McNair v. Boyette
Decision Date | 15 November 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 34,34 |
Citation | 282 N.C. 230,192 S.E.2d 457 |
Parties | Thomas B. McNAIR v. Edward Lee BOYETTE and Oscar Lee Hall. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Twiggs & McCain, by Howard F. Twiggs and Grover C. McCain, Jr., Yarborough, Blanchard, Tucker & Denson, by Charles F. Blanchard and James E. Cline, Raleigh, for plaintiff appellant.
Maupin, Taylor & Ellis, by Armistead J. Maupin, Raleigh, for defendant Boyette, appellee.
Plaintiff assigns as error the signing and granting of summary judgment for defendant Boyette contending that there is a genuine issue as to defendant Boyette's negligence being a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
The rules for granting summary judgment under Rule 56 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure (G.S. § 1A--1) have been fully discussed in recent decisions of this Court. Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 186 S.E.2d 897 (1972); Singleton v. Stewart, 280 N.C. 460, 186 S.E.2d 400 (1972); Harrison Associates v. State Ports Authority, 280 N.C. 251, 185 S.E.2d 793 (1971); Kessing v. Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 180 S.E.2d 823 (1971). It is, therefore, only necessary to briefly review the pertinent rules of law applicable to entry of summary judgment under that rule.
Rule 56 is not limited in its application to any particular type or types of action, and the procedures are available to both plaintiff and defendant. The purpose of summary judgment can be summarized as being a device to bring litigation on an early decision on the merits without the delay and expense of a trial where it can be readily demonstrated that no material facts are in issue. Two types of cases are involved: (a) Those where a claim or defense is utterly baseless in fact, and (b) those where only a question of law on the indisputable facts is in controversy and it can be appropriately decided without full exposure of trial.
The standard for summary judgment is fixed by Rule 56(c). 'The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' See 2 McIntosh, N.C. Practice and Procedure §§ 1660.5 and 1660.10 (2d Ed., Phillips' Supp. 1970); 3 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 1234 and 1236 (Wright Ed., 1958); Gordon, The New Summary Judgment Rule in North Carolina, 5 Wake Forest Intra.L.Rev. 87 (1969).
'3 Barron and Holtzoff, supra, § 1234; Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, supra; Singleton v. Stewart, supra; Harrison Associates v. State Ports Authority, supra; Kessing v. Mortgage Corp., supra.
A careful review of the record in the instant case reveals that, conceding defendant Boyette's negligence, plaintiff and defendant Boyette are in agreement as to all the factual particulars concerning the manner in which the plaintiff was injured. There was no 'genuine issue as to any material fact.' The effect of the undisputed facts was a question of law for the court to determine. 3 Barron and Holtzoff, supra, § 1231; Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, supra; Singleton v. Stewart, supra; Harrison Associates v. State Ports Authority, supra; Kessing v. Mortgage Corp., supra. The issue then becomes: Did the trial court correctly determine the question of law involved?
In an action for recovery of damages for injury resulting from actionable negligence of defendant, plaintiff must show (1) that there has been a failure on the part of defendant to exercise proper care in the performance of some legal duty which the defendant owed the plaintiff under the circumstances in which they were placed, and (2) that such negligent breach of duty was the proximate cause of the injury, a cause that produced the result in continuous sequence, and without which it would not have occurred, and one from which a man of ordinary prudence could have foreseen that such result was probable under the facts as they existed. Moody v. Kersey, 270 N.C. 614, 155 S.E.2d 215 (1967); Morris v. Transport Co., 235 N.C. 568, 70 S.E.2d 845 (1952); Godwin v. Nixon, 236 N.C. 632, 74 S.E.2d 24 (1952); 6 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Negligence § 29.
Foreseeability of injury is an essential element of proximate cause. Luther v. Asheville Contracting Co., 268 N.C. 636, 151 S.E.2d 649 (1966). It is not required that the injury in the precise form in which it occurred should have been foreseeable but only that, in the exercise of reasonable care, consequences of a generally injurious nature might have been expected. Williams v. Boulerice, 268 N.C. 62, 149 S.E.2d 590 (1966). However, the law requires only reasonable prevision and a defendant is not required to foresee events which are merely possible but only those which are reasonably foreseeable. Bennett v. R.R., 245 N.C. 261, 96 S.E.2d 31 (1956); 6 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Negligence § 9.
What is negligence is a question of law, and when the facts are admitted or established, the court must say whether it does or does not exist. This rule extends and applies not only to the negligent breach of duty but also to the feature of proximate cause. Hudson v. Transit Co., 250 N.C. 435, 108 S.E.2d 900 (1959); Godwin v. Nixon, supra; 6 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Negligence § 30.
Defendant Boyette denied that he was negligent as alleged by plaintiff, but alleged that his negligence, if any, was insulated by the negligence of defendant Hall.
The material facts are not in dispute. Conceding Boyette was negligent, was his negligence insulated by the alleged negligence of defendant Hall? In the leading case on insulated negligence in North Carolina, Butner v. Spease and Spease v. Butner, 217 N.C. 82, 6 S.E.2d 808 (1939), Chief Justice Stacy stated:
'This doctrine of insulating the negligence of one by the subsequent intervention of the active negligence of another really belongs to the definition of proximate cause. Boyd v. R.R., 200 N.C. 324, 156 S.E. 507; R. R. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 24 L.Ed. 256. The principle is stated in Craver v. Cotton Mills, 196 N.C. 330, 145 S.E. 570, as follows: 'While there may be more than one proximate cause, that which is new and entirely independent breaks the sequence of events, and insulates the original or primary negligence.' Lineberry v. R.R., 187 N.C. 786, 123 S.E. 1; Thompson v. R.R., 195 N.C. 663, 143 S.E. 186.
". . . The test . . . is whether the intervening act and the resultant injury is one that the author of the primary negligence could have reasonably foreseen and expected.' Harton v. Tel. Co., 141 N.C. 455, 54 S.E. 299. Osborne v. Coal Co., 207 N.C. 545, 177 S.E. 796; Beach v. Patton, supra (208 N.C. 134, 179 S.E. 446).'
In Insurance Co. v. Stadiem, 223 N.C. 49, 25 S.E.2d 202 (1943), Chief Justice Stacy said:
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