McNair v. Mississippi, 4:13–CV–00127–DMB–JMV.
| Decision Date | 21 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:13–CV–00127–DMB–JMV.,4:13–CV–00127–DMB–JMV. |
| Parties | Dr. Samuel L. McNAIR, Plaintiff v. State of MISSISSIPPI; Board of Trustees of State of Mississippi Institutions of Higher Learning; and Mississippi Valley State University, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Derek D. Hopson, Hopson Law Office, PLLC, Clarksdale, MS, for Plaintiff.
James T. Metz, Purdie & Metz, PLLC, Ridgeland, MS, for Defendants.
This is a wrongful termination action brought by Plaintiff Samuel McNair against his former employer, Defendant Mississippi Valley State University (“MVSU”); the State of Mississippi; and the Board of Trustees of the State of Mississippi Institutions of Higher Learning (“Board of Trustees”). Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated from his tenured-professor position in violation of numerous state and federal laws, and seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief. Doc. # 1. Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Doc. # 14.
In their motion, Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. In support of their motion, Defendants attached two affidavits. Doc. # 14–1, # 14–2. The argument section of Defendants' memorandum brief cites to the two affidavits and fails to distinguish between arguments relating to summary judgment and arguments relating to dismissal. See Doc. # 15.
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part:
Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 1281, 1284 (5th Cir.1990) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Clark v. Tarrant Cnty., Texas, 798 F.2d 736, 746 (5th Cir.1986) ). “A party is on notice of the possibility that a court may convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment ten days after a party submits evidence outside of the pleadings and that evidence is not excluded by the court.” Bowers v. Nicholson, No. H–07–1910, 2007 WL 3047223, at *4 (S.D.Tex. Oct. 18, 2007).
Here, more than ten days have passed since Defendants submitted matters outside the pleadings without such evidence being excluded by the Court. Under these circumstances, Defendants' motion should be treated as one for summary judgment. Washington, 901 F.2d at 1284.
“Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Norwegian Bulk Transport A/S v. Int'l Marine Terminals P'ship, 520 F.3d 409, 411 (5th Cir.2008) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). To award summary judgment, “[a] court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor.” Id. at 411–12 (internal quotation marks omitted). To this end, “[t]he moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact.” Id. at 412.
Where “the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may demonstrate that it is entitled to summary judgment by submitting affidavits or other similar evidence negating the nonmoving party's claim, or by pointing out to the district court the absence of evidence necessary to support the nonmoving party's case.” Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir.1998). If the moving party makes the necessary demonstration, “the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that summary judgment is inappropriate.” Id. In making this showing, “the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Cotroneo v. Shaw Env't & Infrastructure, Inc., 639 F.3d 186, 191–92 (5th Cir.2011) (internal punctuation omitted). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court “resolve[s] factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994).
In or about September 1977, Plaintiff was hired as an associate professor of industrial technology at MVSU, a public university in the State of Mississippi. Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 6, 9. Plaintiff received tenure in 1982 and was elected Faculty Senate President for the 2011–2012 academic year. Id. at ¶¶ 9–10. As part of his presidential responsibilities, Plaintiff attended August 2011, September 2011, October 2011, and November 2011, meetings held by the Institutions of Higher Learning of Mississippi (“IHL”). Id. at ¶¶ 10–11. During the time period relevant to this suit, Plaintiff was directly supervised by Richard Maxwell, the Interim Chair of Applied Technology and Technology. Doc. # 14–2 at ¶ 2.
In November 2011, the Faculty Senate convened a vote of “No Confidence” in then-MVSU President Donna H. Oliver. Doc. # 1 at ¶ 11. On November 2, 2011, Plaintiff informed Oliver by letter of the no confidence vote. Id.
On February 16, 2012, Plaintiff attended an IHL meeting and failed to appear for two of his classes. Doc. # 14–2 at ¶ 6.1 Four days later, on February 20, 2012, Maxwell informed Plaintiff “that future leave requests to attend IHL meetings would not be approved at my level unless accompanied by written approval from the administration.” Id. at ¶ 3.
In March 2012, Plaintiff requested permission from Maxwell to travel to Texas “to develop internship slots for students.” Doc. # 14–2 at ¶ 5. Maxwell denied Plaintiff's request because MVSU lacked funds to finance the trip. Id.
On March 7, 2012, Maxwell was “asked by several students where [Plaintiff] was.” Id. at ¶ 4. Upon investigation, Maxwell “was told by several students that [Plaintiff] was not in class and had given instructions the last class meeting that the students should use this time to work on their term-paper.” Id. As punishment for his absence, Plaintiff was docked pay for three days. Doc. # 14–1 at ¶ 6(b).
On April 19, 2012, Plaintiff attended an IHL meeting without obtaining administration approval. Doc. # 14–2 at ¶ 6. As a result of Plaintiff's attendance at the meeting, he failed to appear to teach two of his classes. Id.
On April 24, 2012, Maxwell recommended to Mary Minter, Dean of the College of Education, that Plaintiff's employment be terminated. Doc. # 14–2 at ¶ 8; Doc. # 14–1 at ¶ 4. On May 7, 2012, Minter adopted Maxwell's recommendation. Doc. # 14–1 at ¶ 4. The same day, Minter informed Plaintiff of the termination decision and notified him of his right to request a hearing. Id. at Ex. A.
On July 27, 2012, a hearing committee2 convened to consider the recommendation to terminate Plaintiff. Doc. # 14–1 at ¶ 5. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing committee recommended termination on the grounds that “[a]ll documented facts indicated that after being warned on several occasions, Dr. McNair continued to disobey his supervisor and the administration.” Id. at ¶ 6(a) & (c). The hearing committee deemed such conduct to be “contumacious.” Id. at ¶ 6(a). Oliver accepted the committee's recommendation and, on August 13, 2012, MVSU terminated Plaintiff's employment. Doc. # 14–1 (unnumbered paragraph).
In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts the following state law claims for: (1) two counts of breach of contract; (2) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing; (3) wrongful termination as against public policy; (4) “retaliation;” and (5) “whistle blowing.” Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 19–51. Additionally, Plaintiff brings federal law claims for: (1) “concerted activity and conspiracy;” (2) “conspiracy;” (3) “First Amendment § 1983 due process violations;” (4) violations of substantive and procedural due process; and (5) wrongful termination under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. at ¶¶ 52–110. Plaintiff also seeks an injunction under Mississippi law. Id. at ¶¶ 111–16.
On December 19, 2013, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. Doc. # 14. After receiving a total of nearly six months of extensions, Plaintiff failed to file a response to Defendants' motion.3
Analytically, Plaintiff's claims may be separated into five categories: (1) conspiracy claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 ; (2) a claim for violation of the First Amendment; (3) claims for due process violations brought under the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) a claim for retaliation brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. ; and (5) state law claims.
Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he defendants conspired to have [Plaintiff] terminated from MVSU and MVSU knew of the conspiracy and had a duty to prevent it under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.” Doc. # 1 at ¶ 52. Defendants argue that, as state...
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