McNelis v. Crain

• Decision Date: 30 December 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2016–T–0065.,2016–T–0065.
• Parties: Marcia McNELIS, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Frederick CRAIN, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

78 N.E.3d 1237

2016 Ohio 8523

Marcia McNELIS, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants,

v.Frederick CRAIN, et al., Defendants–Appellees.

No. 2016–T–0065.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eleventh District, Trumbull County.

Dec. 30, 2016.

Michael D. Rossi, Guarnieri & Secrest, P.L.L., Warren, OH, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Thomas J. Wilson, Comstock, Springer & Wilson Co., L.P.A., Youngstown, OH, for defendants-appellees.

OPINION

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, P.J.

{¶ 1} Appellants, Marcia McNelis, et al., appeal from the judgments of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, denying their motion for summary judgment as well as the trial court's entry of directed verdict entered in favor of appellees, Frederick Crain, et al. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm both judgments of the probate court.

{¶ 2} The parties to this matter are the children of Ralph Crain ("the decedent"), who passed away on June 9, 2014. Prior to the decedent's death, Attorney Douglas Neuman represented him and executed his will on April 29, 2013 ("prior will"). The decedent instructed Attorney Neuman to keep the will in his personal possession. Under this will, each of decedent's six children stood to inherit from his estate equally. Later, the decedent requested Attorney Neuman to prepare and execute a second will, which he did, on August 19, 2013. Under this instrument, appellants were bequeathed $10,000 each, and real property and any remainders in the estate were devised and/or bequeathed to appellees. Attorney Neuman advised the decedent the new will could result in a will-contest action following his death. Rather than destroy the earlier will, they agreed that Attorney Neuman would retain the April will, along with the August will in his possession.

{¶ 3} After decedent passed, in June 2014, Attorney Neuman admitted the August 2013 will to probate. Shortly after the decedent's death, Attorney Neuman began representing appellees in matters relating to the decedent's estate. On September 3, 2014, appellants filed a will-contest action against appellees in the Trumbull County Probate Court. Appellants challenged the validity of the August 2013 will, asserting the decedent was under appellees' undue influence when it was executed. The matter proceeded to jury trial, during which Attorney Neuman testified to the existence of the prior will. The parties to the underlying matter asserted they had no knowledge of the will prior to this disclosure. After trial, the jury entered a verdict invalidating the August 2013 will and the trial court entered judgment in appellants' favor. The matter was appealed and, in Sferra v. Shepherd, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2014–T–0123, 2015-Ohio-2902, 2015 WL 4397429, this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

{¶ 4} On February 1, 2016, appellants filed the underlying action seeking a declaration that appellees withheld the prior will in violation of R.C. 2107.10(A), which provides:

{¶ 5} No property or right, testate or intestate, shall pass to a beneficiary named in a will who knows of the existence of the will for one year after the death of the testator and has the power to control it and, without reasonable cause, intentionally conceals or withholds it or neglects or refuses within that one year to cause it to be offered for or admitted to probate. The property devised or bequeathed to that beneficiary shall descend to the heirs of the testator, not including any heir who has concealed or withheld the will.

{¶ 6} Appellants claimed that appellees knew of the prior will for a year after the decedent's death, had control of the will, and without reasonable cause failed to admit it to probate. Appellees filed an answer. Each party subsequently moved for summary judgment.

{¶ 7} In their motion, appellees maintained appellants could not establish appellees knew of the existence of the will within the relevant timeframe and, hence, could not establish they had the ability to control it. Moreover, they argued that, even after they became aware of its existence (during the will-contest proceedings), they had reasonable cause for not admitting it to probate because they had a reasonable expectation of prevailing in the underlying proceedings or on appeal. Thus, they concluded, there was no genuine issues of material fact for litigation and they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

{¶ 8} In their motion, appellants asserted that, regardless of whether appellees had actual knowledge of the will, knowledge can be imputed to them because Attorney Neuman, as their lawyer and agent, did have knowledge of its existence within the relevant timeframe. Similarly, appealing to agency principles, appellants asserted that because Attorney Neuman was in possession of the prior will, appellees had the power to control the same. Finally, they contended there was no reasonable cause for appellees to withhold the will from probate because, once the August will was deemed void, they failed to seek a stay of that judgment. As a result, appellants maintained, the April will was the only valid will and, regardless of the appellate proceedings, appellees had no "reasonable cause for sitting on the 4/13 will." Accordingly, appellants contended there were no genuine issues of material fact and they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

{¶ 9} After considering the motions, the trial court determined there were genuine issues to be litigated and therefore denied the respective pleadings. The matter proceeded to jury trial, at which appellants called Attorney Neuman who testified to most of the facts set forth above. Appellants rested without presenting additional witnesses.

{¶ 10} Appellees subsequently moved for a directed verdict, asserting appellants failed to establish appellees had any knowledge of the prior will until the will-contest trial in November 2014; and, furthermore, even after they became aware of the instrument, appellants failed to establish they had any control over the same. In response, appellants attorney admitted "[i]f this Court is not going to impute Mr. Neuman's knowledge to these two defendants here, then I agree with [defense counsel]. We cannot show that these two defendants knew of the existence of the April—these two defendants knew of the existence of the April '13 will from June 9 of '14 to June 9 of ' 15." Appellants' counsel nevertheless argued that if the court imputes knowledge, then appellees had the power to control the instrument by virtue of Attorney Neuman's status as appellees' agent. And, because they could have admitted the April will, irrespective of the appellate proceedings in the will-contest case, they had no reasonable cause to withhold the same.

{¶ 11} The trial court determined that appellants offered no authority, under these circumstances, to support an imputation of knowledge from Attorney Neuman to appellees. The court observed that, although knowledge of an attorney is imputed to his or her client, where, as here, the attorney gained the subject knowledge while representing a separate client, imputation did not apply. Thus, the trial court granted appellees' Civ.R. 50 motion for a directed verdict. Appellant now appeals and assigns two errors. Because the assignments of error present interrelated issues, we shall address them together. They state:

{¶ 12} "[1.] The trial court erred in denying plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.

{¶ 13} "[2.] The trial court erred in granting defendants' motion for directed verdict at the conclusion of plaintiffs' case-in-chief."

{¶ 14} Under their assignments of error, appellants argue appellees had imputed knowledge of the prior will as soon as...