authority who shall collect or receive the same shall give a certificate that such taxes have been so paid.' From the use of the words 'person or authority' appellant draws the inference that the owner of the property who seeks to redeem is required to pay outstanding and unpaid taxes and assessments to some one other than the county treasurer, and that in this instance it refers to the city treasurer as the one authorized to receive payment of street assessments. We think the section cannot be so construed. The language refers only to taxes, no mention being made of special assessments; and such an inference is too remote to be entertained. Frequent reference is made by counsel to the use of the word 'assessments'...