McRae v. Merrifield
Decision Date | 15 January 1887 |
Citation | 2 S.W. 780,48 Ark. 160 |
Parties | MCREA ET AL. v. MERRIFIELD ET AL |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
APPEAL from Clay Circuit Court, Hon. W. H. CATE, Judge.
Judgment affirmed.
E. F Brown, for appellant.
1. A fair interpretation of the contract shows that the title passed to Erwin & Nesbit, plaintiffs reserving only a security in the nature of a mortgage, which, not being recorded, was void as against appellants. The proof shows that plaintiff never relied on the condition reserving title but that the delivery was unconditional, and a complete sale. The evidence also required a showing of solvency on the part of the vendees, and looked to other property than the machinery for the security of the notes. The contract is also indorsed: "Paid by notes."
2. No demand was made in this case before suit. (17 Ind. 90; 54 ib., 58.) Vendors cannot assail title as against a bona fide purchaser where he has been guilty of laches. 36 Mo. 497.
3. Where one voluntarily places personal property in the hands of a purchaser, and thus makes him the ostensible owner, a sale by the latter to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, will be valid to pass the title, although the sale by the owner was on condition of payment for what has not been performed. 5 N.Y. 41; 6 Johns, 437; 37 Barb., 509; 6 Drew, 238; 36 N.Y. 497; 30 Ark. 403; 2 Kent's Com., 6th Ed., 496-7; 77 N.Y. 391; 15 N.Y. 409; 26 ib., 598; 6 Duer., 238; 21 Ill. 330; 25 Barb., 483; 6 Pick. 262; 4 ib., 516; 13 Ill. 614; 8 Wend. 256; 2 Sanders, 47; 4 Wash. C. C., 594; 37 Ill. 370; 24 ib., 591; 46 ib., 487; 68 Ill. 553; 13 ib., 610; 21 ib., 330; 88 ib., 190; 14 S. & R., 214; 5 ib., 286; 10 ib., 419; 4 Watts, 121; 64 Penn., 501; 1 Barr., 190; 8 Wright, 451; 3 Brewster, 548; 2 Grant, 248.
4. Taking the personal guarantee, indorsed upon the notes and contract, extinguished the plaintiff's vendor's lien, and enabled the vendees to pass a good title to an innocent purchaser.
F. G. Taylor, for appellees.
1. Demand was not necessary. 35 Ark. 169.
The contract itself shows that the title was reserved, and that it was a conditional sale. In such a case the rights of the vendors is preferred to those of even an innocent purchaser. Andrews v. Cox, 42 Ark. 473; McIntosh v. Hill, 47 Ark. 363.
The appellees (the plaintiffs below) brought an action of replevin against the appellants to recover possession of an engine, a saw mill and a lot of tools, etc. A jury being waived, the court found the facts as follows:
Judgement was entered for the plaintiffs.
1. CONDITIONAL SALE: Title: Right of vendor.
The correct determination of this case depends altogether upon the construction that must be given to the contract entered into between the plaintiffs and Erwin & Nisbet, from whom the appellants purchased. If that contract was, in fact, a conditional sale, the title to the property remained in the plaintiffs, unless the condition was performed or waived, and Erwin & Nisbet could transfer no better title, even to an innocent purchaser, than they themselves had. This we have ruled at the present term (McIntosh v. Hill, 47 Ark. 363, 1 S.W. 680), and since the decision, the Supreme Court of the United States, upon an exhaustive review of the authorities, have reached a like conclusion. (Harkness v. Russell & Co., 7 S.Ct. 50.) If, on the other hand, the title passed by the contract, and the plaintiffs have, as it is argued, reserved only a security in the nature of a mortgage, then the purchasers from their vendees took the property freed from this claim because under our law a mortgage is void as against strangers, unless acknowledged or proved and filed for record. The contract, as far as it is material to this question, is as follows:
2. Mortgage or conditional sale: Construction.
Reservation of title.
If we look alone to that provision of the contract which reserves the title or ownership of the property to the vendors, it is evident that it was the intent of the parties not to make an absolute sale and purchase, but only an agreement to sell on the one hand and purchase on the other, upon the condition that the notes described were paid at maturity. The meaning is plain, and the language admits of no other construction.
Promise to give mortgage.
It is argued, however, that the previous provision looking to the execution of a mortgage by the intended purchaser is inconsistent with the plaintiff's ownership, and is itself a recognition of title in Erwin & Nisbet. If a mortgage had been actually executed this would undoubtedly be true, or if the clause were itself a mortgage, the argument would be well founded, for a contract is to be judged by its substance and not by the name that the parties may choose to give it. But all the provisions of a contract are to be construed together, so that if possible they may all harmonize.
Now, a suggestion or even a stipulation by Erwin & Nisbet that they would give a mortgage is not of itself necessarily a mortgage. As was said in Barnett v. Mason, 7 Ark 253: ...
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