McNeal v. Wapello County
Docket Number | 21-0215 |
Decision Date | 03 February 2023 |
Parties | Rita MCNEAL and Cliff McNeal, Appellants, v. WAPELLO COUNTY and Wapello County Board of Supervisors, Appellees. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Matthew G. Sease (argued) of Sease & Wadding, Des Moines, for appellants.
Hugh J. Cain (argued) (until withdrawal), Eric M. Updegraff, Brent L. Hinders, and Daniel J. Johnston (until withdrawal) of Hopkins & Huebner, P.C., Des Moines, for appellees.
Mansfield, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, McDonald, and Oxley, JJ., joined. McDermott, J., filed a special concurrence. May, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
How canst thou make me satisfaction? William Shakespeare, Henry V act IV, sc. 8, l. 46–47.
A problem for King Henry V, a problem in this case. Since Shakespeare's time, "satisfaction" has had both subjective and objective components. Colloquially sometimes we say that a person has been satisfied when they feel satisfied, sometimes we say so when objectively they ought to be satisfied. The law is no different. When a contract requires performance of a covenant to a party's satisfaction, sometimes we place a subjective gloss, sometimes an objective gloss, on that language.
In this case, landowners were operating a vehicle repair and salvage business on R-1 residential property in Wapello County. When the County notified the landowners of its plans to clean up the alleged nuisance, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. Under the agreement, the landowners were to remove "derelict vehicles" from the property, among other things. After forty-five days, the County could enter the property "to determine what remaining ... derelict vehicles" still needed to be removed and notify the landowners. If the landowners did not remove "derelict vehicles ... to the satisfaction of the County" at the expiration of ninety days, the County could enter again and remove the "derelict vehicles."
At the end of the ninety-day period, sixteen vehicles remained on this property—the same sixteen that had always been there. So the County had them towed away, giving the landowners an opportunity to reclaim any of them by paying the towing and storage fees so long as they didn't bring them back to the property. None of the vehicles displayed a current license, many—if not all of them—were inoperative, the vehicles were generally decades old, and some of them were simply being mined for auto parts. Yet the landowners sued, asserting that the County had breached the agreement by removing a group of vehicles that were not "derelict."
The district court granted the County's motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the agreement allowed the County to decide subjectively whether it was satisfied with the removal of vehicles. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that an objective standard applied to the County's determination of its satisfaction under the agreement.
On further review, we agree with the court of appeals that an objective standard applies. But we find that the removal of the vehicles did not breach that objective standard. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the district court.
Together, Rita and Cliff McNeal are the owners of R & C Auto & Auto Repair, which is a vehicle repair and sales business located at their home in rural Wapello County. As part of their business, the two regularly purchase damaged or inoperative vehicles. They either repair and sell the vehicles, or they use them as sources of parts for other repairs. The McNeals store some of the inoperative automobiles on their home property.
On January 21, 2019, the McNeals learned of a bid proposal by the County for "Property Clean-up and Debris Removal" at their home to occur on or before May 1. The bid proposal provided, "The property shall be cleaned and cleared of all brush, small trees, broken concrete and/or rock, trash, garbage and other types of debris." However, it stated that "[a]ll vehicles and trailers shall not be moved for clean-up or debris removal."
Within days, the McNeals filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the County and its board of supervisors in the Wapello County District Court.1 The petition alleged that the McNeals had not received proper notice or time to abate any charged violations.
To resolve the litigation, the parties entered into a written settlement agreement on April 23. As part of this agreement, the McNeals dismissed their petition without prejudice.
The agreement also contained a series of four recitals. In the second recital, the parties "agreed that the McNeals have received notice pursuant to Iowa Code § 331.384(2)." The fourth (and final) recital stated, "WHEREAS, the Parties have agreed to a procedure if the McNeals fail to clean the Property in accordance with Iowa Code § 331.384 and Wapello County Ordinances."
The agreement also contained the following operative provisions:
The County zoning administrator entered the McNeals’ property on May 19. No cleanup work had been done at that time. He sent a letter documenting these findings to the McNeals on May 21, but the County did not make the letter a part of the summary judgment record. When the ninety-day period ran out on June 30, the McNeals had not complied with the instructions in the zoning administrator's letter.
On August 5, after the ninety-day period plus another thirty-five days had elapsed, the County entered the McNeals’ property and removed a large number of items, including sixteen vehicles. All but one of the vehicles had been sitting outside on the property. The only exception was a heavily damaged vehicle that was found under an open structure along with other debris.2
None of the sixteen vehicles removed displayed a dealer license plate or any indication of current licensure. However, the McNeals later attested that nine of the vehicles did have current dealer licensure; the rest of the vehicles did not. Some did not have licensure because no vehicle title could be found or because the vehicle was being used for parts. The removed vehicles were generally Chevy and Ford pickups and sedans from the 1980s, the 1990s, and the 2000s.
The County sent a letter to the McNeals on August 27 advising them that they could retrieve any of these vehicles by providing an indication of title and paying the towing and storage fees, but the vehicles could not be returned to the McNeals’ residence and would be destroyed if not retrieved within ten days.
On September 6, the McNeals filed another action in the Wapello County District Court, alleging that the County's removal of vehicles from their property breached the settlement agreement. The petition sought damages and injunctive relief. The County moved for summary judgment, arguing that its actions had complied with the settlement. The McNeals resisted, and the district court held a hearing.
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