McQuistion v. City of Clinton

• Decision Date: 24 December 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–0413.,14–0413.
• Citation: 872 N.W.2d 817
• Parties: Karen McQUISTION, Appellant, v. CITY OF CLINTON, Iowa; Mark Regenwether; Jeffrey Farwell; and Jeffrey Horne, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

872 N.W.2d 817

Karen McQUISTION, Appellant,

v.CITY OF CLINTON, Iowa; Mark Regenwether; Jeffrey Farwell; and Jeffrey Horne, Appellees.

No. 14–0413.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 24, 2015.

Roxanne Barton Conlin of Roxanne Conlin & Associates, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Cynthia Sueppel of Scheldrup Blades Schrock Smith P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellees.

Thomas J. Duff of Duff Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, Kodi A. Brotherson of Becker & Brotherson Law Firm, Sac City, Katie A. Ervin Carlson of Babich Goldman P.C., Des Moines, and Emily E. McCarty of Fiedler & Timmer, P.L.L.C., Urbandale, for amicus curiae Iowa Association for Justice.

CADY, Chief Justice.

In this case, we are presented with the question whether a city discriminates under the Iowa Civil Rights Act and the Iowa Constitution by refusing to accommodate a pregnant employee with light duties when requested due to her pregnancy. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, City of Clinton and three of its employees, finding as a matter of law no discrimination had occurred. On our review, we adapt our test for the evaluation of pregnancy discrimination claims and remand the case to the district court to consider the statutory civil rights claim under this new standard. We conclude the undisputed material facts of this case do not support equal protection and due process claims under the Iowa Constitution. Accordingly, we affirm the district court in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Karen McQuistion is employed as an engineer and paramedic for the City of Clinton fire department. She was a ten-year veteran of the department during the events in question. She began as a firefighter in 2001 and was promoted to her current position in 2008.

In May 2011, McQuistion informed Fire Chief Mark Regenwether she was pregnant. McQuistion was in the early stages of pregnancy at the time. She requested light-duty assignments for the duration of her pregnancy. The requested accommodation was based solely on her pregnancy and the nature of her job and not on any underlying pregnancy-related medical condition amounting to disability.

The City of Clinton maintained an administrative policy governing light-duty assignments. The policy described the circumstances when light duty was available to employees, generally authorizing light duty for employees who had been injured on the job and were eligible for workers' compensation benefits. This policy controlled light-duty assignments unless it conflicted with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Under a collective bargaining agreement between police officers and the City, a police officer who becomes pregnant is entitled to light-duty assignments. The fire department's collective bargaining agreement did not contain a clause expanding light-duty assignments beyond the policy either to pregnant employees or any other employees suffering temporary disabilities resulting from off-the-job events.

The light-duty policy of the City defined light duty as "modified work for employees injured on the job unable to temporarily return to their regular classification." It is work for an employee "who can return to work but is not yet physically capable of fulfilling the work normally assigned."¹ The policy articulates four benefits of light duty:

a. Getting an employee back to the workplace as soon as possible after an on-the-job injury when there is not a risk to him/her and others;

b. Minimizing financial hardship and emotional stress to an employee injured on the job;

c. Retaining qualified and experienced workers;

d. Minimizing cost of workers' compensation and other related programs.

Light duty generally involves the modification of the worker's normal job duties. For a firefighter, this means conducting inspections, fire prevention duties, training assignments, and other duties that do not include the emergency response requirements of the job. These duties can be performed independent of the normal physical requirements for fire department employees. The normal job duties for an engineer and paramedic in the fire department include:

1. Responding to emergency fire incidents.

2. Responding to emergency rescue incidents.

3. Responding to hazardous materials incidents.

4. Responding to emergency medical incidents.

5. Responding to emergency airport incidents.

6. Performing required training tasks.

7. Performing required maintenance tasks.

8. Performing Fire Prevention and Public Education Assignments.

Fire Chief Regenwether denied McQuistion's request for a light-duty assignment. He determined she was not entitled to light duty under the city administrative policy because she did not have a disabling injury that occurred on the job.

