McNeil v. Hansen

• Decision Date: 18 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2005AP423.,2005AP423.
• Citation: 2007 WI 56,731 N.W.2d 273
• Parties: Karl McNEIL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Brandon HANSEN and Maryland Casualty Company, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

731 N.W.2d 273

2007 WI 56

Karl McNEIL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Brandon HANSEN and Maryland Casualty Company, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 2005AP423.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued October 13, 2006.

Decided May 18, 2007.

For the plaintiff-appellant there were briefs by John A. Becker and Becker, French & DeMatthew, Racine, and oral argument by John A. Becker.

For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by Edward W. Stewart, Danielle R. McCollister, and Lowe & Associates, Waukesha, and oral argument by Edward W. Stewart.

An amicus curiae brief was filed by James A. Friedman, Linda S. Schmidt, and LaFollette Godfrey & Kahn, Madison, on behalf of Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce.

¶ 1 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J

This case comes to us on certification from the court of appeals. The circuit court concluded that Brandon Hansen's (Hansen) action of reaching through an automobile's window and attempting to start the vehicle by turning the key did not constitute "operation of a motor vehicle" as that term is used in an exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Compensation Act (the Act). Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2) (2003-04).¹ As a result, the circuit court concluded that the suit was barred by § 102.03(2), and it granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing Karl McNeil's (McNeil's) complaint.

¶ 2 We conclude that when the action under consideration is undertaken to service or repair a vehicle, and the condition of the vehicle is such that it could not then be driven on a public roadway, the action does not constitute "operation of a motor vehicle" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2). The action at issue here was attempting to start the vehicle when it was connected to a machine to flush the radiator. This action was undertaken to service the vehicle while it could not be driven on a public roadway. Therefore, it does not constitute the "operation of a motor vehicle" as that term is used in § 102.03(2). Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's summary judgment dismissing McNeil's claims.

I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On April 12, 2003, McNeil and Hansen were working at Fast Track Oil Change, performing a radiator flush on a customer's Jeep Wrangler. McNeil, Hansen's supervisor, hooked the Jeep up to a machine that flushes the radiator. The Jeep's engine had to be started in order for the machine to function, so McNeil asked Hansen to start the Jeep's engine while he remained in front of the Jeep to determine whether the hoses being used to flush the radiator were leaking. Hansen, while standing outside of the Jeep, leaned in through an open window and turned the ignition switch. The Jeep had a manual transmission and upon ignition it lurched forward and struck and injured McNeil.

¶ 4 McNeil sued Hansen. Maryland Casualty Company was also named as a defendant. It paid worker's compensation benefits to McNeil as a result of the accident, and therefore, it has subrogation rights with regard to McNeil's claim, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 102.29.² Hansen and Maryland Casualty Company moved for summary judgment of dismissal based on Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2), which provides that the Act is generally the exclusive remedy against employers and coemployees for job-related injuries. The circuit court granted summary judgment, after concluding that Hansen's action did not constitute "operation of a motor vehicle" as the term is used in the exception to the exclusive remedy provision in § 102.03(2). The court concluded that the Act required a "very narrow approach" when defining "operation of a motor vehicle" because the exceptions to the Act's coemployee immunity provisions are to be narrowly construed.

¶ 5 McNeil appealed the circuit court's decision and the court of appeals certified the case due to the conflict between (1) its conclusion that the facts could come within existing definitions of "operation of a motor vehicle" in other statutes, and (2) its conclusion that the Act generally provides the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries. We granted certification.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

¶ 6 We review a grant of summary judgment independently, applying the same methodology as the circuit court. AKG Real Estate, LLC v. Kosterman, 2006 WI 106, ¶ 14, 296 Wis.2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 835 (citing O'Neill v. Reemer, 2003 WI 13, ¶ 8, 259 Wis.2d 544, 657 N.W.2d 403); Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis.2d 304, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987).

¶ 7 To determine whether summary judgment is appropriate in the case before us, we interpret Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2). The interpretation and application of a statute to an undisputed set of facts are questions of law that we review independently. Rocker v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2006 WI 26, ¶ 23, 289 Wis.2d 294, 711 N.W.2d 634; State v. Sostre, 198 Wis.2d 409, 414, 542 N.W.2d 774 (1996) (citing Ynocencio v. Fesko, 114 Wis.2d 391, 396, 338 N.W.2d 461 (1983)).

