McNulty v. City of Boston
| Decision Date | 28 November 1939 |
| Citation | 304 Mass. 305,23 N.E.2d 896 |
| Parties | McNULTY v. CITY OF BOSTON. CLCCOLO v. SAME. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Actions of contract by James A. McNulty against the City of Boston and by Joseph Ciccolo against the same defendant to recover certain compensation to which plaintiffs claimed to be entitled as court officers of the superior court for Suffolk county. In the superior court there was a finding for each plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Judgments for defendant.Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Brogna, Judge.
H. Snyder and S. L. Bailen, both of Boston, for plaintiff.
W. J. Wallace, Asst. Corp. Counsel, of Boston, for defendant.
McNulty was appointed a regular court officer of the Superior Court for Suffolk County on February 2, 1931, at a salary of $2,484 together with an allowance of $100 for uniforms. Ciccolo was appointed to a similar position, and at the same salary and allowance, on April 11, 1931. St. 1930, c. 400, directed the budget commissioner of Boston to prepare and submit to the city council of Boston classification and compensation plans for every officer and employee of Suffolk County whose compensation was wholly payable by the county treasurer. The plans when adopted were to be put in effect for the financial year beginning January 1, 1931. Such plans, together with the rules for their administration, were adopted by the city counsel on April 13, 1931, and approved by the mayor on April 15, 1931. The compensation of court officers in the Superior Court was established at a minimum salary of $2,300, with four advancements of $100 each until the maximum salary of $2,700 was reached. These advancements in salary were to be by successive steps, after the completion of a period of meritorious service at the next lower rate for not less than twelve months. Upon the approval of the plan the salary of each of the plaintiffs was reduced to $2,300. These actions of contract are brought to recover the compensation the plaintiffs would have received if their salaries under the plan adopted were based upon the actual salary paid to each on April 15, 1931. In the Superior Court there was a finding for each plaintiff. The appeals of the city bring the cases here.
The plaintiffs contend that the cases are not properly here on appeal, that they should have been brought here by exceptions. An inspection of the agreed statement of facts shows that it was not submitted by the parties as evidence-as the plaintiffs assume, Frati v. Jannini, 226 Mass. 430, 115 N.E. 746;Atlantic Maritime Co. v. Gloucester, 228 Mass. 519, 117 N.E. 924;Comstock v. Soule, Mass., 21 N.E.2d 257, but it was an agreement that the matter therein recited constituted all the material facts upon which the rights of the parties were to be determined. It was not a statement of the evidence from which the court was to determine the facts. It was an agreement as to the facts themselves or, as expressed by them, ‘the parties hereby agree that the following are the material facts.’ Such an agreement was in effect a case stated. The cases are rightly before us. Federal National Bank v. Koppel, 253 Mass. 157, 148 N.E. 379, 40 A.L.R. 1443;Wolbach v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 268 Mass. 365, 167 N.E. 677;Goewey v. Sanborn, 277 Mass. 168, 179 N.E. 237;Merrimac Chemical Co. v. Moore, 279 Mass. 147, 181 N.E. 219;Pesce v. Brecher, Mass., 19 N.E.2d 36.
The city contends that the classification and compensation plans were effective as of January 1, 1931, although they were adopted and approved at a later date and that, as the plaintiffs had then not been appointed regular court officers, their salaries were properly established by the plans at the minimum rate for those who first entered the service subsequently to January 1, 1931.
St. 1930, c. 400, was entitled ‘An Act relative to the compensation of certain officers and employees whose compensation is paid in whole from county funds, and of registers and assistant registers of probate.’ Its fifth section provided for the establishment of a county personnel board and for the classification of county salaries, offices and positions, and amended G.L. c. 35 by inserting therein nine new sections, being sections 48-56, inclusive. The issue in the present cases depends upon the interpretation of sections 8 and 9 of said c. 400, which read as follows: ...
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