McRae v. People
| Decision Date | 21 March 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. 17467,17467 |
| Parties | Leonard McRAE, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Cook, Ryan & Shea, Denver, for plaintiff in error.
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.
Leonard McRae was charged with the crime of aggravated robbery. Upon arraignment he entered a plea of not guilty; was tried to a jury, which found him guilty as charged, and was by the court sentenced to serve a term in the state penitentiary. He brings the cause to our Court by writ of error seeking a reversal of the judgment.
It is disclosed by the record that the Safeway store at Loveland, Colorado, was, on March 27, 1953, closed shortly after 8 o'clock P.M., and as the last employee was leaving he was accosted by two armed gunmen who inquired of him if he had the keys to the store. Upon being informed that the employee did not have the keys, he was directed to accompany the armed gunmen to the house of another employee who had the keys to the store and the safe. The two Safeway store employees then were ordered to precede the gunmen to the Safeway store and were there compelled to unlock the doors of the store and the safe. The gunmen searched one of the employees, took his money, but it was returned to him later, and the two employees were told that if they did as directed they would not be harmed; otherwise they would be the first to 'get it.' One compartment of the safe was unlocked by one of the employees, but the other compartment was broken into, and all of the contents of the two compartments were taken by the armed gunmen, who left the Safeway store after having chained the two employees together. During the entire period the gunmen wore nylon stockings as masks.
The employees telephoned police officers, and shortly thereafter Loveland's chief of police and others came to the store, released the two employees, and made an investigation which disclosed two compartments of the safe in which money was kept were emptied, and they were then advised that the car in which the gunmen had departed was parked in a certain location. Upon investigating they distinctly saw the tire marks of one wheel of the gunmen's car.
On the morning of April 2, 1953, defendant was arrested in Englewood, Colorado, and taken to the Denver police headquarters, where he was questioned concerning the Safeway store robbery by William E. Flor, captain of detectives, and other Denver police officers. When defendant was arrested he had in his possession a bank money order for $650, dated March 31, 1953, and $68 in currency. No search of defendant's home in Englewood was made by the arresting officers.
Captain Flor testified that he questioned defendant about the Safeway store robbery, and he denied participation therein; denied that he owned a gun; that he had in his possession narcotics or was an addict; when asked about the $650 bank money order and the currency he had in his possession at the time of his arrest, he replied that it was money which he had earned when he was confined in the State Penitentiary at Canon City. Upon this answer being made, defendant's counsel moved for a mistrial, and after hearing counsel on this motion in chambers and out of the presence of the jury, it was denied.
Subsequently, defendant, upon being questioned as to the source of the money in his possession, and particularly that used in the purchase of the bank money order, he replied that his sister had sent him $1,000 after he was released, and that that was used in purchasing the money order. Upon being questioned again about the bank money order and the cash which he had on his person at the time of the arrest, he said a man on Seventeenth street had given him $750 with which to go into the television business, but that he didn't know the man's last name but could find him if released for that purpose.
On the morning of April 3, 1953, defendant again was question by Captain Flor in regard to his possession of a gun, and, in the presence of defendant's wife, he admitted that he had a .38 automatic type gun, and this, according to the People's witnesses, was the type of gun used by one of the two gunmen in the Safeway store robbery. Defendant explained that he had purchased a gun from an ex-convict, but refused to disclose the name of the man because it would get him into trouble. At a later questioning of defendant he stated that he knew a man who was involved in the Safeway store robbery and would produce him if released for that purpose.
Defendant stated to Captain Flor that the leader of the two men who robbed the Safeway store was one whose initials were J. G. and that the second man was unknown to him; that J. G. received $1,700 for his share of the robbery, and that the other man received $1,300.
Just before defendant was released to the custody of the sheriff of Larimer county, he stated to Captain Flor and Sheriff Barger that he did not want to return to Fort Collins and would prefer being tried in Denver. He stated that he had 'pulled' the Howark Pharmacy job, but that being outside of the Denver jurisdiction, he did not care to further talk about it.
Other police officers were called to testify to conversations held with McRae, and corroborated Captain Flor's testimony in many respects, although they were not present at all of the questioning between the captain and defendant.
Sheriff Barger, of Larimer county, took possession of defendant's Hudson automobile and made a plaster paris cast of the tire on the wheel that had left a mark when it was driven by the gunmen from the place parked during the robbery. The imprint on the roadway was called to the attention of Sheriff Barger and the chief of police on the night of the robbery, but no photograph or cast was taken thereof because of the shallowness of the print. The plaster paris cast was offered in evidence, and admitted after the sheriff had identified it as a cast of the particular wheel on defendant's automobile, and after the chief of police had testified that the cast was of a tire similar to the one which he had carefully observed on the night of the robbery.
The two Safeway store employees were called to Denver on April 4th and were present at a police 'line-up,' at which time they identified defendant as one of the robbers. At the trial they testified that he was one of the men who participated in the robbery and that the gun, which defendant admitted he owned, was similar to the gun used by one of the gunmen in the robbery.
Defendant's employer was called as a witness and testified that defendant had been working as a commissioned...
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