McMinimee v. McMinimee
| Decision Date | 16 December 1947 |
| Docket Number | 47033. |
| Parties | McMINIMEE v. McMINIMEE et al. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Crawford County; R. L. McCord Judge.
L V. Gilchrist, of Denison, for appellants.
L W. Powers, of Denison, for appellee.
Plaintiff and A. C. McMinimee were married November 14, 1943. He died March 8, 1946. Each had been previously married, had children and owned substantial property. Decedent's first wife, mother of defendants, appellants herein, died April 6, 1943; plaintiff's first husband, March 25, 1931.
It is conceded by all that there was an oral antenuptial contract between the parties by the terms of which each made some renunciation of rights in the property of the other. Defendants claim it was absolute as to all property of each. Plaintiff contends that in event of Mr. McMinimee's death she was to have the right to occupy the homestead as long as she lives, and ownership of the contents of the home consisting of furniture, household equipment and wearing apparel.
Approximately two months after their marriage the parties executed an instrument which recited the making of an oral antenuptial contract whereby each had agreed, in event of the other's death, to waive and relinquish (as surviving spouse) 'all right in and to the property' of the other. This written instrument referred to the consummation of the subsequent marriage and (ironically, in view of the present litigation) expressed a desire 'to confirm and put in writing said agreement so that no further difficulties or questions might ever arise about the true agreement made between the parties hereto prior to the time of said marriage.' Whether there had already arisen 'difficulties or questions' does not otherwise appear.
This instrument made no exception in plaintiff's favor as to homestead rights or as to ownership of the contents of the home. Plaintiff prays that she nevertheless be decreed to have such rights and ownership, and alternatively that if necessary, 'said prenuptial agreement' (presumably the written instrument evidencing it) be reformed for that purpose. Defendants, by appropriate pleadings, joined issue on both propositions. The trial court held the instrument as drawn would preclude plaintiff from claiming such rights but decreed reformation. The defendants appeal.
I. Assuming (but not deciding, as the point is not raised here) that equity has power to reform such an evidentiary instrument as we have described, we first inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to support the decree.
The quantum and character of proof necessary to justify reformation has been variously described in Iowa decisions as 'clear and satisfactory,' 'clear, full and decisive,' 'clear, convincing and satisfactory,' 'clear, convincing, satisfactory and free from doubt,' 'more than mere preponderance,' 'beyond a reasonable doubt,' etc. Citation of the various cases is unnecessary. See 16 Iowa Dig., Reformation of Instruments, k45, page 559, et seq.
We have here, as bearing on the issue of reformation, the testimony of plaintiff, of the attorney who drew the instrument, and of another witness who testified as to declarations of Mr. McMinimee; also some slight evidence as to the possible financial situation of the parties.
Plaintiff first consulted the attorney alone. She testified over appropriate objection, to the terms of the oral agreement and what she told the attorney to put into the proposed writing. Clearly she was incompetent to testify directly or indirectly to the transaction wherein the oral contract was made. While her evidence, so far as pertinent and material, was admissible to prove the transaction between her and the attorney, it could not be used to prove the transaction between her and decedent.
Later the husband and wife went to the attorney's office and signed the instrument the latter had in the meantime drawn. The testimony of the attorney is far from clear or satisfactory. It does not differentiate between what was discussed on the first visit and what was later said by decedent or in his presence. It is not clear whether the discussion as to homestead right and ownership of the contents of the home related to the terms of the previous oral agreement or only to what the parties presently wanted incorporated into the writing.
The attorney testified: 'My best recollection was that each was, they were to have no rights in the property of the other. They both had children and I remember her discussing that part of it. She wanted her children to have her property and he wanted his to have his, and neither one wanted any part of the other. Now, with reference to the homestead, I can't remember exactly what was said about it. I do remember that the question of living in the home was discussed and my best recollection is that I was told to do, to include that in the contract, but I remember at the time when I was drawing this contract it troubled me as to whether it would be possible to make a contract after their marriage which would be valid, and I know it took some time and I finally ran across a couple of cases that said you could draw a valid contract confirming a contract made before marriage. At that time it is my recollection that I ran on to the homestead question and when they came to my office to sign it that question was put to me. I don't know whether they read the contract or not, I don't remember that at all, but I know that question was brought up and it is my recollection that I told them I thought under the law it wouldn't make any difference anyway. It was my understanding of the law that the widow would have the right to occupy the homestead under the terms of this contract and that was true of the exempt property in the home, it was discussed. That is all I can recall about it. I have ransacked my mind for weeks trying to remember all the details and looking for our notebooks and our files.
'The property in the home was discussed along with the right to occupy the homestead, that it wouldn't make any difference anyway, she would get it anyway.
'On cross-examination:
We have omitted no material part of this testimony. He does not purport to state what was told him by Mr. McMinimee or in Mr. McMinimee's presence as to the terms of the oral contract. So far as his testimony reveals there was no discussion of the oral contract at all but only of what was to go into the written instrument,--'my best recollection is that I was told * * * to include that in the contract.' Told by whom? Before there can be reformation a mutual mistake must be shown.
The only other testimony on the subject is that of plaintiff's sister-in-law (her first husband's sister) who said Mr. McMinimee told her (some time after the marriage and before the written contract was executed):
She also testified: 'At different times I would say to him I am glad she has such a comfortable home and for the future and he said I am too, and I intend it to be hers while she lives.'
On cross-examination she added: 'I said to him at one time I hope you have arranged your affairs, both of you are not young any more and he said we have.'
There is no evidence that connects any of this with the supposed terms of a previous oral contract--nothing inconsistent with what appears to have been supposed by all parties (including the attorney) to have been the legal situation under or in spite of the contract as revealed by the written instrument. Assuming that it would be admissible to prove the making of a valid postnuptial written contract, it had no probative value to establish the terms of the oral prenuptial contract.
Not much is shown of the situation of the parties at the time of the oral antenuptial agreement--surely nothing tending to sustain plaintiff's contention. There is nothing as to their respective ages, health or mode of living. The only clew to their relative financial condition indicates that her situation may have been slightly superior to his. Her first husband left a net estate in 1931 valued at $50,000 to $60,000. The exempt personal property set aside to her was appraised at $4,560. Some years later (1939) her son died and she was his sole heir to an interest in real estate estimated at $4,000 and personal property the value of which is not shown.
Mr McMinimee's estate was estimated at approximately $15,000 plus an interest in $3,900 of U. S. 'E' bonds held jointly with grandchildren. It is true these figures may not accurately show the relative financial situation of the parties in November, 1943, when they were married but we have no further light on that subject. Perhaps the most that can be inferred is that they dealt on substantially even terms though it appears plaintiff was the one later taking the initiative in getting the...
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