McNeil v. Duncan
| Decision Date | 15 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 19-694 (RDM) |
| Parties | PATRICK MCNEIL, Plaintiff, v. JEFFREY DUNCAN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
PATRICK MCNEIL, Plaintiff,
v.
JEFFREY DUNCAN, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 19-694 (RDM)
United States District Court, District of Columbia
July 15, 2022
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
RANDOLPH D. MOSS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Patrick McNeil is a former employee of BAE Systems Corporation (“BAE”), which, along with JRC Systems, Inc. (“JRC”), provides contract support to the Department of the Navy's Strategic Systems Program. Plaintiff initially brought this action pro se in D.C. Superior Court against one former and one current employee of the Department of the Navy-Vice Admiral Tony Benedict and Karon Joyner-Bowser-and against two JRC employees-Jeffrey Duncan and Marco D'Eredita. Plaintiff asserted claims for (1) tortious interference with a business relationship, (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (3) defamation. Dkt. 11 at 2 (Compl.). In March 2019, the United States certified pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) that Vice Admiral Benedict and Joyner-Bowser “were acting within the scope of their employment as deemed employees of the United States Department of Navy at the time of the alleged incidents.” Dkt. 1-2 at 2. The United States then removed the case to this Court and substituted itself as the party defendant in place of Vice Admiral Benedict and Joyner-Bowser. See id. All four defendants then moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claims. Dkt. 7; Dkt. 11. The United States moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; Duncan and D'Eredita moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
On March 31, 2021, the Court granted the United States' motion to dismiss the claims against it on the ground that the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity did not apply. See McNeil v. Duncan, 2020 WL 1536252, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2020). The Court also denied Duncan and D'Eredita's motion to dismiss without prejudice, explaining that the Court would benefit from further briefing on the question whether the Court retained subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims against Duncan and D'Eredita in light of the Court's dismissal of the claims against the United States. Id. at *5.
On April 20, 2021, with the aid of newly retained counsel and with leave of Court, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging the same three tort claims against Defendants Duncan and D'Eredita (“Defendants”). Dkt. 44. Defendants now move to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. 45.
For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that it retains subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims against Defendants and will DENY the motion to dismiss as to Counts I and II and GRANT the motion as to Count III.
I. BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are derived from Plaintiff's complaint and are taken as true. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).
Plaintiff Patrick McNeil was previously married to DeAnna Rhodes. Dkt. 44 at 2 (Am. Compl. ¶ 11). In 2014, the couple created online profiles on FetLife.com (“FetLife”), a social networking website that serves people interested in “BDSM.”[1] Dkt. 44 at 3 (Am. Compl. ¶ 16).
In 2015, Plaintiff and Rhodes met Jeffrey Duncan and James Crawley through the BDSM community. Id. at 4 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17-18). Duncan worked for JRC. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 19). In April 2016, Rhodes started working for JRC, reporting to Duncan. Id. at 2 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10-11). “As part of her job duties, . . . Rhodes attended work trips out of state with Defendant Duncan, which Mr. Crawley, [who was] not a JRC employee, would attend as well.” Id. at 4 (Am. Compl. ¶ 21). In May 2016, Rhodes “moved out of the marital home and eventually moved into Mr. Crawley's home.” Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 22).
In August 2016, Duncan helped Plaintiff secure a job with BAE. Id. at 5 (Am. Compl. ¶ 26); see also Dkt. 44-6 at 2. Like JRC, BAE provides contract services to the Navy's Strategic Systems Program (“SSP”). Dkt. 44 at 2 (Am. Compl. ¶ 10). Plaintiff began working for BAE in support of the SSP in October 2016. Id. at 5 (Am. Compl. ¶ 27). Around the same time, Plaintiff “expressed his distress over his marriage to Defendant Duncan,” id. at 5 (Am. Compl. ¶ 25), and his “mental health began suffering,” id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 28).
On or about December 28, 2016, Plaintiff “published a website biography detailing his perspective about Duncan and Mr. Crawley's actions regarding Mrs. Rhodes and his marriage.” Id. at 5-6 (Am. Compl. ¶ 29). The website biography included photos of Rhodes that Duncan and Crawley had “posted publicly to the FetLife website.” Id. at 6 (Am. Compl. ¶ 29). The website also “included a reference to [Plaintiff's] current work in relation to the SSP.” Id.
