McNeill Trucking v. MO State Highway

• Decision Date: 23 January 2001
• Parties: (Mo.banc 2001) . McNeill Trucking Company, Inc., and Roy S. Golden, Appellants, v. Missouri State Highway and Transportation Commission, Respondent. SC82615 Supreme Court of Missouri Handdown Date: 0
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

35 S.W.3d 846 (Mo.banc 2001)

This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court.

McNeill Trucking Company, Inc., and Roy S. Golden, Appellants, v. Missouri State Highway and Transportation Commission, Respondent.

SC82615

Supreme Court of Missouri

Handdown Date: 01/23/2001

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Greene County, Hon. Calvin R. Holden; Circuit Court of Camden County, Hon. Mary A. Dickerson

Counsel for Appellant: Joseph A. Bohrer and Rae L. Nickell

Counsel for Respondent: Zachary T. Cartwright, Rich Tiemeyer, and R.B. Regan

Opinion Summary: McNeill Trucking Company and a driver were sued for wrongful death and personal injuries from an accident on I-44 in Laclede County. They settled with the plaintiffs and filed third-party petitions seeking contribution from the Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission, alleging negligence in the construction, repair, and maintenance of the highway. The court granted MHTC's motions to dismiss asserting sovereign immunity.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Court en banc holds:

Claims for contribution are not barred by sovereign immunity when compensatory damage claims for injuries result from dangerous conditions on public property and a joint obligation on the liability is shared by tortfeasors. The MHTC conceded that sovereign immunity would not shield it as a party to the original action. Section 537.600 (sovereign immunity) applies to injuries caused by dangerous conditions on public property; it does not bar claims for contribution. To the extent Steinhoff v. Rolen, 945 S.W.2d 516 (Mo. App. 1997), is inconsistent with this opinion, it should no longer be followed.

Opinion Author: Ronnie L. White, Judge

Opinion Vote: REVERSED AND REMANDED. All concur.

Opinion:

Following settlements for injuries sustained as a result of a motor vehicle accident, defendants, McNeill Trucking Company (McNeill) and Roy S. Golden, filed third-party petitions seeking contribution from the Missouri State Highway and Transportation Commission (MHTC). MHTC responded with motions to dismiss asserting the defense of sovereign immunity. The motions were granted. We hold that claims for contribution are not statutorily barred by sovereign immunity when compensatory damage claims for injuries result from dangerous conditions on public property and a joint obligation on the liability is shared by tortfeasors. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

The two underlying lawsuits forming the basis for this consolidated appeal involved personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on Interstate 44 (I-44) in Laclede County, Missouri. McNeill employed Mr. Golden, an independent contractor, as a tractor-trailer driver. On September 7, 1997, the truck he was driving overturned and an automobile driven by Jack Kramer collided with the wreckage. Mr. Kramer was injured along with all four of his children. His only son, Kyle, died as a result of the injuries he sustained.

The first suit was a wrongful death action against McNeill and Golden for the loss of Kyle. The second, involving the same parties, sought recovery for the injuries sustained by the surviving family members. The plaintiffs reached settlement agreements in both suits, but prior to their dismissal McNeill and Golden filed third-party petitions seeking contribution from the MHTC alleging negligence in the construction, repair, and maintenance of the section of I-44 where the accident occurred. MHTC responded with motions to dismiss asserting the defense of sovereign immunity. The motions were granted.

McNeill and Golden raise two points on appeal. They contend MHTC waived its sovereign immunity defense by not timely asserting it, and that sovereign immunity is not a bar to a third-party action for contribution. If sovereign immunity is not a bar, then the issue of waiver need not be reached.

II.

The right to contribution is based upon the principle of fairness, and, while historically afforded in equity, it has subsequently been enforced at law under a variety of legal theories to rectify unjust enrichment.¹ The contribution defendant must be liable to the same person for the same injury.² It is this joint liability, not a joint judgment, that is a prerequisite to contribution.³ With regard to third-party practice under Rule 52.11, an original party is not obligated to implead a third party in an original tort action. Failure to do so does not affect that party's substantive rights nor does it provide a defense to an action for contribution.⁴

The general rule regarding sovereign immunity is that the sovereign cannot be sued without its consent.⁵ Consequently, statutory provisions that waive sovereign immunity must be strictly construed.⁶ Missouri's sovereign immunity statute, section 537.600,⁷ waives sovereign immunity to allow compensatory damages for injuries resulting from the negligent operation of motor vehicles or dangerous conditions on public property and provides in pertinent part:

1. Such sovereign or governmental tort immunity as existed at common law in this state prior to September 12, 1977, except to the extent waived, abrogated or modified by statutes in effect prior to that date, shall remain in full force and effect; except that, the immunity of the public entity from liability and suit for compensatory damages for negligent acts or omissions is hereby expressly waived in the following instances:***

(2) Injuries caused by the condition of a public entity's property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury directly resulted from the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the course of his employment created the dangerous condition or a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition . . . .

2. The express waiver of sovereign immunity in the instances specified in subdivisions (1) and (2) of subsection 1 of this section are absolute waivers of sovereign immunity in all cases within such situations whether or not the public entity was functioning in a governmental or proprietary capacity and whether or not the public entity is covered by a liability insurance for tort.

MHTC conceded at oral argument that it could have been impleaded into the original action and, if the facts supported it, found liable to the Kramers. What MHTC contends is that while sovereign immunity would not shield them as a party to the original tort action, it shields them from any claim of contribution which they characterize as being a separate and distinct cause of action not covered under section 537.600. Combining the decisions in Rowland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc.⁸ and Steinhoff v. Rolen,⁹ MHTC contends that an action for contribution is not substantively grounded in tort, and the courts are precluded from making extensions beyond the limited waiver of sovereign tort immunity under section 537.600. The analysis argued for by MHTC, and...