B. Operation of a Motor Vehicle

¶ 8 In general, an employee's exclusive remedy for a job-related injury is under the Act. Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2). However, there are three limited exceptions in that statute that allow an employee to bring an action against a coemployee. Id. Section 102.03(2) provides:

Where such conditions exist the right to the recovery of compensation under this chapter shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer, any other employee of the same employer and the worker's compensation insurance carrier. This section does not limit the right of an employee to bring action against any coemployee for an assault intended to cause bodily harm, or against a coemployee for negligent operation of a motor vehicle not owned or leased by the employer, or against a coemployee of the same employer to the extent that there would be liability of a governmental unit to pay judgments against employees under a collective bargaining agreement or a local ordinance.

Id. In this case, we must decide whether Hansen's action of reaching through the vehicle's window during service of that vehicle and turning the ignition switch while the vehicle could not be driven on a public roadway falls within the term "operation of a motor vehicle" under the second exception in § 102.03(2).

¶ 9 "[S]tatutory interpretation `begins with the language of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.'" State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, 236 Wis.2d 211, 232, 612 N.W.2d 659). The context in which the operative language appears is important. Therefore, the language should be "interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole." Id., ¶ 46, 681 N.W.2d 110. If the statutory language is unambiguous, extrinsic sources of interpretation generally are not consulted. Id. A statute is ambiguous "if it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses." Id., ¶ 47, 681 N.W.2d 110. If a statute is ambiguous, a court may turn to external sources, such as legislative history, to assist its interpretation. Id., ¶ 48, 681 N.W.2d 110.

¶ 10 A general rule of statutory construction is that exceptions within a statute "should be strictly, and reasonably, construed and extend only as far as their language fairly warrants." 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 371 (2006). If a statute is liberally construed, "it follows that the exceptions must be narrowly construed." Miller v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 2003 WI App 58, ¶ 18, 260 Wis.2d 581, 659 N.W.2d 494 (interpreting exceptions to the recreational immunity statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.52, narrowly because the statute is liberally construed in favor of property owners).

¶ 11 The term "operation of a motor vehicle" is not defined in the Act. The word "operation" may have different meanings, depending on the context in which it is used. Hake v. Zimmerlee, 178 Wis.2d 417, 421, 504 N.W.2d 411 (Ct.App. 1993) (citing Lukaszewicz v. Concrete Research, Inc., 43 Wis.2d 335, 342, 168 N.W.2d 581 (1969)). For example, depending on the context, "operation" could require actually driving a vehicle, or it could refer to simply activating any of the controls of a vehicle.³ The meaning of "operation of a motor vehicle" in Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2) is not readily discernable from its context. Therefore, we agree with the court of appeals; the term is ambiguous because it has more than one reasonable interpretation. Id. Since the term is ambiguous, we turn to the legislative history to aid our interpretation.

¶ 12 In Hake, the court of appeals reviewed the legislative history and examined the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2) while determining whether an employee's action of closing the door of a vehicle on a coemployee's hand constituted negligent "operation of a motor vehicle" under § 102.03(2). Id. at 420-422, 504 N.W.2d 411. The court stated that one purpose of the Act "is to allocate the cost of employment injuries to the industry or business in which they occur and, ultimately, to the consuming public as part of the price for the goods or services offered." Id. at 421-22, 504 N.W.2d 411 (quoting Oliver v. Travelers Ins. Co., 103 Wis.2d 644, 648, 309 N.W.2d 383 (Ct.App.1981)).

¶ 13 Hake noted that prior to 1977, the Act precluded suits against the employer and the worker's compensation insurance carrier, but it did not prohibit suits between coemployees for work-related injuries. Id. at 422, 504 N.W.2d 411. Consistent with the purpose of the Act, in 1977 the Act was revised in accordance with recommendations from the Worker's Compensation Advisory Council (the Advisory Council) to prohibit most work-related injury suits between coemployees. Id. The Advisory Council explained the amendment to Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2) as follows:

[The amendment] would permit a suit where there was an assault by the co-employe or where there was negligent operation of a motor vehicle not owned or leased...