Mcnamara v. Boston & M.R.r.

Decision Date25 February 1914
Citation104 N.E. 285,216 Mass. 506
PartiesMcNAMARA v. BOSTON & M. R. R.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
COUNSEL

F. W. Fosdick and J. J. Butler, both of Boston, for plaintiff.

Archibald R. Tisdale, of Boston, for defendant.

OPINION

RUGG C.J.

This is an action of tort to recover damages for injuries received by reason of ice upon a platform of station premises of the defendant. The only question presented is whether the plaintiff gave a notice as required by St. 1908, c. 305 whereby a person founding an action upon defective conditions caused by or consisting in part of snow or ice is required to give notice of the time, place and cause of the injury or damage to the person or corporation responsible therefor.

The plaintiff contends that this statutory requirement is satisfied by a communication addressed by her attorney to the assistant general solicitor in the defendant's legal department, of the tenor following:

'Boston Massachusetts, Jan. 12, 1912.

'Charles S. Pierce, Esq., Boston, Mass.--Dear Sir: Miss Alfreda McNamara, of Boston, has placed in my hands for adjustment a claim against the Boston & Maine Railroad for injuries received on the night of January 6, 1912, on the premises of said company at their Wakefield Junction station.

'Awaiting your earliest convenience, I remain,

'Very truly yours, John J. Butler.'

It is to be noted that this communication is not addressed to the defendant, and does not purport to be addressed to any one in its behalf. It does not create the impression upon the mind by reading that it is intended to be a notice. It is in form a letter. It omits any reference to the cause of the injury although it states the time and place. Where snow or ice is the cause of the damage, it is of especial importance that this fact should be called to the attention of the one upon whom it is sought to fasten liability, for the reason that the condition in the nature of things can last but a short time and is liable to change from hour to hour. This is demonstrated by the fact that the Legislature added snow and ice as one of the conditions respecting highways which called for a special notice within 10 days instead of 30 days, the usual time for such notices, St. 1894, c. 422; and in 1908 the provision was extended to all persons or corporations against whom damages were demanded by reason of snow and ice. See however St. 1913, c. 324. It is matter of common knowledge that these statutes were enacted because of the ease by which claims of this sort could be made and the general helplessness of the person against whom they were charged to ascertain the facts after the lapse of a brief time. The...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT