MCR FUNDING v. CMG Funding Corp., 4D99-1139.
Decision Date | 27 September 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 4D99-1139.,4D99-1139. |
Citation | 771 So.2d 32 |
Parties | MCR FUNDING and Mortgage Capital Resource Corporation, Appellants, v. CMG FUNDING CORP., a Delaware corporation, Donna A. Alexis, Crystal Carter, Donn Gardner, Mark S. Gray, Ann M. Hinton, Harold J. Hoodwin, Marlene L. Jaime, Rosalia E. Johnson, Gary D. Lester, Richard P. Mank, John S. Monroe, Mondany Phem And Kim Stanley, Appellees. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
June G. Hoffman and Steven E. Stark of Fowler, White, Burnett, Hurley, Banick & Strickroot, P.A., Miami, for appellants.
Jack J. Aiello and Meenu T. Sasser of Gunster, Yoakley, Valdes-Fauli & Stewart, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee CMG Funding Corp.
Here, the parties entered into a settlement agreement which was neither filed with the trial court nor specifically approved by order of the court. The litigants then filed a joint stipulation for dismissal pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(a)(1)(B) which contained a provision stating that the trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. Then, just a little more than a month after the voluntary dismissal, both parties filed motions seeking enforcement of the settlement agreement. The trial court ruled on the motions and entered judgment, including a damages award, in favor of the appellee. Appellant now challenges that judgment attacking not only the merits of the trial court's decision, but also suggesting—for the first time on appeal—that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the parties' motions seeking enforcement of the settlement agreement. Because the trial court never lost, and could not lose, subject matter jurisdiction of this case, we reject appellant's jurisdictional argument. On the merits, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
Nothing further appears in the record until December 7, 1998, when CMG filed a motion seeking court enforcement of the terms of the settlement agreement. MCR immediately filed a cross-motion for enforcement. Ultimately, a hearing was held on the motions on March 18, 1999. As the result of a combination of events, MCR appeared without counsel and was, thus, unable to participate in the hearing. Nonetheless, the hearing went forward and, at the conclusion, the trial court found that MCR had breached the settlement agreement and entered judgment in favor of CMG. MCR now appeals, raising a number of issues, including an allegation that, following the 1.420(a)(1)(B) voluntary dismissal, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the motion to enforce the settlement agreement. It is this issue—the trial court's alleged lack of subject matter jurisdiction—that we first address.
The settlement dilemma
On some occasions, as in the instant case, settlement is reached, and dismissal is later achieved by the parties without an order of court pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420.1 See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Walker, 401 So.2d 1147, 1149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
. When this is the route taken and the parties have neither presented the settlement agreement to the judge nor obtained an order of dismissal predicated upon the same, a party will not be able to obtain enforcement of the settlement agreement by simply filing a motion in the now-dismissed case if one of the other parties to the agreement objects. By voluntarily dismissing their suit, the litigants have removed their dispute from the judge's consideration. And, under this scenario, the trial court may not rely on its inherent power to enforce its own orders since there is no judgment or order for the court to enforce. In this instance, the parties would ordinarily have to pursue a new breach of contract action to enforce the settlement agreement. See Eye & Ear Sales & Serv. Co. v. Lamela, 636 So.2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Buonopane v. Ricci, 603 So.2d 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
Here, the parties availed themselves of this latter method of ending the suit, filing a voluntary dismissal while neither presenting their settlement to the judge nor obtaining an order of dismissal. The filing of the voluntary dismissal terminated the trial court's "case" jurisdiction. "Case" jurisdiction is the "power of the court over a particular case that is within its subject matter jurisdiction." See T.D. v. K.D., 747 So.2d 456, 457 n. 2 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
. If MCR had objected below to CMG's filing a motion to enforce settlement, it could have prevented the trial court from exercising any further "jurisdiction" in the dismissed case and could have required CMG to litigate the breach of the settlement agreement in a new lawsuit. See Eye & Ear Sales & Serv. Co.; Buonopane. However, not only did MCR not object to the trial court considering CMG's motion to enforce the settlement agreement, MCR filed its own motion asking the court to enforce the agreement. Thus, having willingly submitted itself, and the dispute, to the court's authority, MCR may not for the first time on appeal challenge the court's power to decide the issue.
review denied, 519 So.2d 986 (Fla.1987); see also Parker v. Parker, 553 So.2d 309, 311 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Subject matter jurisdiction "concerns the power of the trial court to deal with a class of cases to which a particular case belongs." Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 630 So.2d 179, 181 (Fla.1994)(citing Lovett v. Lovett, 93 Fla. 611, 112 So. 768 (1927)).
"[Subject matter] [j]urisdiction," in the strict meaning of the term, as applied to judicial officers and tribunals, means no more than the power lawfully existing to hear and determine a cause. It is the power lawfully conferred to deal with the general subject involved in the action.
Cunningham, 630 So.2d at 181 (quoting Malone v. Meres, 91 Fla. 709, 725, 109 So. 677, 683 (1926)); see also Bell v. Kornblatt, 705 So.2d 113, 114 (Fla. 4th DCA)
() (citations omitted), review denied, 717 So.2d 528 (Fla.1998). Clearly, the trial court has the power to hear cases concerning breach of a contract. Thus, it cannot be subject matter jurisdiction that is lacking.2
In sum, while there may have been procedural improprieties in the manner in which the parties brought their allegations of breach of the settlement...
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