McMinn v. United States
| Decision Date | 23 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | Criminal Action 2:16-cr-140 |
| Parties | MATTHEW K. MCMINN, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Before the Court is Matthew K. McMinn's (“Petitioner”) pro se Motion to Reduce Supervised Release Term pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(c)(2)(C). Pet'r's Mot. Reduce Superv. Rel., ECF No. 36 (“Pet'r's Mot.”). The Government opposed the Motion and Petitioner replied. Resp't's Mem. Opp'n Pet r s Mot. Reduce Superv. Rel., ECF No. 39 (“Resp't's Mem. Opp'n”); Pet'r's Reply to Resp't's Mem. Opp'n Pet'r's Mot. Reduce Superv. Rel., ECF No. 40 (“Pet'r's Reply”). This matter is now ripe for judicial determination. Upon review, the Court finds that a hearing on this Motion is not necessary.[1] See E.D VA. LOCAL CRIM. R. 47(J). For the reasons set forth below Petitioner's Motion to Reduce Supervised Release Term is DENIED.
On October 19, 2016, Petitioner was named in a five-count Indictment, charging him with crimes involving child pornography. Indictment, ECF No. 1. On December 7, 2016, pursuant to a written plea agreement with the Government, Petitioner pled guilty to Count One of the Indictment, which charged him with Possession of Child Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). Id; see also Guilty Plea Mins., ECF No. 16; Plea Agreement, ECF No. 17.
According to the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), from in or about August 2014 through in or about March 2015, individuals could access a site in which they could share and collect images of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct (SEC) on the TOR network. Presentence Inv. Report ¶ 5, ECF No. 33 (“PSR”). On or about March 3, 2015, agents with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) deployed a law enforcement technique to identify the site's registered members. Id. Through this technique, agents obtained Petitioner's IP address, his computer name, and his logon name. Id. On February 29, 2016, FBI and other law enforcement agents conducted a search of Petitioner's residence pursuant to a search warrant and seized several computers and other electronic media storage items. Id. During the search, law enforcement agents spoke with Petitioner at his place of work. Id. Petitioner told the interviewing agents that he had been routinely viewing images of minors engaging in SEC on the TOR network. Id. Petitioner told agents that he downloaded images of minors engaging in SEC to his computers and to his USB drives. Id. On or about April 21, 2016, a Department of Justice Forensic Examiner completed a forensic analysis on the electronic media seized from Petitioner's residence. Id. In total, Petitioner was attributed with 1, 021 images of child pornography and 55 videos containing child pornography. AZ. At ¶ 13. Pursuant to §2G2.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, Petitioner was attributed with a total of 5, 146 images of child pornography for sentencing purposes. Id.
Petitioner was assessed a Criminal History Category of I, Total Offense Level of 28, and had a recommended U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range of 78 to 97 months in prison, followed by five (5) years to life of supervised release. Id. at ¶¶ 87-88. On March 23, 2017, the Court sentenced Petitioner to forty-two (42) months' imprisonment followed by twenty (20) years of supervised release. J., ECF No. 31. On November 13, 2018, Petitioner completed his term of imprisonment and was released from custody to begin his term of supervised release under the U.S. Probation Office. Pet'r's Mot. at 3. As of the date of this Order, Petitioner has served about three-and-a-half (3.5) years of his 20-year term of supervised release.
On July 7, 2021, Petitioner filed the instant pro se Motion. Pet'r's Mot. Petitioner asks the Court to reduce his term of supervised release from 20 years to 10 years based on changed circumstances in [his] case.” Id. at 2. On August 20, 2021, the Government replied in opposition. Resp't's Mem. Opp'n. On August 31, 2021, Petitioner replied. Pet'r's Reply.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3583 provides a court with the authority, “in imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for a felony or a misdemeanor, ” to “include as a part of the sentence a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment” if not already required by statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a). The purpose of supervised release is to assist individuals in their transition to community life” and to “fulfill[] rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration.” United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000). Title 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2), entitled “Modification of Conditions or Revocation, ” provides a court with the authority, “after considering the factors” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to:
“(2) extend a term of supervised release if less than the maximum authorized term was previously imposed, and may modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised release, at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the term of supervised release, pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to the modification of probation and the provisions applicable to the initial setting of the terms and conditions of post-release supervision.”
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). Therefore, “[w]hen a district court considers whether to modify or revoke a condition of supervised release, § 3583(e) authorizes the court to consider the same § 3553(a) factors” that it must consider when first deciding “whether to impose a term of supervised release, and the duration and conditions of that release.” United States v. McLeod, 972 F.3d 637, 641 (4th Cir. 2020). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(c) pertains to modifying the conditions of probation or supervised release. In general, the court must holding a hearing before modifying conditions, unless: “(A) the person waives the hearing; or (B) the relief sought is favorable to the person and does not extend the term of probation or of supervised release; and (C) an attorney for the government has received notice of the relief sought, has had a reasonable opportunity to object, and has not done so.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(C)(1)-(2).
Petitioner's Motion raises two issues before the Court: (1) whether 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) provides the Court with the discretionary authority to reduce his term of supervised release; and (2) if the Court has such authority, whether it is appropriate to do so.[2]
A. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) Allows a Supervised Release Term Reduction
Petitioner argues that the Court has the jurisdictional and statutory authority to reduce his term of supervised release. Pet'r's Mot. at 3-4. Specifically, Petitioner contends that the Court has “statutory authority to grant early termination to supervised release sentences by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2).” Id. at 3. The Government disagrees, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) “references modifying, reducing, or enlarging the conditions of supervised release, but makes no mention of reducing the term of supervised release itself.” Resp't's Opp'n at 3.
As a preliminary matter, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) grants a court with the authority to “terminate a term of supervised release and discharge the defendant released at any time after the expiration of one year of supervised release ... if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.” Title 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) does not pertain to early termination, as Petitioner argues, but rather allows a court to “extend a term of supervised release .. . and .. . modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised release.” The Government therefore addressed, in part, Petitioner's Motion under § 3583(e)(1), but Petitioner clarified that he intentionally seeks relief under § 3583(e)(2). Resp't's Mem. Opp'n at 4-6 (); see Pet'r's Reply at 1 ( ). Accordingly, the Court will assess the merits of Petitioner's Motion under § 3583(e)(2)[3]
The United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (“Fourth Circuit”) have not explicitly decided this issue. In analyzing the language of § 3583(e)(2), however, the Supreme Court has understood the statute to confer on districts courts the authority to exercise only two actions: (1) to modify the conditions of supervised release; and (2) to extend the length of the term itself. See Mont v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 1826, 1836 (2019) (Sotomayor, J dissenting) () (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2)); cf. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 724 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (); see also Johnson, 529 U.S. at 60 ( ...
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