McQuistion continued to perform her regular job duties as an engineer and paramedic for the fire department after her request for light duty was denied. In June, Fire Chief Regenwether met with city officials in an effort to provide an accommodation for McQuistion, without success. The city officials who participated in this meeting and the decision to deny the request included Jeffrey Farwell, the city attorney, and Jeffrey Horne, the city administrator.

By the end of September, McQuistion's pregnancy had advanced to the point that she was no longer able to perform her required emergency-response duties safely and her protective uniform no longer fit her. Her doctor recommended she stop performing her regular duties. As a result, McQuistion took a leave of absence from work by using accrued vacation and sick leave time. She was paid during this time period. Once she exhausted the vacation and sick leave, however, her leave of absence was unpaid. McQuistion gave birth in January 2012. She returned to her job as an engineer and paramedic for the fire department in March.

McQuistion brought a lawsuit against the City of Clinton and the individuals who participated in the decision to deny her light duty (collectively referred to as the City). She alleged pregnancy discrimination under Iowa Code section 216.6(2), a violation of her equal protection rights under article I, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution, and a violation of her due process rights under article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution. The City moved for summary judgment. It asserted McQuistion was not entitled to an accommodation as a matter of law. It claimed the action of the City in denying light-work accommodations was not discriminatory under the Iowa Civil Rights Act and the Iowa Constitution because all fire department employees with nonwork-related disabilities were denied light-duty work. It also claimed the actions of the City did not violate the due process clause of the Iowa Constitution.

The district court found McQuistion was unable to show an inference of discrimination under the Iowa Civil Rights Act because the City policy denies light work to both pregnant employees and nonpregnant disabled employees who are not injured on the job. It found the undisputed facts of the case failed to establish pregnancy discrimination under the Iowa Civil Rights Act or the Iowa Constitution. It found the policy of the City treated all employees who were not granted separate rights under a collective bargaining agreement the same. It also found the policy did not impinge upon McQuistion's fundamental right to procreate. McQuistion appealed.

II. Standard of Review.

We review district court summary judgment rulings for corrections of errors at law. Goodpaster v. Schwan's Home Serv., Inc., 849 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2014). Summary judgment is properly granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. We construe the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. However, to survive a motion for summary judgment, sufficient facts must be in the record to support the claim that a reasonable fact finder could find in the nonmoving party's favor. See Smidt v. Porter, 695 N.W.2d 9, 15 (Iowa 2005).

Statutory interpretation is reviewed for errors at law. State v. Romer, 832 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 2013). "If the statute is capable of being construed in more than one way, one of which is constitutional, we must adopt the constitutional construction." Hensler v. City of Davenport, 790 N.W.2d 569, 578 (Iowa 2010). Our review of constitutional claims is de novo. State v. Groves, 742 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Iowa 2007).

III. Statutory Analysis.

The Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965 makes it an unfair or discriminatory practice for any person to discriminate in employment against an employee based on various classifications, including the "sex ... or disability of such ... employee." Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a ) (2011).² In the early years following the enactment, claims involving discrimination based on pregnancy emerged in several cases, even though pregnancy was not specifically mentioned in the Act as a protected classification. In 1975, we held that pregnancy constituted a temporary disability and concluded an employment policy that failed to treat pregnant employees in the same manner as disabled employees regarding the imposition and use of leave constituted sex discrimination under the Act. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Parr, 227 N.W.2d 486, 493, 495–96 (Iowa 1975) (finding the employment policy discriminated under the Act because it imposed special restrictions on pregnant employees that did not apply to employees with other conditions). We subsequently reiterated this position on two occasions in 1978, rejecting as discriminatory in both cases employment policies that excluded pregnancy from benefits provided for employees disabled from nonwork injuries. See Franklin Mfg. Co. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 270 N.W.2d 829, 834 (Iowa 1978) (rejecting a group insurance plan that did not cover pregnancy because it was not an illness or injury); Quaker Oats Co. v. Cedar Rapids Human Rights Comm'n, 268 N.W.2d 862, 864, 867 (Io...