McNeill v. Park County School Dist. No. 1, s. 5501
Decision Date | 06 November 1981 |
Docket Number | 5502,Nos. 5501,s. 5501 |
Parties | 25 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 366 Bob G. McNEILL, Appellant (Claimant-Appellee), v. PARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, Appellee (Defendant-Appellant). Dorothy O. McNEILL, Appellant (Claimant-Appellee), v. PARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, Appellee (Defendant-Appellant). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
James M. Guill, Goppert, Day & Olson, Cody, for appellants.
Ross D. Copenhaver (argued), and Tracy J. Copenhaver, Legal Intern, Copenhaver & Kahl, Powell, for appellee.
Before ROSE, C. J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROONEY and BROWN, JJ.
This appeal arises from a district court's reversal of a decision by the Commissioner of the Wyoming State Department of Labor and Statistics. The commissioner's decision was in the appellants' favor and declared the appellee wrongfully witheld wages. Appellee was ordered by the commissioner to pay appellants wages they claimed due under their employment contracts. The district court reversed partly on the basis that the Labor Commissioner had misconstrued Wyoming law and partly because he had exceeded his jurisdiction. Appellants contend that the district court's action was erroneous for the following reasons:
However, the real issue here concerns the scope of the Commissioner of the Department of Labor and Statistics' jurisdiction.
We will affirm.
Appellant Bob G. McNeill was employed as a teacher by the appellee continuously from 1966 until 1979. He was a continuing contract teacher under the definition of that term appearing in § 21-7-102(a)(ii), W.S.1977; 1 and therefore under § 21-7-106, W.S.1977 2 he could not be terminated at the end of a school year unless so notified before March 15, prior to the school year's end. In light of § 21-7-104, W.S.1977 3 it is apparent that a school district's failure to terminate by March 15 constitutes a renewal of the teacher's contract. And thus under state law, since appellee failed to send notice to Bob McNeill on or prior to March 15, 1979, there was a renewal of his teaching contract for the 1979-1980 school year. However it is appellants' contention that appellee's school board policy No. 532.27 superseded state law. This policy provided:
Accordingly appellants argue that since the contract was not in writing, there was no contract.
Appellant Dorothy O. McNeill taught in the appellee's school district during the 1977-1978 and 1978-1979 school years. She was an initial contract teacher as that term is defined in § 21-7-102(a)(iv), W.S.1977. 4 Under § 21-7-105, W.S.1977 5 an initial contract teacher must be hired on an annual basis and provided notice of termination by March 15 of each year. On March 14, 1979, Dorothy McNeill was offered a contract for the 1979-1980 school year. On May 4, 1979, she was advised of her teaching assignment for that year.
Under § 21-7-107, W.S.1977, 6 any teacher desiring to resign must give notice of that intent prior to April 15. Neither of the McNeills gave any notice of their desire to leave their positions until early July of 1979. At that time they sent the following letter:
Appellee did not accept the tendered resignations. In February 1979, appellee had adopted a policy which provided in essence that any teacher released from a contract after June 1, and prior to July 15, would pay $200.00 for the estimated cost of replacement. After July 15 appellee would be due $300.00. Appellee's position was that the McNeills' tendered resignations were conditioned upon a release from the obligation. Since appellee was not willing to agree to such a release, it viewed the resignations ineffective. When the appellants failed to report to their jobs in August, appellee withheld $300.00 from the final payment due to each under the previous year's contract and initiated dismissal proceedings.
On October 17, 1979, appellants filed claims with the Department of Labor and Statistics for the monies withheld by appellee. The Department of Labor and Statistics' proceedings culminated with the commissioner of that department ordering appellee to pay each appellant the $300.00 in question. Appellee appealed to district court where the commissioner's order was reversed.
The scope of the Commissioner of Labor and Statistics' jurisdiction is defined in § 27-2-104, W.S.1977, which provides:
"It shall be the duty of the commissioner of labor and statistics to enforce all laws enacted by the legislature of Wyoming, relating to labor, hours of labor, and to the health, welfare, life and limb of the workers of this state; to see that workers are protected in the collection of their wages lawfully due; to make such inspections as may be by him deemed necessary of the industrial establishments and buildings hereinafter provided for; to make an inspection of all living accommodations provided employees whereever employed, where such are furnished as a part of the wages, and he shall, as required by section 9-21 (§ 9-2-103) of the statutes, report to the governor, together with such recommendations thereon as he deems appropriate." (Emphasis added.)
The general rule is that only those powers expressly conferred are granted to an administrative agency. Continental Pipe Line Co. v. Belle Fourche Pipeline Co., 372 F.Supp. 1333 (D.C.Wyo.1974). The commissioner's power includes only assisting workers in obtaining collection of lawfully due wages. The grant of power to the commissioner does not include jurisdiction to decide what wages are lawfully due in a disputed matter and override a contract of employment.
The statutory scheme can be more clearly seen in §§ 27-4-104 and -105, W.S.1977. Section 27-4-104 provides:
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