McQueen v. EMC Plastic Company
| Decision Date | 04 June 1969 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 1838. |
| Citation | 302 F. Supp. 881 |
| Parties | Mrs. Effie McQUEEN v. E. M. C. PLASTIC COMPANY. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
C. B. Bunkley, Jr., Dallas, Tex., for plaintiff.
George W. Hart, Atlanta, Ga., Paul Brown, Sherman, Tex., for defendant.
JUSTICE, District Judge.
This is a suit in which the plaintiff, a negro woman, seeks injunctive relief and damages against the defendant, E.M.C. Plastic Company of Denton County, Texas, for alleged violations of her civil rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, Title 42, U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.1. Specifically, she alleges that the defendant unlawfully discriminated against her in its hiring practices by reason of both her race and her sex.
On October 14, 1965, plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,2 wherein she asserted that defendant employed no negro females. After investigation of the charge, the EEOC, in a decision dated August 10, 1966, found reasonable cause to believe that defendant was in violation of Section 703(a) of the Act, Title 42, U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), which, inter alia, prohibits limitation of employment opportunities because of race or sex.
In a letter dated August 18, 1966, the EEOC notified plaintiff of its inability to obtain from defendant voluntary compliance with the Act, and of her right to bring an action against the defendant in the appropriate federal district court within thirty days of the receipt of the letter. In addition, the letter advised plaintiff of her right to make application to the court for the appointment of counsel, as authorized by Title 42, U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). The letter was received by plaintiff on August 23, 1966. On September 13, 1966, the plaintiff appeared at the office of the United States District Clerk at Sherman, Texas, and informed the Deputy United States District Clerk of her desire to institute suit in the United States District Court and to secure appointment of an attorney to represent her. At the same time, the plaintiff executed an affidavit attesting that, because of her poverty, she was unable to pay the costs of the action or to give security therefor.
The Honorable Joe W. Sheehy, then Chief United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Texas, appointed an attorney practicing in Sherman, Texas, as counsel for the plaintiff. The attorney was notified of the appointment in a letter dated September 29, 1966. The letter contains the following language:
"If, after you have looked into this matter, you feel that Mrs. McQueen has a justifiable claim, Mrs. McQueen will be authorized to institute the action without the payment of costs."
The plaintiff promptly met with her appointed attorney. At the time, her attorney's wife was in a terminal condition from cancer, which caused a disruption in his practice and rendered it impossible for him to conduct his legal affairs in the usual way. He notified Judge Sheehy that he did not intend to file an action in plaintiff's behalf, because he did not believe that she had a case. Judge Sheehy died on February 23, 1967. His replacement in office did not qualify until June 29, 1968.
In the meantime, the plaintiff, who was under the erroneous impression that her case had been filed, was urging her appointed attorney "to bring this suit to court." In September of 1967, the attorney suggested that she re-apply for employment with the defendant. The plaintiff complied with the suggestion, but she was again rejected for employment by defendant.
In October of 1967, the plaintiff wrote a letter to the State Bar of Texas, seeking assistance in procuring her appointed attorney to act for her. No response was made by the State Bar to her request for this assistance. The plaintiff then, by a letter dated January 29, 1968, requested advice from the EEOC as to what course she should pursue. In reply, the Acting Director of Compliance of the EEOC wrote to the plaintiff, on March 1, 1968, and informed her that the EEOC was powerless to take further action in the matter. He suggested that, if the plaintiff felt that she had not received proper consideration and representation by her attorney, she should "personally call this fact to the attention of the court." There is nothing in the record to reveal whether plaintiff made this effort.
Title 28, U.S.C. § 133, provides that there shall be two United States district judgeships in the Eastern District of Texas. However, the Honorable Joe J. Fisher was, at the time in question, the only surviving United States district judge in the district, which consists of forty-one counties, divided into six divisions. The Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for 1967 reveals that the Eastern District of Texas had the fourth heaviest weighted caseload per judgeship among all the United States district courts. Accordingly, it is manifest that plaintiff's opportunity to have established communication with Judge Fisher, or for Judge Fisher to have maturely considered her problem, would have been minimal at best.
On September 10, 1968, at the behest of the plaintiff, the Deputy United States District Clerk at Sherman discussed the case with the appointed attorney, who stated that he would "begin litigation on the case by the end of next week." Still beset by the lingering illness of his wife, the attorney failed to file the suit.3
On October 23, 1968, apparently in response to a request from the plaintiff, Lee G. Williams, Regional Director of the EEOC, spoke on the telephone with the appointed counsel. In the conversation, he learned that the attorney had not filed suit for the plaintiff. On October 30, 1968, Mr. Williams wrote to the plaintiff and suggested that she get another attorney to represent her. On December 2, 1968, Mr. Williams conversed by telephone with plaintiff's present attorney relating to the case. On January 29, 1969, the suit was finally filed.
It should be added that the author of this opinion, who succeeded Judge Sheehy in office, was wholly unaware of the situation here involved until the filing of defendant's motion to dismiss.
The motion in question contends that this court lacks jurisdiction over this case, on the ground that plaintiff did not satisfy the 30-day statute of limitations set forth in Section 706(e) of the Act. That section, in relevant part, reads as follows:
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Earnestine Hill v. Windows
...843, 848 (5th Cir.2002). In addition, a court may toll a deadline if the delay arises from the act of the court. McQueen v. E.M.C. Plastic Co., 302 F.Supp. 881 (E.D.Tex.1969) (citing the remedial public purpose of Title VII and allowing a Title VII action to proceed when the judge's death a......
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