McMillan v. Page

• Decision Date: 12 May 1888
• Citation: 71 Wis. 655,38 N.W. 173
• Parties: MCMILLAN v. PAGE.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

71 Wis. 655

38 N.W. 173

MCMILLAN

v.PAGE.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

May 12, 1888.

Appeal from circuit court, Columbia county.

Action for work and labor by Annie McMillan against John Page. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals.Rogers & Hall and G. W. Bird, for appellant.

John S. Maxwell, for respondent.

ORTON, J.

The plaintiff's claim is for work and labor from October 1, 1879, to December 1, 1885, for $100 for the first year, and $200 for the subsequent years. The plaintiff, at the commencement of such work and labor for the defendant, was only 16 years of age. Her mother had died, and her father had neglected to support or care for her, and she was dependent upon her own labor for support, when she commenced to work out in the city of Chicago at her own instance, and without interference of her father; and she so worked about four years, when she came to her uncle's at Fall River, in this state, where she had a home, in the spring of 1879, and where and when the defendant came and employed her to work for him for the ensuing summer. For such service the defendant paid her at the rate of 10 shillings per week. He then employed her, as she alleges, to continue to work for him for an indefinite time, and agreed to pay her well when she got through, and she continued in his service until late in the fall of 1885. The defendant in his answer alleges, in effect, that the agreement was that the plaintiff should have a home with him, and that he should board, clothe, and care for her in sickness, and pay her doctor bills, as long as she saw fit to live with him, and that she should work for him according to her ability, as the full and entire consideration of and complete compensation for such home, board, clothing, and care in sickness, and that, beyond that, he should pay her nothing for her labor. The defendant was a single man, about 50 years of age, and owned and conducted a farm of 260 acres, and kept house thereon with a housekeeper. The plaintiff testified, substantially, that, during the first summer, she worked part of the time on the farm, and part of the time in the house; and that, after she and the defendant settled, and she received her 10 shillings per week, the defendant said to her that he would like to have her stay with him right along, and that he would pay her well when she got through, and that she stayed and worked under that contract six years. The first winter she worked in the house most of the time. In the spring she plowed and dragged until the crops were in, and then she worked in the corn until harvest, and then worked in harvest on the harvester, and then did fall plowing and husked corn. In 1883, she plowed about 100 acres, and in 1884 about 120 acres, and in 1885 about 100 acres. She worked three horses all the time. She generally got to her work, in the spring, summer, and fall, at 4 o'clock in the morning, and her breakfast was sent to her in the field. She sometimes plowed until 10 o'clock at night, and sometimes all night by changing teams, and worked all the next day,--late in the fall. She had good and suitable clothing when she commenced to work for the defendant, and when they were worn out she was clothed with coarse, stout cloth, called “demings,” the same as men's overalls. She was strong and healthy, and never needed a doctor. In this way she continued until December 1, 1885, and then quit work, and asked the defendant to pay her for her labor, and he refused to pay her anything except to offer her an acre of beans. She thinks she received, during her term of service, in all, about $15. She sometimes asked for a few dollars, and was refused. One of the defendant's neighbors, whose land adjoined his own, testified that the plaintiff worked for the defendant about six or seven years, doing all kinds of farm work, such as plowing, dragging, working in harvest, binding, pitching bundles, etc.; that he employed hired men on his farm; and that she did as much as a man, and her services were worth $200 per year, and that the defendant said that his women could do as much work as his men, and that he would rather hire them, because he could get them cheaper. Another adjoining neighbor testified that she did as much work as a man in all kinds of farm work, and that the defendant told him that he could not afford to hire men, and that he could get women cheaper, and get more out of them; and she worked for defendant over six years, and her services were worth $200 per year. Another adjoining neighbor testified the same as to her labor, and the time she worked for the defendant, and defendant said to him that his girl could do more work than his man, and asked how much he paid, and then said that he, the witness, paid too much, and that he could hire women cheaper, and that he should pay the plaintiff all he possibly could.

In view of the hard, rough, and constant work out of doors, exacted of this poor young girl, under the guise and pretext of giving her a home, and boarding and clothing her suitable to her sex and condition, the conclusion is almost irresistible that the defendant violated, in both letter and spirit, the very agreement that he alleges in his answer, and upon which he relies in defense of her action. Is that the kind of a home he agreed to give her? Is that boarding and clothing her, suitable to her age and sex? Was such the female services she was to render as the consideration for such advantage, of for such “privileges of a home,” as they are called in the defendant's answer? Most emphatically not. Although this view of the case is not urged by the learned counsel of the respondent, yet it stands out in such bold relief, and is so apparently conclusive against the defense set up in the defendant's answer, that I could not help noticing it as preliminary to the consideration of the contract which the plaintiff alleged as the foundation of her action. If this view of the case had been taken by the court and the jury, it might have appeared as a sufficient reason for the verdict. Such unusual, unnatural, and most unsuitable work and labor that she did for the defendant were clearly not within the reasonable intent and meaning of the...