McMurray v. Day

• Decision Date: 16 June 1886
• Parties: MCMURRAY AND OTHERS v. DAY.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

70 Iowa 671

28 N.W. 476

MCMURRAY AND OTHERS

v.DAY.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 16, 1886.

Appeal from Polk circuit court.

Action to set aside a deed of a certain tract of land in Polk county, made by plaintiffs to defendant, and for a decree that he reconvey the same; and also for a decree for an accounting in regard to rents and profits and improvements. There was a decree for the plaintiffs. The defendant appeals.Barcroft & Bowen and Seckmon & Long, for appellant.

Good, Phillips & Read and Hutchinson & Read, for appellees.

ADAMS, C. J.

The plaintiff Mary A. McMurray is the widow of Hiram McMurray, deceased, and the other plaintiffs are his children. Hiram McMurray died in 1876, leaving the land in question and considerable other property. He was also somewhat in debt. The defendant was appointed administrator, and qualified and acted as such. In the course of the administration it was represented by the defendant, and believed by the plaintiffs, to be necessary to sell the real estate in question to raise money to pay the debts of the estate. The plaintiffs aver, in substance, that it was not in fact necessary, but had been made to appear so by the defendant; that the defendant, by his conduct and representations, depreciated the market value of the property, and prevented it from being sold for its full value, and finally induced the plaintiffs to sell the same to him at a grossly inadequate price; that they conveyed the same to him under a misconception of the true facts of the case, induced by him. Issue was joined, a trial was had, and on the seventeenth day of December, 1884, a decree was rendered that the defendant reconvey the land to the plaintiffs, upon the payment to him, with interest, of the sum paid by him, and upon the payment also of the value of the substantial improvements made by the defendant, less the rents and profits and the value of certain timber taken by him. The case was then referred to R. N. Bayles to take an account. His report was filed and approved, and decree was rendered theron April 18, 1885. The appeal was taken October 13, 1885.

1. The first question presented is as to whether the original decree of December 17, 1884, is now subject to review. The plaintiffs insist that it is not. Their position is that that decree constitutes a final judgment, and was reviewable in this court only upon an appeal therefrom, taken within six months from the time of its rendition. Counsel for the defendant concede that an appeal cannot be taken from a final judgment after six months from its rendition, but they deny that the decree of December 17, 1884, was a final judgment. It was, of course, not a final judgment in the sense that it was the last judgment rendered in the case; but it is manifest that there is another sense in which the words “final judgment” may be used, and that is to denote the final determination of a substantial right for which the action was brought. This action was brought to determine the plaintiffs' right to the land in question. They asserted that right, and the defendant denied it. The court adjudged that the plaintiffs had such right. It is true that there were certain equities in favor of the defendant. He had paid the plaintiffs a certain sum for the land, and was entitled, after accounting for rents and profits, to be reimbursed. The exercise of the right on the part of the plaintiffs was made contingent upon their paying the defendant what he was equitably entitled to. But for that fact there would have been no need of a second decree. But the former adjudication was in no way dependent upon the state of the account, or upon the plaintiffs' payment. Nothing could be developed in the subsequent proceeding which could affect its correctness, or require it to be changed. It was final, we think, if a decree ever can be final, where something more is to be ascertained and done in order to give the party in whose favor it was rendered a right to its enjoyment.

The precise question before us does not appear to have been determined by this court; but in Williams v. Wells, 62 Iowa, 747, S. C. 16 N. W. Rep. 513, language was used which goes far to support the views which we have expressed. That was an action for partition. Mr. Justice BECK said: “It will be observed that the decree settling the rights and interest of the parties to the land is, in effect, final, so far as to settle all the rights of the parties. ...