Morris v. Covan Worldwide Moving, Inc.

• Citation: 144 F.3d 377
• Decision Date: 08 July 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-30667,97-30667
• Parties: Fed. Carr. Cas. P 84,067 Tex MORRIS; Cindy Sagrera Morris, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COVAN WORLD WIDE MOVING, INCORPORATED; Coleman American Moving Services, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Page 377

144 F.3d 377

Fed. Carr. Cas. P 84,067

Tex MORRIS; Cindy Sagrera Morris, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COVAN WORLD WIDE MOVING, INCORPORATED; Coleman American

Moving Services, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 97-30667.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

July 8, 1998.

Timmy J. Fontenot, Eunice, LA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Robert Henry Sarpy, Jr., Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, Roderick K. West, Vial, Hamilton, Koch & Knox, New Orleans, LA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

Before WISDOM, JOLLY and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

Moving from Virginia to Louisiana, Tex and Cindy Morris lost most of their furniture and belongings when a fire destroyed the truck transporting their property. The Morrises sued the moving company, seeking a greater recovery than statutory law--the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act--allows them. Thus, the primary issue in this case is whether federal common law remedies are available in actions against common carriers for the loss of goods shipped under a receipt or bill of lading within the scope of the Carmack Amendment. The case further presents the question whether summary judgment was inappropriate because there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to the value of the plaintiffs' goods lost while in the carrier's custody. We hold that federal common law remedies are preempted by the Carmack Amendment. We also hold, however, that fact issues remain as to the value of lost goods. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I

On January 9, 1995, the Morrises entered into a contract with Covan Worldwide Moving, Inc. and Coleman American Moving Services, Inc. (collectively, "Covan") to transport their household goods from Dale City, Virginia, to Baton Rouge, Louisiana. In the process, the Morrises completed an "Estimate and Order for Service" form in which they provided Covan with estimates as to what property would be shipped and its value. The Morrises also filled out a "Shipment Protection Plan" in which Covan offered three levels of coverage. The Morrises requested the maximum, "full value" coverage for their property. ¹ Finally, the Morrises signed a bill of lading in which they declared the total value of their shipped property to be $29,000.00. The total weight listed on the bill of lading was 7,860 pounds.

On January 10, 1995, the Morrises' property was loaded for shipment to Baton Rouge. During the trip, the tractor-trailer caught fire. The blaze destroyed nearly everything. Covan nevertheless delivered some of the property and charged the Morrises for 4429 pounds of freight. The Morrises disputed the charge, contending that all of the property delivered was effectively destroyed by the fire and attending smoke and water. Covan adjusted its figures to reflect a delivery of 2658 pounds of freight and ultimately paid the Morrises $26,498.38 of the declared value of $29,000.00.

The Morrises were dissatisfied with the settlement offer and brought this action in the district court. They alleged that the actual value of their property was $54,312.00 and that they had suffered an additional $60,000.00 in punitive damages, lost wages, and mental anguish resulting from the destruction of their belongings. In all, the Morrises sought $87,813.62 in damages, the difference between their actual losses and the amount Covan had already paid them, as well as attorney's fees.

The Morrises submitted timely discovery requests to Covan seeking, among other things, a copy of the tariff under which Covan was operating. Before any responses were received, however, Covan moved for partial summary judgment. Covan argued that the action fell within the scope of the Carmack Amendment and that the Amendment limited the Morrises' recovery to the value of property declared in the bill of lading--$29,000.00.

The district court granted Covan's motion and then dismissed the entire lawsuit. Based on the bill of lading and Covan's tariff (which had been attached to Covan's summary judgment reply brief, but not provided to the Morrises in response to their discovery requests), the court determined that the action was governed by the Carmack Amendment and, thus, that Covan was entitled to limit its liability to the declared value of the property. Accordingly, the court dismissed all claims based on state or federal common law. Also, because the alleged loss occurred before the effective date of the recently added provisions permitting recovery of attorney's fees under the Carmack Amendment, the court held that the Morrises were not entitled to attorney's fees. Finally, and without expressly addressing the Morrises' claim that they were nevertheless entitled to the unpaid balance on their $29,000.00 declaration (amounting to $2501.62), the court dismissed the remainder of the case. The Morrises appealed.

II

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Exxon Corp. v. Baton Rouge Oil, 77 F.3d 850, 853 (5th Cir.1996). The court will not weigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses; further, all justifiable inferences will be made in the nonmoving party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513-14, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If, as here, the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may demonstrate that it is entitled to summary judgment by submitting affidavits or other similar evidence negating the nonmoving party's claim, or by pointing out to the district court the absence of evidence necessary to support the nonmoving party's case. Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir.1990).

Once the moving party presents the district court with a properly supported summary judgment motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that summary judgment is inappropriate. Id. In doing so, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings, and unsubstantiated or conclusory assertions that a fact issue exists will not suffice. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. at 2514. Rather, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a "genuine" issue concerning every essential component of its case. Thomas v. Price, 975 F.2d 231, 235 (5th Cir.1992). That is, the nonmoving party must adduce evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. With these standards in mind, we turn to the merits.

III

A

The first issue we address, whether federal common law remedies are available in actions against common carriers within the scope of the Carmack Amendment, is purely a question of law. The Amendment provides, in relevant part:

A common carrier providing transportation or service subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission ... shall issue a receipt or bill of lading for property it receives for transportation under this subtitle. That carrier ... and any other common carrier that delivers the property and is subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission ... are liable to the person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading. The liability imposed under this paragraph is for actual loss or injury to the property caused by (1) the receiving carrier [or] (2) the delivering carrier....

49 U.S.C. § 11707(a)(1) (1995). ²

The Morrises contend that the purpose of the Amendment was simply to establish uniform rules governing the interstate shipment of goods by common carriers. Furthermore, federal common law remedies are not explicitly precluded by the text of the Amendment, and applying those remedies here will not frustrate the Amendment's purpose. Covan, on the other hand, maintains that section 11707 expressly limits the carrier's liability to the actual damages caused to the property up to the amount declared in the bill of lading.

In support of their argument, the Morrises also point out that the Carmack Amendment contains a "savings clause," which provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the remedies provided under this subtitle are in addition to remedies existing under another law or at common law." 49 U.S.C. § 10103 (1995). Our reading of this language leads us to conclude initially that two aspects of this clause are of particular relevance here. First, remedies provided by the Carmack Amendment are "in addition to" other remedies. Second, such other remedies include those available under "common law." Based on a plain reading of this language we would think that the Morrises' claim for punitive damages, if supported by federal common law, has a firm statutory basis as an additional remedy under the Carmack Amendment. We are not, however, writing on a clean slate and must therefore consider how the Carmack Amendment and its savings clause have already been interpreted.

B

Our analysis must begin with the Supreme Court's decision in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 33 S.Ct. 148, 57 L.Ed. 314 (1913). In Adams, the plaintiff hired the defendant, a common carrier, to ship a package containing a diamond ring from Ohio to Georgia. The package never arrived. The bill of lading stated that charges for delivering the package were based on the value of the shipment, that the value was to be declared by the shipper, and that failure to declare the value would result in a rate based on a value of $50. The plaintiff had not declared a value. Nevertheless, he brought suit against the defendant in Kentucky state court for the full market value of the ring. Under Kentucky law, the contract to limit the plaintiff's recovery to an agreed or declared value was invalid, and the plaintiff was generally entitled to recover the actual value of the ring. The plaintiff prevailed, and the case eventually went to the Supreme Court.

The...