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff learned that he had been banned from the JRC worksite where Rhodes and Duncan worked. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 30). On January 4, 2017, Duncan confronted Plaintiff about the website, stating that the JRC “security officer did ban [Plaintiff] [from entering JRC] past the front desk” and that the website “ma[d]e [Plaintiff] a problem for [Duncan].” Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 32). That same day, Plaintiff removed the photos of Rhodes from
his website. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 31). On January 9, 2017, Rhodes petitioned for and obtained a preliminary protective order in Fairfax County, Virginia. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 33). On or about January 24, 2017, Marco D'Eredita, Director of Facilities and Security for JRC, emailed Plaintiff to advise him not to contact JRC employees about Rhodes and to inform him that JRC was aware of Rhodes's protective order. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 34).
In or around February 2017, Defendants “reported [Plaintiff's] website as a security risk to BAE.” Id. at 7 (Am. Compl. ¶ 36). Duncan “requested an in-person meeting with BAE, which BAE declined.” Id. On or about February 13, 2017, Vice Admiral Benedict “contacted BAE regarding the reports received from Defendants” and “demanded that [Plaintiff] be removed from his worksite in D.C.” Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 38). Around the same time, Duncan also reported to his supervisors that Plaintiff and Rhodes were divorced-even though they were only separated-and Duncan “used that misrepresentation to request and receive advanced warning of [Plaintiff's] travel to the [SSP] work site” in Florida. Id. at 7 (Am. Compl. ¶ 40); see also Dkt. 44-8 at 2 (text messages between Plaintiff and Duncan). Plaintiff's trips to the Florida worksite were subsequently cancelled. Dkt. 44 at 7 (Am. Compl. ¶ 41).
On or about February 15, 2017, BAE “concluded [its] investigation and determined that [Plaintiff] had not violated any of BAE's company policies, and therefore, did not present a security risk.” Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 42). Despite this determination, “a report of Plaintiff's alleged violation was logged into the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (‘JPAS') within the Department of Defense's personnel security clearance and access database.” Id. at 8 (Am. Compl. ¶ 44). Over the next several months, Plaintiff (1) was transferred from his worksite in Washington, D.C. to BAE's worksite in Rockville, Maryland, id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 43); (2) had his security clearance temporarily suspended, id. at 9 (Am. Compl. ¶ 51); (3) was eventually
suspended from the Rockville worksite, id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 52); and (4) was terminated from BAE on September 6, 2017, id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 53).
On January 19, 2019, Plaintiff filed this action pro se in the Superior Court against Vice Admiral Benedict, Joyner-Bowser, Duncan, and D'Eredita. Dkt. 1-1 (Compl.). He asserted claims for (1) tortious interference with a business relationship, (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (3) defamation. Dkt. 1-1 at 5-20. The United States removed the action to this Court, Dkt. 1-1 at 1, citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1441, 1442(a)(1), 1446, 2401(b), and 2671-80. That same day, the United States certified pursuant to the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d), that Vice Admiral Benedict and Joyner-Bowser “were acting within the scope of their employment . . . at the time of the alleged incidents” and substituted itself as a party defendant in their place. Dkt. 1 at 2. The United States then moved to dismiss the claims against it for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680, did not cover Plaintiff's claims. Duncan and D'Eredita also moved to dismiss, arguing that they were “entitled to absolute immunity” from suit for informing the Navy about issues potentially affecting Plaintiff's security clearance and that, in any event, the complaint did not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Dkt. 11.
On March 31, 2020, the Court granted the United States' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. See McNeil v. Duncan, 2020 WL 1536252, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2020). As a threshold matter, the Court concluded that the United States was properly substituted for Vice Admiral Benedict and Joyner-Bowser under the Westfall Act. McNeil, 2020 WL 1536252, at *3-5. The Court then concluded that the FTCA barred Plaintiff's intentional tort claims against the United States. Id. at *5. The Court also denied Duncan and D'Eredita's motion to dismiss without prejudice, on the ground that the Court would benefit from further briefing on the
question whether the Court retained subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining statelaw claims after having dismissed the claims against the United States for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at *8. The Court, accordingly, ordered the parties to show cause why it should not dismiss or remand to the Superior Court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.
On March 29, 2021, Plaintiff moved for leave to file an amended complaint in light of his recent retention of counsel. Dkt. 42. The Court granted leave to amend and, on April 20, 2021, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint naming only...
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