McQueen v. State, No. A08-1978 (Minn. App. 12/15/2009)

Decision Date15 December 2009
Docket NumberNo. A08-1978.,A08-1978.
PartiesCatherine Renee McQueen, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
CourtMinnesota Court of Appeals

Appeal from the District Court, Anoka County, File No. 02-K9-06-010765.

Marie L. Wolf, Interim Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael W. Kunkel, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, (for appellant).

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Stoney Hiljus, Coon Rapids City Attorney, David J. Brodie, Assistant City Attorney, Coon Rapids, MN (for respondent).

Considered and decided by Wright, Presiding Judge; Kalitowski, Judge; and Stoneburner, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

KALITOWSKI, Judge.

Appellant Catherine Renee McQueen challenges the district court's denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea, arguing that the district court abused its discretion because her plea was not voluntarily or intelligently entered. We affirm.

DECISION

Appellant pleaded guilty to third-degree driving while impaired, in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(1) and 169A.26, subds. 1(a), (2) (2006). Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant was sentenced to one year in the Anoka County jail, stayed, with 15 days executed on home electronic monitoring. Shortly after sentencing, appellant filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea. The district court denied appellant's motion.

District courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea, and a reviewing court will reverse only if the district court abused its discretion. Barragan v. State, 583 N.W.2d 571, 572 (Minn. 1998). In deciding whether there was an abuse of discretion, this court must consider all the facts and circumstances that formed the basis of the district court's determination. State v. Hayes, 276 Minn. 384, 386, 150 N.W.2d 552, 553-54 (1967). We will sustain the district court's findings if they are supported by sufficient evidence in the record. Williams v. State, 760 N.W.2d 8, 11 (Minn. App. 2009). When credibility determinations are crucial, "a reviewing court will give deference to the primary observations and trustworthiness assessments made by the district court." State v. Aviles-Alvarez, 561 N.W.2d 523, 527 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. June 11, 1997).

A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea once it is entered. Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 685 (Minn. 1997). But Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1, provides that any time before or after sentencing, a court shall allow withdrawal of a guilty plea "upon a timely motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice." A manifest injustice exists where the plea was not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Perkins, 559 N.W.2d at 688. "The voluntariness requirement insures that the guilty plea is not in response to improper pressures or inducements; and the intelligent requirement insures that the defendant understands the charges, his or her rights under the law, and the consequences of pleading guilty." Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Minn. 1998). Withdrawal is not warranted if the defendant understood the nature and seriousness of the offense charged at the time of pleading. Perkins, 559 N.W.2d at 689.

Voluntariness

We reject appellant's argument that because she felt ill and dizzy at the plea hearing, feared the onset of a seizure, and pleaded guilty so that she could take care of her health, her plea was not voluntary. In Perkins, the defendant asserted that because his ears were seriously infected, his temperature was at 102 degrees, and he was feeling "miserable," he hastily pleaded guilty in order to leave the jail and receive better medical care at a state facility. 559 N.W.2d at 690. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the argument that defendant's plea was not voluntary or intelligent, noting that he received appropriate medical care in jail, he stated that he was competent to understand the proceedings at the time of the hearing, and he had opportunities to express any concerns regarding his health or the guilty plea. Id. at 691. See also Williams, 760 N.W.2d at 14 (rejecting appellant's argument that her plea was involuntary due to depression, stress, and being rushed).

Here, the evidence in the record supports the district court's finding that appellant's plea was voluntary. According to the testimony of appellant's attorney at the plea hearing, the attorney met with appellant three separate times throughout the day of the plea, including "for the entire noon hour." Appellant had multiple opportunities to inform her attorney or the district court that she was not feeling well, that she did not understand what was going on, or that she felt she had no meaningful choice. See Perkins, 559 N.W.2d at 691 (noting that appellant did not tell the court or his attorney at any point that he did not understand what was going on, nor did he "express any concerns regarding his health and the guilty plea").

Moreover, during the plea colloquy, appellant stated that she was voluntarily entering a plea, was "clearheaded," and that she believed her attorney "did a good job." Appellant's signed plea petition also stated that she was pleading voluntarily, that she had not been ill recently, and that she had the option of pleading not guilty and proceeding to trial.

Significantly, the district court concluded the withdrawal hearing by recalling that the negotiation of appellant...

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